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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the relationship between family ownership and the value-
relevance of accounting information. While the value-relevance of accounting 
information has been widely explored, the research in this area has focused on the 
traditional agency context of widely held firms, and has overlooked the distinct agency 
context of family ownership. To address this significant gap in the prior research, this 
thesis extends the value-relevance literature to consider the impact of family ownership, 
a distinct agency context that is the predominant business structure in the world and 
represents a substantial portion of listed firms.  
The theoretical development of this thesis proposes that the value-relevance of 
accounting information is moderated by its qualitative characteristics, specifically by its 
faithful representation and relevance. These propositions are based on the normative 
theory derived from the accounting standards and from positive theories developed 
through research. This thesis proposes that family ownership is indirectly related to the 
value-relevance of accounting information, through its relationships to the two 
moderators faithful representation and relevance, which are operationalized as 
accounting information quality and unidentifiable intangible assets.   
 This thesis uses listed firms on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) to test the 
formulated hypotheses. The relationship between family ownership and accounting 
information quality is tested using established earnings management models. An 
experimental variable is developed to estimate unidentifiable intangible assets. This 
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variable and its estimation is based upon prior research in related areas that uses Tobin’s 
q to measure intangibility. To investigate the relationship between family-ownership 
and the value-relevance of accounting information, a levels based value-relevance 
model is used to capture the value-relevance of both earnings and book value. 
This thesis finds that family ownership is positively related to the qualitative 
characteristics of accounting information, specifically accounting information quality 
and unidentifiable intangibles. The increase in information quality is in addition to the 
positive effects of governance mechanisms such as block holders and independent audit 
committees. This suggests that family-owned firms provide accounting information of 
higher quality, and implies that the agency benefits outweigh any potential agency costs 
that may arise due to family ownership. Family ownership is also positively related to 
the level of unidentifiable intangible assets within a firm. This supports prior research 
that has suggested that family ownership is related to the accumulation of unidentifiable 
intangible assets, such as social and human capital.  Furthermore, both accounting 
information quality and unidentifiable intangible assets are found to be value-relevant. 
Firms that report accounting information of higher quality are valued more highly on 
their earnings, and less on their book value. Furthermore, firms that hold a large amount 
of unidentifiable intangible assets are valued at higher Price/Earnings and Price/Book 
Value multiples. This suggests that the market recognizes the omission of these 
unidentifiable intangible assets in financial statements. Overall, based on these findings, 
family ownership has a positive influence on the value-relevance of accounting 
information through its positive influence on accounting information quality and 
unidentifiable intangible assets. 
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This thesis investigates the relationship between family ownership and the value-
relevance of accounting information. Research has largely overlooked the notion that 
family ownership may be related to the value-relevance of accounting information, 
despite the fact that family-owned firms are the predominant business structure in the 
world (La Porta et al., 1999). Existing value-relevance research has focused on the 
traditional agency context of widely held firms (Ayers, 1998; Barth et al., 1998a; 
Collins et al., 1997; Dechow et al., 1999; Ohlson & Penman, 1992). However, family 
ownership is a distinct agency context and its relationship to the value-relevance of 
accounting information is an unexplored empirical issue. This thesis uses the normative 
theory found in the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) conceptual 
framework in exploring and explaining the relationship between family ownership and 
the value-relevance of accounting information. According to the conceptual framework, 
the value-relevance of accounting information is dependent upon the qualitative 
characteristics that it possesses. This thesis proposes that family ownership impacts the 
qualitative characteristics of accounting information, and that these qualitative 
characteristics in turn impact the value-relevance of that information. Consequently, the 
proposed relationship, depicted in Figure 1-1, is of an indirect nature. 
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Figure 1-1 Overview of theoretical links 
 
 
This relationship, and gap in research, is important to address as the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) states that one of the primary objectives of 
financial statements is to provide equity investors with decision-useful information. As 
value-relevance research is the empirical test for the decision-usefulness of information 
(Barth et al., 2001) an important research question is whether the predominant business 
structure in the world has an impact on value-relevance and thus usefulness of 
accounting information. 
This chapter provides an introduction to this thesis by firstly exploring the concept 
of value-relevance and how the qualitative characteristics of information impacts its 
usefulness for valuation purposes. Then, an overview of family-owned firms and their 
distinct nature is provided to justify the inquiry into this specific agency context. Next, 
the primary research question for this thesis is presented; it aims to test the theoretical 
links between family ownership and the value-relevance of accounting information. 
Based on this research question and the scope of this thesis, the contribution to research, 
education, and practice are explored. Finally, the structure of this thesis is provided. 
Value- 
Relevance 
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1.1 VALUE-RELEVANCE OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION 
Value-relevance research aims to determine if information is used by investors in 
the valuation process and is the empirical test for decision-usefulness of accounting 
information (Barth et al., 2001). In essence, this body of research investigates the 
statistical association between accounting information and firm value. If accounting 
information is used in the valuation process then we would expect there to be a high 
association between the accounting information and firm value, as exemplified in 
Figure 1-2, thus deeming the information as value-relevant (Barth et al., 2001). 
Figure 1-2 Value-relevance of accounting information 
Accounting 
Information
Firm Value
 
Early value-relevance research focused on the two primary accounting measures 
of earnings and book value (Ayers, 1998; Barth et al., 1998a; Collins et al., 1997; 
Dechow et al., 1999; Ohlson & Penman, 1992). The research  has found that while both 
are value-relevant their individual importance varies based on the state of the firm 
(Kothari, 2001). Barth et al. (1998a) find that the value-relevance of book value is 
dependent on the financial health of a firm. As the financial health deteriorates, the 
explanatory power of book value for market value increases. Conversely, the opposite 
effect is found for the earnings figure, as the authors find a positive relationship 
between its explanatory power and financial health (Barth et al., 1998a). The two effects 
highlight the different roles of the income statement and the balance sheet. Dechow et 
al. (1999) provide further support for this notion, finding that book value provides 
additional explanatory power over earnings. 
Overall, the importance and value-relevance of accounting earnings and book 
value has been established over long time periods, with research finding that their 
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explanatory power for market values has been increasing over the past 40 years (Collins 
et al., 1997; Francis & Schipper, 1999).  
 
1.2 QUALITATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF ACCOUNTING 
INFORMATION 
While the value-relevance of earnings and book value are well established, recent 
research has explored how other information characteristics moderate the value-
relevance of earnings and book value, and make them more or less value-relevant 
(Aboody & Lev, 1998; Marquardt & Wiedman, 2004). This research is consistent with 
the IFRS conceptual framework, which states that the decision-usefulness of 
information is dependent upon its qualitative characteristics. Specifically, it states that 
the two fundamental qualitative characteristics of useful information are faithful 
representation and relevance1. While empirical research has often not explicitly 
mentioned these qualitative characteristics, the issues central to the empirical work 
addresses these two qualitative characteristics. 
Early value-relevance research assumed that the accounting information is free of 
systematic management bias and that the reported information quality was homogenous 
across firms. However, Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) argue that it is imperative to 
consider accounting information quality when investigating value-relevance of 
accounting information. The views of Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) are consistent 
with agency theory and extensive research into accrual quality, which has shown that 
managers opportunistically manipulate discretionary accruals (Burgstahler & Dichev, 
                                                 
 
1 The term relevance is distinct from value-relevance. Relevance refers to the qualitative characteristic of 
information and that it has predictive or confirmatory value (or both). Value-relevance refers to the 
research that explores statistical associations between information and market value, and is a joint test for 
the qualitative characteristics of relevance and faithful representation (Kothari, 2001). 
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1997; Degeorge et al., 1999). This research, based on agency theory, highlights the 
importance of considering the quality of the information supplied when investigating 
value-relevance. If investors do not perceive the supplied accounting information to be 
trustworthy and unbiased, then it is reasonable to expect that they will find it less useful 
in their decision-making (Marquardt & Wiedman, 2004). This reasoning is in line with 
the IFRS conceptual framework, which states that faithful representation is one of the 
fundamental qualitative characteristics of useful information. In other words, if 
information does not faithfully represent the underlying economic phenomena then its 
usefulness is diminished.    
Furthermore, the IFRS conceptual framework states that relevance is also a 
fundamental qualitative characteristic of useful information. Information is considered 
relevant if it is capable of impacting the decisions of users, thus having predictive or 
confirmatory value (or both) for users. The issue of relevance and its potential loss has 
been highlighted in research that surrounds intangible assets, and specifically the 
intangible assets that are not included in financial statements and thus classified as 
unidentifiable (Cañibano et al., 2000). Lev and Zarowin (1999) document a 
deterioration of the value-relevance of accounting information over the past 20 years. 
The authors attribute the loss in value-relevance to the shortcomings of the accounting 
standards to account for intangible assets. The failure to do so has made financial 
information less accurate in the portrayal of the underlying economic reality of the firm, 
thus becoming less relevant for decision-makers. The concerns of Lev and Zarowin 
(1999) are shared by others, who suggest that we have moved to a knowledge economy, 
where tangible assets are becoming less important and that the primary source of value 
stems from the intangible assets in the economy (Goldfinger, 1997). The inability to 
account for all intangible assets influences the relevance of book value, as the omission 
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of important assets decreases its predictive and confirmatory value (Barth & Clinch, 
1998). This also has implications for the earnings figure, as expenses associated with 
the creation of these intangible assets are expensed rather than capitalized. According to 
Stewart (1997), the practice of expensing these costs has caused a loss of relevance for 
the earnings measure as well. Furthermore, several studies have shown that the market 
positively values capitalization of intangibles in comparison to immediate expensing 
(Aboody & Lev, 1998; Abrahams & Sidhu, 1998; Lev & Sougiannis, 1996). In other 
words, research indicates that the level of unidentifiable (omitted) intangible assets 
within firms may moderate the usefulness of the accounting information they report. 
In summary, the existing research has highlighted that while there are several 
moderators of value-relevant accounting information; two critical moderators emerge, 
and overlap with the IFRS conceptual framework qualitative characteristics. These are 
(1) accounting information quality and thus the faithful representation of the reported 
accounting information and (2) the level of unidentifiable intangible assets within firms 
and their impact on the relevance of accounting information. Consequently, this thesis 
uses these two issues to explore the pathway for the relationship between family 
ownership and the value-relevance of accounting information. 
 
1.3 FAMILY OWNERSHIP 
Family ownership is a distinct agency context compared to widely held firms, as 
the principal and agent often belong to the same family (McConaughy et al., 2001). As 
accounting literature is often predicated upon the agency relationship, there has been a 
growing interest in family ownership and its impact on accounting practices and 
outcomes (Salvato & Moores, 2010).  Researchers have found that family-owned firms 
have specific agency costs and benefits that impact the performance of the firm 
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(Anderson & Reeb, 2003), the quality of accounting information (Wang, 2006) and the 
level of intangible assets (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). Accordingly, family-owned firms 
present a unique agency setting to explore value-relevance, as these firms have distinct 
practices that have direct implications for the two moderators of value-relevant 
information. 
The importance of family-owned firms as a research context stems from the 
predominance of the business structure and the size of these firms. Family-owned firms 
are the most predominant business structure in the world (La Porta et al., 1999), roughly 
65% to 80% of the world businesses can be deemed as family-owned firms. The 
prevalence of family-owned firms is higher in emerging economies, nevertheless, even 
in developed countries like Australia at least 50% of all businesses are family-owned 
firms (La Porta et al., 1999). Additionally, there is a common misconception that these 
firms are small and thus insignificant to the economy. Family-owned firms contribute 
45% to 70% to a country’s GDP (Schwass, 2005), and roughly a third of all publically 
listed firms in the world are family-owned firms (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Setia-Atmaja 
et al., 2011). These factors together establish the prevalence and the significance of 
family-owned firms in the economy.  
The distinctiveness of family-owned firms is the intermingling between the family 
and the firm. These firms often lack the separation between owners and managers, and 
have a goal of continuity (James, 1999). Furthermore, the return function for a family 
owner is not only comprised of a financial return, but also of an emotional return 
(Astrachan & Jaskiewicz, 2008). The issue of emotional return leads to a series of non-
financial goals for family-owned firms (McConaughy, 1999). While traditional 
economic theory would suggest that pursuing non-financial goals may be detrimental to 
financial performance, the empirical evidence in regards to family-owned firm 
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performance indicates that this may not be true (Hasso & Duncan, 2012). The non-
financial goal of the continuity of the firm and thus the ability to pass it on to the next 
generation may lead to the positive effect of negating the short-termism that is 
detrimental to firms long-term performance (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005; Zahra et 
al., 2004). The capital that the family has invested in the firm is considered patient 
capital. In contrast to a non-family investor, the family will not withdraw the capital if a 
certain financial goal is not met in the short-term (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). This approach 
allows them to have a long-term horizon instead of chasing short-run returns at the 
expense of shareholder wealth. Overall, research has shown that family-owned firms 
provide an interesting research context as the intermingling between the family and the 
firm make them distinct from widely held firms. Furthermore, the distinctiveness of 
family-owned firms has direct implications for the two moderators of value-relevant 
information. 
The primary difference in family-owned firms in relation to accounting 
information quality and the qualitative characteristic of faithful representation is the 
lack of separation between owners and managers. This distinction is important for this 
thesis, as the incentives for managing earnings are not the same as in widely held firms. 
The traditional owner-manager agency conflict, Type I agency problem, is mitigated in 
publically listed family-owned firms (Anderson et al., 2003; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; 
Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Nevertheless, the concentration of ownership and 
management in these firms may lead to Type II agency problems, as the family is able to 
act opportunistically and expropriate wealth from the firm at the expense of minority 
shareholders. Studies assessing these two opposing effects in family-owned firms often 
focus on the relationship between family ownership and accounting information quality 
by using accruals quality as a proxy measure. Prior studies have found conflicting 
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evidence regarding this relationship, with studies from the US showing a positive 
relationship between family ownership and accounting information quality (Ali et al., 
2007; Wang, 2006), while some non-US studies show a negative relationship (Kim & 
Yi, 2006; Prencipe et al., 2008; Yang, 2010). A possible explanation for these mixed 
results is that the studies have used accounting information quality measures that do not 
properly discriminate between accruals arising from the economic fundamentals of the 
firm and accruals arising from earnings management. Consequently, the existing 
evidence regarding the association between family ownership and accounting 
information quality is not conclusive.  
The non-financial goals in family-owned firms also have implications for the level 
of unidentifiable intangible assets within the firm, and in turn the relevance 
characteristic of the earnings and book value measures. Many authors suggest that 
intangible assets are now the primary driver of value in firms (Cañibano et al., 2000; 
Goldfinger, 1997). This development is important to consider in the case of the family-
owned firm, as the nature of the family-owned firm leads to an accumulation of 
intangible assets (Hasso & Duncan, 2012; Miller et al., 2008). The family’s connection 
to the firm impacts decision-making in terms of the horizon, strategy, and governance 
and results in an accumulation of intangible assets in family-owned firms such as social 
capital and human capital (Habbershon & Williams, 1999; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). The 
work in this area is primarily theoretical, but recently, empirical evidence has confirmed 
that family-owned firms place greater importance on social and human capital 
generating activities (Miller et al., 2008). However, information about these 
unidentifiable intangible asset differences is not captured fully under current accounting 
standards and, thus, accounting measures of earnings and book value may be deficient 
in their usefulness for valuation (Lev and Zarowin, 1999). While this deficiency impacts 
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all firms, it is especially important for family-owned firms as research suggests they 
may hold more unidentifiable intangible assets (Hasso & Duncan, 2012). 
In summary, research has explored the nature and distinctiveness of family-owned 
firms. The literature has provided indications that family ownership may impact 
accounting information quality and the level of unidentifiable intangible assets, both of 
which have a potential impact on the value-relevance of accounting information. 
 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTION 
The overarching research question of this thesis is: 
RQ: What is the relationship between family ownership and the value-relevance of 
accounting information? 
The value-relevance of accounting information is moderated by the qualitative 
characteristics that it possesses. Specifically, empirical work indicates that accounting 
information quality and the level of intangible assets within the firm moderate the 
value-relevance of accounting information. Furthermore prior research provides 
indications that family ownership may impact these two moderators. Thus, this thesis 
argues that the relationship between family ownership and the value-relevance of 
accounting information is indirect via the qualities of the accounting information. In 
Chapter 2, the research question is explored in greater detail and the various related 
issues and linkages are discussed further. 
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1.5 CONTRIBUTIONS 
The contribution of this thesis can be separated into three distinct categories;. 
These are: (1) contribution to theory; (2) contribution to practice; (3) and contribution to 
education. 
The theoretical contribution of this thesis is fourfold. First, it provides the 
conceptual underpinnings for how family ownership impacts the value-relevance of 
accounting information, and ultimately how family ownership impacts financial value.  
Second, the empirical work in this thesis adds to the extensive body of knowledge 
within value-relevance research. While extensive, the question of family ownership 
structure has been overlooked. Third, this thesis provides an empirical test for the 
conceptual framework by considering how the qualitative characteristics of relevance 
and faithful representation can be operationalized simultaneously in a joint model. 
Fourth, the empirical work of this thesis adds to the body of knowledge of family-
owned firm research. Using accounting research methodologies, this thesis examines 
whether family ownership in large firms is value adding from the perspective of 
shareholders, and does so in an Australian context. While family-owned firm research is 
a growing area, Australian studies in this area are still rare. This is surprising as 
Australia is a developed economy where there is high investor protection, making it an 
interesting context to study family ownership in listed firms. Furthermore, this thesis 
provides researchers with a multitude of avenues for future research. Specifically, it 
allows future empirical tests of the relationships proposed as well as a basis for 
conceptual extensions of this thesis’ theoretical model.  
The contribution of this thesis to practice is significant to valuers, family-owned 
firm owners, and standard setters. For valuers, this thesis identifies a multitude of issues 
that have to be considered when valuing a family-owned firm. While an overarching 
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solution or valuation model is not intended, the knowledge of the specific issues in 
family-owned firm valuation will allow for more holistic and informed valuations. 
Knowledge of the impact upon the reliability of accounting information reported 
provides an indication of how useful they may be, and if family-owned firms do have a 
different level of unidentifiable intangible assets then that will have to be considered in 
the valuation process. Family-owned firm owners will, on the other hand, be more 
informed about how their involvement adds or detracts from the financial value of the 
firm. Through a deeper understanding of this relationship, family-owned firm owners 
can put value-adding strategies into place. Additionally, it also allows more informed 
decisions to be made at times of divesture. Lastly, this research is of interest to 
standard-setters, as this thesis provides further empirical tests of the shortcomings of 
accounting information, specifically the inability to accurately portray the intangible 
assets of a firm. While research has shown that certain industries have specific issues 
with non-accounted intangible assets, ownership has not been considered a driving 
factor. 
Finally, in regards to education, this thesis contributes to both accounting and 
family business education. For accounting education, and specifically to teaching of 
valuation, this thesis highlights the important role of qualitative issues in valuation. 
Teaching accounting students the nuances of valuation, rather than taking a mechanical 
approach, builds foundations for better future valuations in the marketplace. 
Furthermore, there has been a steady rise in interest in family business education. This 
trend has resulted in standalone subjects and even complete academic programs being 
taught in the field. This thesis enables students to understand how financial value of a 
firm is impacted by family ownership, and allows them to better perform in the future, 
either as consultants or as family-owned firm leaders. 
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1.6 ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature that is important for this thesis. The value-
relevance and family-owned firm literature is reviewed and the links between family 
ownership and value-relevance emerge and are transformed into propositions. 
Chapter 3 provides the research design for this thesis. Specifically, this chapter 
provides the operationalization constructs and propositions that are discussed in Chapter 
2. 
Chapter 4 provides the results of this thesis. Furthermore, the results are subjected 
to robustness testing to ensure they are statistically valid. Additionally, the important 
constructs in this thesis are subjected to sensitivity testing to ensure that the results are 
not sensitive to alternative operationalizations of the constructs. 
Chapter 5 provides the discussion and conclusion for this thesis. Specifically, it 
integrates the theoretical developments with the results and discusses the consistencies 
and inconsistencies of the theory and the empirical results, while taking into account 
prior research evidence. Finally, the limitations, future research opportunities and 
contributions of the findings are presented. 
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This chapter explores the research question and thus the relationship between 
family ownership, accounting information characteristics, and the value-relevance of 
accounting information. It reviews and synthesizes the pertinent prior literature. The 
first section provides an overview of the theoretical links and propositions that are 
presented in this chapter and is a road map for the reader to go through this chapter. The 
second section provides a justification for investigating value-relevance from a 
normative accounting perspective by a reviewing the IFRS conceptual framework and 
the objective of financial reporting. The third section provides an overview of value-
relevance research and how it has been developed as an empirical test for the decision-
usefulness of accounting information. Furthermore, the research surrounding the value-
relevance of earnings and book value is explored. This section also discusses how the 
qualitative characteristics of accounting information moderate the value-relevance of 
earnings and book value, the two primary accounting summary measures. The fourth 
and final section provides an overview of family ownership and its distinctiveness. This 
section also explores how family ownership impacts the value-relevance of accounting 
information. It is proposed that family ownership is related to the qualitative 
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characteristics of accounting information. Specifically to accounting information quality 
(faithful representation) and the level of unidentifiable intangible assets in a firm 
(relevance), both of which impact the value-relevance of accounting information. 
 
2.1 OVERVIEW OF THEORETICAL LINKS 
Figure 2-1 provides a graphical overview of the primary theoretical links and 
propositions that will be developed in this chapter. 
Figure 2-1 Primary theoretical links 
Family 
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The underlying notion is that the two primary accounting information measures of 
earnings and book value are related to firm value and are thus value-relevant. According 
to the IFRS conceptual framework, for information to be useful it has to be faithfully 
represented. This is supported by empirical research conducted by Marquardt and 
Wiedman (2004) and Whelan and McNamara (2004). Thus, this thesis asserts that 
accounting information quality moderates the relationships between earnings and firm 
value, and book value and firm value. The IFRS conceptual framework also states that 
for information to be useful it has to be relevant for the decision-maker and thus can 
impact their decisions. As we move from a physical capital economy to a knowledge 
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economy the intangible assets within a firm are often their most important assets 
(Goldfinger, 1997; Hand & Lev, 2003), yet most of these intangible assets are not 
present in the measure of book value and costs associated with developing them are 
expensed instead of capitalized (Cañibano et al., 2000). Both theoretical and empirical 
research has noted that this presents a threat to the relevance of accounting information 
as it decreases its usefulness for decision-makers (Amir & Lev, 1996; Hasso & Duncan, 
2012; Lev, 2001). Consequently, this thesis asserts that the level of unidentifiable 
intangible assets within a firm moderates the relationships between earnings and firm 
value, and book value and firm value. 
Finally, this chapter introduces the distinct agency context of family ownership 
and discusses its distinctiveness as it relates to the qualitative characteristics of 
accounting information. Specifically, how family ownership impacts accounting 
information quality and the accumulation of unidentifiable intangible assets. It is 
proposed that family ownership may impact these two moderators of value-relevance. 
While it is suggested that the traditional owner-manager agency conflict, Type I agency 
problem, is mitigated in publically listed family-owned firms, there are also potential 
downsides of family ownership (Anderson et al., 2003; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; 
Villalonga & Amit, 2006). The concentration of ownership and management in these 
firms may lead to Type II agency problems. Furthermore, family ownership is related to 
the level of unidentifiable intangible assets in firms, as the family places a different 
importance weight upon non-financial goals and consequently increasing social capital 
and human capital (Hasso & Duncan, 2012; Miller et al., 2008; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). 
In summary, it is suggested that family ownership is related to the value-relevance 
of accounting information through its relationship to the qualitative characteristics of 
accounting information. These qualitative characteristics are accounting information 
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quality (faithful representation) and unidentifiable intangible assets (relevance). This 
chapter will now explore these issues in greater detail, starting with an overview of the 
IFRS conceptual framework and its importance to the theoretical development in this 
chapter. 
 
2.2 IFRS CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The IFRS conceptual framework provides a normative theory of the purpose of 
accounting information and financial reporting. This theory promotes consistency in 
financial reporting by using the collective reasoning of accountants to reach a consensus 
on the objectives of accounting information. The conceptual framework states that the 
decision-usefulness of accounting information is one of the primary objectives of 
financial reporting. Specifically, the framework suggests that present and potential 
investors are amongst the primary users of financial reports, and use the information in 
these reports to aid them in making decisions about buying, selling or holding equity 
(IASB, OB 2). This includes information about an entity’s resources and claims (IASB, 
OB 13), and changes therein due to the entity’s financial performance (IASB, OB 15). 
This theory provides justification and support for the importance of accounting 
information in the valuation process. 
The framework suggests that to achieve decision-usefulness, accounting 
information must possess certain qualitative characteristics. Specifically, it states that 
the two fundamental qualitative characteristics of useful information are faithful 
representation and relevance (see Figure 2-2). For financial information to be decision-
useful it has to faithfully represent (formerly known as reliability) the underlying 
economic phenomena and be relevant for users (IASB, QC 4).  
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Figure 2-2 Qualitative characteristics of accounting information 
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The first2 fundamental qualitative characteristic, faithful representation, is met 
when the economic phenomena is faithfully represented in words and numbers. This 
characteristic encompasses the underlying characteristics of the information, including 
completeness in terms of sufficient information (in the notes) to judge an estimated 
measure, neutrality in terms of it being neutral and not manipulated by managers or 
other employees, and freedom from material error (IASB, QC12). The second 
fundamental qualitative characteristic, relevance, is met when the financial information 
can impact decisions by providing predictive value, confirmatory value, or both (IASB, 
QC6-QC10). 
These two fundamental qualitative characteristics are central to this thesis. 
Faithful representation can be seen as the higher-order construct for the empirical work 
on accounting information quality (earnings management and earnings quality) 
(Dechow et al., 2010). Neutrality is one of the components of faithfully represented 
information. When management manipulates earnings and book values through the 
accruals process, it decreases the neutrality of the reported figures. 
The notion of relevance can be linked to research on unidentifiable intangible 
assets (Lev, 2001). Specifically, it is suggested that increases in unidentifiable 
                                                 
 
2 The order in which these qualitative characteristics are mentioned does not imply their relative 
importance. Furthermore, the conceptual framework mentions relevance before faithful representation, 
but for the purposes of this thesis the order in which they are mentioned is reversed to improve the clarity 
of the argument being made. 
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intangible assets impacts the relevance of accounting information as the book value 
measure does not account for these assets. This decreases the predictive value of book 
value, as predictions are based on measures that do not account for some intangible 
assets and are noisy (Amir & Lev, 1996). In summary, the IFRS conceptual framework 
provides initial support for this thesis’ conceptual model that asserts that the qualitative 
characteristics of information moderate the value-relevance of accounting information. 
Next, value-relevance is explored in detail. 
 
2.3 VALUE-RELEVANCE OF EARNINGS AND BOOK VALUE 
This section outlines the underpinnings of value-relevance research and provides 
the support for propositions 1 and 2 (P1 and P2), that both earnings and book value are 
related to firm value. This relationship is depicted in Figure 2-3. 
Figure 2-3 Earnings, book value, and firm value 
Earnings
Firm Value
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The normative conceptual framework sets forth that the decision-usefulness of 
accounting information is one of the primary objectives of financial reporting. Value-
relevance research is the empirical assessment of the decision-usefulness of financial 
information and is a joint test for the fundamental qualitative characteristics of faithful 
representation (formerly known as reliability) and relevance (Barth et al., 2001). The 
origin of value-relevance research, and specifically the value-relevance of earnings, can 
be traced back to the seminal study of Ball and Brown (1968). The authors investigated 
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the relationship between earnings announcements and abnormal returns in the months 
around the announcement. They concluded that while the earnings figure was 
informative, containing more than half of all value-relevant information about the firm, 
it was not timely; up to 90 per cent of the content was captured before the actual 
earnings announcement. This suggests that earnings have confirmatory rather than a 
predictive role in decision-making. Thus, while the earnings announcements in most 
cases do not lead to shocks in market values, there appears to be a strong post-earnings 
announcement drift in cases of unexpected negative earnings. These core findings were 
also supported by Beaver’s (1968) seminal article that investigated the relationship 
between earnings announcement and the trading activity of stocks. Beaver (1968) shows 
that the trade volume of stocks increased dramatically in the week of an earnings 
announcement. Additionally, he found that the stock price changes in the week of 
reporting were of a higher magnitude in comparison to non-reporting trading weeks. 
However, the concept of value-relevance only emerged in the work of Amir et al. 
(1993). Thus, while the origins and the foundation were laid in the 1960’s and 
thereafter, the majority of the value-relevance work, as we know it today, is 
predominantly based on research from the past two decades. 
For accounting information to be deemed as useful for equity investors, there has 
to be an association between reported accounting information and market values 
(Francis and Schipper, 1999). This association can be of a direct or indirect nature. 
Thus, if accounting information is deemed as non-useful for equity investors, one of the 
primary purposes of financial reporting would not be met. Under this view, accounting 
information is deemed as value-relevant if there is a statistical association to market 
values of returns. This view can be formally stated as: 
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 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 𝑓(𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)  (1) 
This function does not specify the exact line items that are used in valuation but 
the focus of value-relevance studies has been the earnings and book value and the 
components thereof (Kothari, 2001). This focus can be traced to the dominance of the 
Ohlson (1995) framework for valuation that states that a firm’s equity value is equal to 
the book value of equity plus the discounted value of future residual income. Formally, 
the model is stated as follows: 
 𝑃𝑡 = 𝐵𝑉𝑡 + ∑
𝑁𝐼𝑡 − 𝑘𝑒 ∗  𝐵𝑉𝑡−1
(1 + 𝑘𝑒)𝑡
∞
𝑡=1
 (2) 
where P is the firm value, BV the book value of the equity, NI the net income, and 
ke the cost of equity capital. The residual income is thus equal to a firm’s net income 
minus the required rate of return of the book value of equity. Based on this framework, 
the central focus of the value-relevance literature becomes to assess the significance 
level and explanation power of earnings and book values for variation in stock prices. 
The formal model for testing this view is the following: 
 𝑃𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 (3) 
where P is the price per share for firm j at fiscal year-end t plus 3 months, EPS is 
earnings per share for firm j at year t, and BVPS is book value per share for firm j at 
year t. Researchers often decompose this model and investigate the value-relevance of 
earnings and book value of equity separately as follows: 
 𝑃𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 (4) 
 𝑃𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 (5) 
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Models (4) and (5) are applied in research to investigate the incremental value-
relevance of each component. By comparing the explanation power of model (3) to the 
explanation power of models (4) and (5), the incremental value-relevance of the 
earnings and book value of equity can be estimated. Furthermore, model (4) is also used 
in research investigating the earnings response coefficient, specified as β1  in this model. 
Researchers have also investigated the changes in each component and how they 
explain the change in firm value. This is referred to as price return specification or 
changes model. However, as Barth et al. (2001) note, the price return specification does 
not determine what is reflected in the value of a firm, merely what drives changes in 
value. Furthermore, the changes model does not suit studies that focus on book value as 
the changes model is usually dominated by earning changes (Hung, 2000). As the 
primary theoretical links presented in this chapter suggest that intangible assets are 
major sources of firm value, the price levels specification is of primary interest. The 
price levels specification is able to capture both the importance of earnings and book 
value in the valuation process. 
When using the price levels specification, the two primary concerns of researchers 
investigating the value-relevance of earnings are the explanatory power of model (4) 
and the magnitude of the earnings response coefficient in the model (β1). The fact that 
earnings are value-relevant is generally accepted amongst researchers at present (Collins 
et al., 1997), and thus provides the first proposition of this thesis. 
Proposition 1: There is a positive relationship between earnings and firm value. 
Nevertheless, while the consensus is that earnings are indeed value-relevant, 
researchers have found a number of factors that impact the relationship between 
earnings and firm value; earnings persistence (Kormendi and Lipe, 1987), the timeliness 
of earnings (Collins et al., 1994), and conservative accounting (Basu, 1997). These 
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researchers highlight the importance of not only focusing on the magnitude of earnings 
but also on the nature of the earnings number and how it is determined through 
measurement and discretionary accounting choices. 
The majority of the research within value-relevance has historically focused on 
the earnings component. This can be explained by the market’s tendency to focus on 
profits and returns (Collins et al., 1997). In addition, the stable nature of book value of 
equity makes it of lesser interest for researchers adopting price return specifications for 
investigating value-relevance (Barth et al., 1998b). Thus the majority of the research 
investigating the value-relevance of book values uses a price level specification model 
of value-relevance (Barth et al., 1998b). 
Many studies investigate the association between book value of equity and firm 
value (Ayers, 1998; Barth et al., 1998; Collins et al, 1997; Dechow et al., 1999; Ohlson 
and Penman, 1992). In general, these researchers agree that book values are indeed 
value-relevant and have a high explanatory power for firm values. This notion leads to 
the second proposition of this thesis: 
Proposition 2: There is a positive relationship between book value and firm value. 
The explanatory power of book value does, however, depend on the nature and 
state of the firm. For example, firms that are not profitable, either having very low or 
negative earnings are often valued solely based upon their book value (Basu, 1997; 
Block, 1995). Furthermore, value-relevance models using level specification are 
considered to be more theoretically sound; if we consider a case of liquidation, a firm 
that has no foreseeable earnings will still be of some value if it has physical or 
intangible assets (Shleifer & Vishny, 1992). 
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The value-relevance of book value is also sensitive to the rules and principles 
applied in the valuation of the assets and liabilities that make up book value. 
Consequently, a number of studies have compared the usage of historical cost 
accounting to fair value accounting, and the impact this has upon the value-relevance of 
book values (Barth et al., 1996; Carroll et al., 2003). In general, the consensus amongst 
researchers is that fair value accounting increases the value-relevance of book values. 
However, Khurana and Kim (2003) note that this increase in value-relevance only exists 
when the fair value accounting estimates are based on objective market-determined 
measures. Additionally, Hahn et al. (2007) find that while there is merit in using fair 
value accounting, the value-relevance of earnings may be negatively impacted through a 
higher prevalence of transitory gains and losses under fair value accounting. 
Researchers have established that both earnings and book values are value-
relevant. Their relative importance is, however, conditional upon the state of the firm. 
Furthermore, the characteristics and nature of the earnings and book value 
measurements may also impact the usefulness of these two measures for valuation 
purposes. The following section explores how the qualitative characteristic of 
accounting information quality may moderate the usefulness of both earnings and book 
value. 
 
2.3.1 VALUE-RELEVANCE AND ACCOUNTING INFORMATION QUALITY 
The qualitative characteristics and nature of reported information has an impact 
upon its value-relevance. This section provides the arguments for propositions 3 and 4 
(P3 and P4); that accounting information quality (faithful representation) moderates the 
relationship between earnings, book value, and firm value. This relationship is depicted 
in Figure 2-4.  There has been a growing interest in the intersection between accounting 
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information quality and value-relevance research (Christensen et al.,1999; Marquardt & 
Wiedman, 2004); this research criticises prior work for assuming that accounting 
information reported by different firms is of homogenous quality. In contrast, these 
authors suggest that as accruals are subject to judgments by management, there is 
opportunity for manipulation and bias. 
Figure 2-4 Moderating role of accounting information quality 
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Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) contend that due to the incentive structure in 
firms, management engage in opportunistic behaviour to manipulate earnings. In turn, 
this impacts the reliability of the earnings figure and thus the usefulness of the figure for 
valuation purposes, consequently decreasing the value-relevance of earnings. 
Christensen et al. (1999) support this view and find a negative relationship between the 
incentives for earnings management and the information content of earnings. Whelan 
and McNamara (2004) provide further insights by decomposing earnings management 
into two components, short-term discretionary accruals and long-term discretionary 
accruals. The authors find that although earnings management is value-relevant, 
earnings management via long-term discretionary accruals has a greater impact upon the 
value-relevance of earnings and book value compared to earnings management via 
short-term discretionary accruals. Together, these studies provide support for the third 
proposition of this thesis: 
 26 
Chapter 2: Development of Propositions 26 
Proposition 3. The relationship between earnings and firm value is positively 
moderated by accounting information quality. 
While the subjective and judgmental nature of accounting provides opportunity 
for earnings management, the negative impact upon value-relevance of earnings exists 
only when there are incentives for management to manage earnings. In contrast, the 
subjective nature of accounting and the accrual process can provide a more timely and 
accurate portrayal of firm performance, and thus increase the value-relevance of 
earnings (Bao & Bao, 2004; Guay et al., 1996). As such, the accrual process gives 
managers the discretion to either increase or decrease the quality of the earnings figure. 
The motivations of management, as theorized through agency theory are thus of the 
utmost importance. Therefore, a shift in the traditional agency relationship, such as in 
the case of family ownership, may have a significant impact upon accounting 
information quality. This issue will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter 
(see section 2.4.1). 
The value-relevance of earnings is also influenced by the persistence of earnings. 
If earnings are considered to be permanent then the market will consider them to be 
more value-relevant and thus assign a greater weight to them in contrast to transitory 
earnings (Kormendi and Lipe 1987; Sloan 1996). Similarly, the value-relevance of cash 
flows is related to earnings persistence. When the market considers the earnings figure 
transitory, the value-relevance of cash flows increases, and hence it can be seen as an 
alternative information source for the market (Cheng et al., 1996). Thus, while earnings 
have been established as value-relevant, there are conditions where their value-
relevance will either increase or decrease. In such conditions, the market may use book 
value for valuation purposes. Therefore, while accounting information quality will 
primarily moderate the relationship between earnings and firm value, it will also 
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moderate the relationship between book value and firm value. A firm that provides low 
quality accounting information will most likely be valued more so upon their book 
value, as investors will see the book value as the guaranteed value while seeing the 
reported earnings as easily manipulated and unreliable (Marquardt & Wiedman, 2004; 
Whelan & McNamara, 2004). This provides the fourth proposition for this thesis: 
Proposition 4. The relationship between book value and firm value is moderated by 
accounting information quality. 
 Thus accounting information quality has a moderating effect on both the value-
relevance of earnings and book value. However, accounting information quality 
represents only one of the two fundamental qualitative characteristics of useful 
accounting information as described by IFRS, namely faithful representation. The 
second characteristic of relevance as operationalized by unidentifiable intangible assets 
is discussed and explored in the next section. 
  
2.3.2 VALUE-RELEVANCE AND UNIDENTIFIABLE INTANGIBLE ASSETS 
Lev and Zarowin’s (1999) 20-year longitudinal study found that the value-
relevance of accounting information in general is steadily decreasing.3 This effect is 
observed for both earnings and book value. The authors attribute the loss in value-
relevance to the shortcomings of the accounting standards to account for intangible 
assets. This section provides the arguments for propositions 5 and 6 (P5 and P6): that 
the level of unidentifiable intangible assets moderates the relationship between earnings, 
and book value and firm value. This relationship is depicted in Figure 2-5. 
                                                 
 
3 This effect is for a 20-year period and authors recognize that others have found an increasing effect over 
the past 40 years (Collins et al., 1997; Francis & Schipper, 1999). However, Lev and Zarowin (1999) 
contend that the increase in value-relevance is only observed for the first half of the 40-year period, and a 
decline in the last 20 years. 
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Figure 2-5 Moderating role of unidentifiable intangible asets 
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The importance of intangible assets has grown in the last two decades and they are 
now considered to be the primary source of value, representing a shift from the 
traditional physical assets value dominance (Goldfinger, 1997; Hand & Lev, 2003; Lev, 
2001). The term intangible asset is broad and encompasses a variety of assets that do not 
have a physical substance. Lev (2001) provides an overview of common intangible 
assets and the various ways researchers have attempted to group them based on their 
characteristics. For the purpose of this thesis, two groups of intangible assets are of 
special interest due to their prevalence in family-owned firms. These are social capital 
and human capital (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). Social capital is comprised of the firm’s 
relationships with its customers and suppliers and could thus be seen to encompass the 
firm’s brand and reputation, while human capital refers to the skills and knowledge of 
the firm’s employees that could be used to benefit the firm (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). The 
common factor between these two groups of intangible assets is that they are both not 
accounted for in financial statements. Lev and Zarowin (1999) suggest that the failure of 
accounting to account for these intangible assets has made financial information less 
useful for valuation purposes, consequently decreasing the value-relevance of 
accounting information.  
 29 
Chapter 2: Development of Propositions 29 
To recognize an intangible asset in the accounts, the resource or asset must: (1) be 
under the control of the firm and the firm has to be able to obtain the benefits of owning 
the asset, (2) embody future economic benefits associated with the control of the asset 
either in the form of increased revenue or decreased expenses, and (3) be identifiable 
(IAS 38). 
The third test of identifiability is the critical stumbling when it comes to 
recognizing most intangible assets. To consider an asset identifiable, the firm must be 
able to separate the asset from the firm. Separability, in this respect, means that the 
benefits of controlling the asset can be transferred to a third party, for example, in the 
form of selling or renting the asset (Bond et al., 2000). If we consider the case of social 
capital and its reputation subcomponent, while there may be future economic benefits 
stemming from a positive reputation, the firm’s reputation cannot be severed from the 
firm itself (Cañibano et al., 2000). This disqualifies reputation from being an intangible 
asset for accounting measurement. 
However, while some suggest that accounting standards have failed to accurately 
account for intangible assets, others have attempted to proxy for these intangible assets 
in order to investigate their importance for investors. Barth et al. (1999) investigated the 
value-relevance of brand value and used the estimated brand valuations of Financial 
World as a proxy for the brand value. The authors found that brand values are value-
relevant as there is a statistical association between brand values and market values, and 
that brand values provide incremental explanation power beyond what can be explained 
by earnings and book values. Similarly, researchers have also investigated the value-
relevance of human capital by using employee training expenditure as a proxy for 
human capital. Both Hand (1998) and Backer et al. (1999) found that human capital, 
proxied by employee training expenditure, is value-relevant and provides incremental 
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explanation for market values beyond what can be explained by earnings and book 
value. 
These studies show that the market partially incorporates the value of these 
intangible assets. However, if investors are relying more heavily upon non-financial 
information, what does this mean for the usefulness of accounting information and 
accounting itself? According to Cañibano et al. (2000), the shortcomings of the 
standards to account for intangible assets have made financial information less useful 
for valuation purposes in general. While the authors highlighted the impact on book 
value, they also considered the role of earnings and how expensing the development 
cost of the unidentifiable intangible assets has made earnings less value-relevant as 
well; this view is also seen in the work of Stewart (1997). Indeed, if these unidentifiable 
intangible assets are significant and considered valuable by investors, the omission of 
these from the book value of the firm would make this measure less useful to predict or 
confirm firm value. Furthermore, the development of these unidentifiable intangible 
assets is generally associated with large expenditures for training employees and 
building relationships with customers and suppliers. As the outcomes of these 
expenditures are not seen as legitimate intangible assets, the costs associated with their 
developments are expensed rather than capitalized. This practice may then decrease the 
usefulness of both the earnings and book value measures, and it leads to propositions 
five and six: 
Proposition 5. The relationship between earnings and firm value is moderated by the 
level of unidentifiable intangible assets. 
Proposition 6. The relationship between book value and firm value is moderated by the 
level of unidentifiable intangible assets. 
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 Having explored the moderating impact of unidentifiable intangible assets the 
remaining question becomes: how does family ownership fit in this picture? 
2.4 FAMILY OWNERSHIP 
When a family has an ownership stake in a firm and is able to shape its strategic 
direction, the firm is said to be a family-owned firm (Chua et al., 1999). In these firms, 
the principal and the agent often belong to the same family (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). 
This is a distinct agency context in contrast to traditional widely-held firms, where 
owners are separated from management. This chapter has proposed that accounting 
information quality and unidentifiable intangible assets moderate the value-relevance of 
accounting information. This section and its subsections (2.4.1 and 2.4.2) propose that 
due to the unique agency context, family ownership is related to both accounting 
information quality and unidentifiable intangible assets. However, before exploring 
these relationships in detail, agency theory itself is explored to identify how it relates to 
family ownership. 
In academia, agency theory was recognized in the 1970s following the seminal 
work of Jensen and Meckling (1976), Alchian and Demsetz (1972), and Ross (1973). 
However, while it was not until the 1970s that agency theory evolved in a formal sense; 
the core thesis of the theory has been of interest since the 1700s. Smith (1776) can be 
seen as the grandfather of agency theory, as the author was the first to note the 
importance of separation between owners and managers in publicly held companies. At 
that time, publicly held companies were a growing business structure; however, Smith 
(1776) theorized that these companies would probably not stand the test of time, except 
in certain conditions. The primary reason for his argument was that managers in these 
firms were self-interested and unless actively monitored, they would not act in the best 
interest of the owners. Therefore, according to Smith (1776) these firms would not be 
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economically feasible and would most likely disappear except in certain industries. 
However, Smith (1776) did not consider the role of families in these firms. Most of the 
large firms at that time were family-owned firms, where the family had control of the 
firm through significant ownership and thus appointed managers affiliated with the 
family. As such, Smith’s (1776) prediction remains unrealized, at least for the time 
being. 
In the early 1900s many of the large firms had grown so much that it was not 
possible to only appoint family members as managers. Furthermore, some heirs were 
not interested in the active management of the firm and hired outside managers to 
oversee the operations. Thus, when the depression of the 1920s caused widespread 
economic devastation, there were questions regarding what caused the markets to fail 
and whether the conditions for the governance of these firms were to blame. This 
investigative trend can be seen as the tipping point for agency theory. 
Berle and Means (1932) revisited the discussion started by Smith, and provided 
regulators with a plausible scapegoat. Berle and Means (1932) repeated the arguments 
of Smith regarding the problem of separation of ownership and control. They stated that 
the conditions present in publicly held firms provided managers with the opportunity to 
act in self-interest to the detriment of shareholders. Consequently, they argued that there 
needed to be formal and reliable channels through which owners could monitor and 
evaluate the performance of managers. This view was accepted by many and resulted in 
the revision of the Securities Act of 1934 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The 
enactment of these legislations can be seen as the birth of corporate governance as we 
know it today. 
While the work of Berle and Means (1932) is seen as seminal in agency theory, 
the notion of agency theory was not formalized until the 1970s when Jensen and 
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Meckling (1976) published Theory of the Firm. In this seminal piece, the authors 
provided the framework for agency theory, which outlines the issues in relationships 
between principals (owners) and agents (managers). Namely, the authors stated two 
primary problems that occur in agency relationships. The first agency problem (Type I) 
arises when the interests and goals of the two parties do not align, especially under 
circumstances in which it is hard for the principal to monitor the agent’s actions. The 
second problem (Type II) arises from the potential differences in risk-aversion between 
the two parties. These two problems are the two primary threats to the viability of 
publicly held firms. These threats can, however, be managed by aligning the interests 
between principals and agents and thus reducing the associated costs of the agency 
relationship. One of the fundamental ways to align the interests of the two parties is to 
ensure that managers have an ownership stake in the firm. According to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) the agency problem is virtually eliminated in situations when the firm 
is managed by a single owner. Consequently, agency theory has become a focal source 
for distinguishing the family-owned firm, where there is often an overlap between 
owners and managers. 
Drawing upon agency theory, research has identified two competing effects of 
family ownership on the firm: the alignment effect (typical Type I agency conflict) and 
the entrenchment effect (typical Type II agency conflict) (Wang, 2006). The alignment 
effect proposes that the interests between principals and agents are better aligned within 
family-owned firms and thus the agency issues are minimized (Bhaumik and Gregoriou, 
2009). This alignment results partially from the fact that the family often appoints 
members of the family to senior management positions, thus naturally aligning the 
interests of the firm and the owners (Wang, 2006). The family’s investment in the firm 
may also reduce any short-termism in the firm. As the family has a long-term interest in 
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the firm, the practices and strategy of the firm may be more inclined towards activities 
that maximise long-term wealth rather than short-term profits. However, the family 
could also have negative effects on the firm, according to the entrenchment effect 
(Wang, 2006). In situations where the family-owned firm has outside equity investors, 
the family may itself act opportunistically and attempt to expropriate assets from the 
firm to the detriment of minority shareholders. The family then attempts to maximize 
their own wealth rather than the wealth and value of the firm itself (Fan & Wong, 2002). 
Overarching these two opposing effects is the legal environment in which the firm 
operates (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2011). A country’s legal system and investor protection 
regulation may deter entrenchment behaviour, as the family may be fearful of legal and 
financial repercussions. 
Using this agency framework and the two competing effects of alignment and 
entrenchment, this thesis investigates how family ownership may impact the qualitative 
characteristics of accounting information and therefore its value-relevance. To date, 
value-relevance research has focused primarily on widely held firms and in some cases 
managerial ownership (See Warfield et al. (1995) and Gabrielsen et al. (2002)). Two 
studies explicitly investigate value-relevance and do so in a family ownership context, 
however the institutional settings of these two studies and their methodological flaws 
make it hard to generalize these results to all family-owned firms as a group (Bae & 
Jeong, 2007; Cascino et al., 2010). The recent study by Bae and Jeong (2007) was based 
on a South Korean sample, and focused on large business conglomerates (chaebols), 
which often are controlled by families. In line with their hypothesis, the authors found 
that the value-relevance of accounting information was lower for these firms; they 
attribute this loss in value-relevance to the lower quality of accounting information 
supplied by chaebols. However, even though families often control these chaebols, the 
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distinct institutional and cultural setting makes it hard to generalize these results. 
Furthermore, Cascino et al. (2010) investigated the value-relevance of earnings and 
compared family and non-family-owned firms in the Italian context. The authors found 
that the earnings of family-owned firms were more value-relevant. However, as the 
authors did not control for firm-specific characteristics such as size, growth, leverage, or 
industry, the results of this study are not conclusive. Beyond the issue of methodology, 
the institutional and cultural issues in Italy are quite unique, making it hard to generalize 
from the Italian results (La Porta et al., 1999). 
In summary, this section explored the nature of family-owned firms and the 
essence of their distinctiveness. The overlap between owners and managers is central to 
their distinctiveness as the separation between these two parties lies at the heart of 
corporate legislation and corporate governance, as we know it today. Furthermore, the 
current body of knowledge about family ownership and its association to value-
relevance is sparse, and thus provides the motivation for this thesis. With this in mind, 
this thesis continues by exploring the relationships between family ownership and 
accounting information quality (faithful representation), and the level of unidentifiable 
intangible assets (relevance). 
 
2.4.1 FAMILY OWNERSHIP AND ACCOUNTING INFORMATION QUALITY 
Drawing upon agency theory, this section uses the two competing effects of 
alignment and entrenchment to propose that there is a relationship between family 
ownership and accounting information quality (faithful representation). This leads to 
proposition 7 (P7), which is depicted in in Figure 2-6. 
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Figure 2-6 Family ownership and accounting information quality 
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The unique agency context of family ownership has the potential to diminish Type 
I agency conflicts by aligning the interest between owners and managers and exerting 
greater managerial monitoring. In family-owned firms, the family members often hold 
senior positions, potentially eliminating the Type I agency conflicts (Bhaumik and 
Gregoriou, 2009) as alignment exists between owners and managers. However, even in 
cases where the family uses a professional manager, the undiversified nature of the 
family’s investment portfolio incentivises them to carefully monitor the manager and 
decrease the incentive for opportunistic management behaviour (Prencipe and Bar-
Yosef, 2011). Anderson et al. (2003) found that family-owned firms are able to derive a 
lower cost of debt; this finding indicates that bond-holders prefer the governance 
provided by families. As the interests of the owners and managers are aligned, there 
exists less possibility for earnings management and the potential for managers to extract 
benefits from the firms to the detriment of shareholders. This should theoretically lead 
to an increase in the value-relevance of accounting information for family-owned firms, 
as investors would consider the reported information neutral and consequently faithfully 
represented. 
There is, however, a body of literature to argue that concentrated ownership may 
lead to an increase in Type II agency conflicts through the entrenchment effect (Morck 
et al., 1988; Schleifer & Vishny, 1997). In these situations, the controlling shareholders 
have an opportunity to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders. The controlling 
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families may be entrenched, self-interested, and reporting accounting information that is 
of benefit to them, thus making the accounting information lose credibility amongst 
outside investors (Fan and Wong, 2002). If accounting information is not seen as 
neutral and credible by outside investors then its use in decision making would 
decrease, causing its value-relevance to diminish. In these cases, outside investors 
would in effect price-protect and punish the family-owned firms that expropriate from 
minority shareholders (Jensen et al., 1976). Thus, it becomes important for a family-
owned firm to communicate and signal that they are not engaging in expropriation by 
having transparent and sound governance. 
Given this interesting agency setting, there has been some empirical research 
conducted in this area. The empirical research uses accruals quality models to detect 
earnings management and consequently accounting information quality. Prior studies 
have found conflicting evidence regarding this agency context, with studies from the US 
showing a positive relationship between family ownership and accruals quality (Ali et 
al., 2007; Wang, 2006), while some non-US studies show a negative relationship (Kim 
& Yi, 2006; Prencipe et al., 2008; Yang, 2010). Furthermore, Setia-Atmaja et al. (2011) 
investigate the issue in the Australian context and find that family-owned firms, on 
average, have lower quality accruals. However, the model used by Setia-Atmaja et al. 
(2011) to measure accruals quality has been criticized for not appropriately 
distinguishing accruals arising from fundamentals of the firm and the accruals that arise 
from discretionary choices by management (Aboody et al., 2005; Francis et al., 2005; 
Schipper & Vincent, 2003). This criticism is applicable to the majority of studies that 
have investigated the relationship between family ownership and accounting 
information quality. These studies often rely on a single accrual quality model even 
though there is extensive research that disputes the validity of such models (Aboody et 
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al., 2005; Francis et al., 2005; Schipper & Vincent, 2003). Furthermore, portions of 
accruals arise from the fundamentals of the firm rather than by earnings management. 
The models that have been employed in the past often fail to distinguish the innate 
component from the accruals measures, making them noisy in estimating the true 
discretionary accruals that could be attributed to earnings management (Francis et al., 
2005). As agency theory and empirical evidence provides conflicting views on the 
effects of family ownership upon accounting information quality, a non-directional 
relationship is proposed: 
Proposition 7: There is a relationship between family ownership and accounting 
information quality. 
 
2.4.2 FAMILY OWNERSHIP AND UNIDENTIFIABLE INTANGIBLE ASSETS 
This section provides the arguments leading to proposition 8 (P8): that there is a 
relationship between family ownership and the level of unidentifiable intangible assets 
(relevance). This relationship is represented in Figure 2-7. Research has shown that 
family-owned firms have a long-term orientation, in that they do not chase short-run 
returns at the expense of long-term gains (James, 1999). This long-term orientation 
impacts the firms’ goals and behaviours and, in turn, the development of unidentifiable 
intangible assets. 
Figure 2-7 Family ownership and unidentifiable intangible assets 
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The discussion leading to this proposition can be framed using the alignment 
effect within agency theory and can be explained through a stewardship theory lens 
(Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson & Davis, 1991). Recently, it has been 
applied within the family business context (Arregle et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2007; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005). According to stewardship theory, due to the 
interdependency of the family and its business, family members share a stronger 
connection to the firm versus non-family owners. This connection between the family 
and its business leads to managerial practices that differ from non-family businesses. 
One of the primary manifestations is the long-term orientation of the owners (James, 
1999), the firm is managed with future generations in mind, often by CEOs whose job 
tenure greatly exceeds those of non-family-owned firms (Beckhard & Dyer, 1983). This 
connection with the firm and the long-term orientation has several implications for the 
level of unidentifiable intangible assets within the firm. 
As the family has a deep connection with its business (Astrachan & Jaskiewicz, 
2008) the family’s social capital is often intertwined with that of the firm (Anderson et 
al., 2003), the permanence of the firm is equivalent to continuity of the family name. 
Consequently, family-owned firms place greater importance on social-capital-
generating activities than non-family-owned firms. These include elements such as 
reputational development (Habbershon & Williams, 1999) and fostering relationships 
with the firm’s customers and suppliers (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). This notion is supported 
empirically by Miller et al. (2008), who found that family-owned firms have more 
personalized marketing, spend more on reputational development, and focus on markets 
that are often neglected. These activities are linked to future economic gains in prior 
research. A favourable reputation has been shown to improve financial performance 
(Roberts & Dowling, 2002) while customer satisfaction has been shown to be a lead 
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indicator of future performance (Ittner & Larcker, 1998). Additionally, it has also been 
shown that capital markets see brand values as an intangible asset Barth et al. (1998). 
However, family-owned firms also face challenges that may destroy the social capital of 
the firm. The most reported is the problem of rivalries within the company, which is 
especially pronounced in siblings who may attempt to gain control of the inherited 
company through legal battles and thus damage the reputation of the firm (Friedman, 
1991; Tagiuri & Davis, 1996). 
It has also been suggested that family-owned firms are more likely to perform 
human capital-increasing activities to ensure longevity than non-family-owned firms 
(Ward, 2004). Miller et al. (2008) showed that family-owned firms spend more on 
human capital-related activities than non-family-owned firms. These include training, 
wider job roles, flexible arrangements for work, and longer employment of individual 
managers. Human capital-related expenditure such as training has a positive impact on 
firm performance through productivity gains (Barbera & Moores, 2011; Bartel, 1994). 
Furthermore, the human capital of the firm is often described as the most important 
intangible asset (Hand & Lev, 2003). However, family-owned firms are also plagued 
with challenges that have a negative impact on the human capital of the firm. While 
family employees may show high commitment to the firm, this may come at the 
expense of resentment from non-family member employees. The possible glass ceiling 
for non-family members may have a detrimental effect upon their motivation (Casson, 
1999). Furthermore, as the human resource pool within the family is limited, there exists 
the risk that underqualified family members may be promoted to positions in which they 
can damage the firm’s wealth (Habbershon et al., 2003). In addition, some empirical 
research has shown that family firms may at times spend less on human resource 
management, as compared to non-family firms (Graves & Thomas, 2006; Kotey & 
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Folker, 2007; Reid & Adams, 2001). While it is true that non-family-owned firms also 
possess unidentifiable intangible assets (e.g. social capital and human capital), the level 
of unidentifiable intangible assets in family-owned firms may be of a different 
magnitude than it is for non-family-owned firms due to issues specific to family-owned 
firms that have been discussed in this section. 
Empirical evidence that explores the relationship between family ownership and 
the level of unidentifiable intangible assets in specific is sparse (Hasso & Duncan, 
2012). However, several inferences can be made by reviewing the research that 
investigates the relationship between family ownership and firm values. Table 2-1 
provides an overview of research that has investigated the impact of family ownership 
upon the firms Tobin’s q, P/B ratios, and intangible assets. Interestingly, no published 
research has investigated the issue in the Australian context. International research has 
found that family-owned firms are usually valued higher in the market than non-family-
owned firms, based on higher price-to-book (P/B) ratios as a proxy for Tobin’s q values 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Maury, 2006; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). However, if family-
owned firms hold more unidentifiable intangible assets than non-family-owned firms, 
then their reported book values are relatively more understated (compared to the true 
underlying but unobservable state). A consequence of this understatement of book value 
is that the Tobin’s q proxy P/B is biased since the denominator in the ratio is the 
reported (understated) book value of assets. 
The argument that family-owned firms have a proportionally greater amount of 
unidentifiable intangible assets is supported by a body of literature that uses Tobin’s q 
as a measure for resource intangibility (Sanchez et al., 2000; Villalonga, 2004). 
Industries such as information technology, where unidentified intangible assets are 
common, have higher Tobin’s q ratios in comparison to industries where book values 
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reflect the true nature of the asset holdings (i.e. with more tangible asset bases) (Amir & 
Lev, 1996). Family-owned firm evidence of higher Tobin’s q is thus consistent with the 
argument that family-owned firms have higher unidentifiable intangible assets. 
Evidence suggests that due to the nature of the intangible assets, the book values of 
family-owned firms are understated relative to their true underlying values (Hasso & 
Duncan, 2012). 
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Table 2-1 Family-owned firm research related to intangible assets 
Author(s) Sample period Region Sample Main findings 
Anderson & Reeb (2003) 1992–1999 U.S. S&P 500 Family-owned firms are found to have higher Tobin’s q compared to 
non-family-owned firms. 
Cronqvist & Nilsson 
(2003) 
1991–1997 Sweden Stockholm Stock 
Exchange 
Firms where the family is a controlling minority shareholder (CMS) 
have lower Tobin’s q relative to non-family CMS. 
King & Santor (2008) 1998-2005 Canada 613 publicly traded firms 
 
Family-owned firms with control-enhancing mechanisms were 
associated with lower Tobin’s q values than non-family-owned firms. 
Martinez, Stohr, & 
Quiroga (2007) 
1995-2004 Chile Companies registered in 
Bolsa de Comercio de 
Santiago’s database 
Family-owned firms have lower Tobin’s q values than non-family-
owned firms. A subsample consisting of the 40 most traded firms 
shows the opposite effect. 
Maury (2006) 1996–2003 13 countries in 
Western Europe 
WorldScope 2003 Family-owned firms have higher Tobin’s q values than non-family-
owned firms. 
McConaughy, Matthews, 
& Fialko (2001) 
1986-1988 U.S. Firms listed in ‘The 
Business Week CEO 1000’ 
in 1987 
Family-owned firms have higher P/B ratios. Median P/B ratio for 
family-owned firms was 2.06, versus 1.42 for non-family-owned 
firms.  
Miller, Le Breton-Miller, 
Scholnick, & Montreal  
(2008) 
1995 Canada 676 small businesses with 
100 or fewer employees 
Family-owned firms engage in more reputational development, 
training of employees and relationship-building with customers.  
Mishra, Randøy, & 
Jenssen (2001) 
1996 Norway Oslo Stock Exchange There is a positive association between founding family control and 
firm value as measured by Tobin’s q. 
Pérez-González (2006) 1980–2001 U.S. Firms in Compustat in 1994 Family-owned firms that appoint a family CEO as a successor have 
lower P/B ratios relative to firms that appoint a non-family member 
CEO. 
Villalonga & Amit (2006) 1994-2000 U.S. Fortune 500 Family-owned firms have higher P/B ratios than non-family-owned 
firms.  
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Based on the findings in this section and the insights from the prior research, it is 
proposed that there is a positive relationship between family ownership and the level of 
unidentifiable intangible assets: 
Proposition 8: There is a positive relationship between family ownership and 
unidentifiable intangible assets. 
 
2.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided the theoretical linkages between family ownership and 
the value-relevance of accounting information. Figure 2-11 summarizes the proposed 
theoretical links in a visual format. 
Figure 2-8 Summary of theoretical links 
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The underlying notion is that earnings and book value are related to firm value 
and are thus value-relevant. However, their value-relevance is moderated by the 
qualitative characteristics of accounting information quality and unidentifiable 
intangible assets. These moderators of decision-useful and thus value-relevant 
information have been established both from normative and positive lenses. The IFRS 
conceptual framework considers faithful representation and relevance as the 
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fundamental qualitative characteristics of decision useful information. These two 
qualitative characteristics overlap with the moderators found in empirical evidence. 
Faithful representation is the higher-order construct of accounting information quality, 
while the increase in unidentifiable intangible assets presents a threat to the relevance of 
financial statements. This chapter explored the relationship between family ownership 
and each of these issues. The research in the family-owned firm context has provided 
indications that there exists a relationship between family ownership and accounting 
information quality, and between family ownership and unidentifiable intangible assets. 
A summary of the developed propositions is presented in Table 2-2. These propositions 
will now be operationalized to hypotheses in Chapter 3. 
Table 2-2 Summary of propositions 
# Proposition 
P1 There is a positive relationship between earnings and firm value. 
P2 There is a positive relationship between book value and firm value. 
P3 The relationship between earnings and firm value is positively moderated by 
accounting information quality. 
P4 The relationship between book value and firm value is moderated by accounting 
information quality. 
P5 The relationship between book value and firm value is moderated by the level of 
unidentifiable intangible assets. 
P6 The relationship between earnings and firm value is moderated by the level of 
unidentifiable intangible assets. 
P7 There is a relationship between family ownership and accounting information 
quality. 
P8 There is a positive relationship between family ownership and unidentifiable 
intangible assets. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to describe and explain the research design used in 
operationalizing and testing the propositions developed in Chapter 2. The first section 
describes the sample that will be used in this thesis. The sample consists of firms listed 
on the Australian Stock Exchange between 2002 and 2006. The extensive continuous 
data requirements of the measures restricted the sample to 570 firms in total, of which 
104 are identified as family-owned firms. The second section details the 
operationalization of the important constructs in this thesis. Specifically, the way this 
thesis operationalizes family-owned firms, value-relevance, accounting information 
quality and unidentifiable intangible assets. The third section operationalizes the 
propositions into hypotheses by using the operationalized constructs in the formulation 
of empirical models. Finally, the eight operationalized hypotheses and variables used 
across the empirical models to test these hypotheses are summarized. 
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3.1 SAMPLE 
The sample consists of public firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange 
between 2002 and 2006. Firms in the financial sector were excluded, as this is 
consistent with prior earnings management and value-relevance research (Kothari, 
2001). The initial sample frame consisted of 2034 listed firms; however, as the 
accounting information quality measure requires eight years4 of specific continuous data 
the sample was constrained to 570 firms. Of these firms, 104 or 18.25 per cent were 
identified as family-owned firms. These data restrictions may introduce survival bias to 
the results. However, as the surviving firms tend to be larger firms they may potentially 
have less variation in the independent variables. As such, the survival bias may manifest 
itself by the lack of significant relationships, as the variation is decreased (Francis et al., 
2005).  
Data was collected from Worldscope fundamentals, AspectHuntley’s DatAnalysis 
and FinAnalysis, and Bureau van Dijk’s Osiris database. The firms’ age of 
incorporation and other governance characteristics were collected from AspectHuntley’s 
DatAnalysis and FinAnalysis. Financial performance and financial structure were 
collected from Worldscope fundamentals through Datastream. Supplemental variables 
were obtained from the Osiris database.  
 
3.2 OPERATIONALIZATION OF CONSTRUCTS 
This section provides the operationalization of the important constructs related to 
the propositions developed in Chapter 2. Specifically, this section discusses how family-
                                                 
 
4 One year prior and one year after the sample period for the cash flows, in addition of two years prior 
total asset figures for asset averaging. 
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owned firms, value-relevance, accounting information quality, and unidentifiable 
intangible assets are operationalized.  
 
3.2.1 FAMILY-OWNED FIRM  
This thesis primarily uses Villalonga and Amit’s (2006) family-owned firm 
definition, in which a firm is said to be a family-owned firm when the founding family 
is a shareholder and has at least one officer or director currently in the firm. The choice 
of this definition was based on the seminal status of this work. It is important to note 
that family-owned firms can be defined in a variety of ways and there is still no single 
commonly accepted definition (Chua et al., 1999; Hasso & Duncan, 2012). The 
definition used in this thesis follows the components approach of classifying family-
owned firms, where family-owned firms are identified based on the components of 
ownership, management, and control (Chrisman et al., 2005). An alternative way of 
classifying family-owned firms would be to use an essence-based approach where 
family-owned firms are identified based on their intention to be, and remain, a family-
owned firm. However, the essence based approach is generally not used in family-
owned firm capital markets research as the data collection is archival and often does not 
include any information about the intentions of the firm (Mroczkowski & Tanewski, 
2007).  
Furthermore, alternative definitions of family-owned firms are used to test if the 
results are sensitive to the family-owned firm definition.  The alternative definitions are 
based on the work of Anderson and Reeb (2003), Villalonga and Amit (2006), and 
Mroczkowski and Tanewski (2007). The definitions used in this research design are 
reported in Table 3-1. The first definition is used in the primary analysis and the 
remaining definitions are utilized in the sensitivity analysis only. 
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Table 3-1 Definitions of family-owned firm 
Definition Number of 
family-
owned firms 
Percent of 
sample 
1. One or more family members are shareholders, 
and one or more family members are officers or 
directors (primary definition) 
 
104 18.25% 
2. One or more family members are shareholders, 
and one or more family members are officers or 
directors (dummy variable) 
 
104 18.25% 
3. One or more family members are shareholders 
and the chief executive officer or chief financial 
officer is a family member 
 
75 13.16% 
4. The family has at least 20% of the votes, and the 
chief executive officer or chief financial officer is a 
family member 
51 8.95% 
 
To identify family ownership and thus family-owned firms, this thesis follows the 
procedures of Mroczkowski and Tanewski (2007) who provide an approach for 
delineating publicly listed family and non-family-owned firms, specifically within the 
Australian context. Furthermore, the work of Yupitun (2008) is used to identify the 
founding family of firms listed on the ASX. 
The first step in the process was collecting the annual reports for all the firms in 
the sample. The second step attempted to identify the founding family of each firm in 
the sample. Firm histories that were available through the annual reports, firm website 
or by a third party, were examined to find information in regards to the founder and his 
or her family. This process was facilitated by cross-referencing founding family data 
provided by Yupitun (2008). Third, the list of the top 20 shareholders in the notes is 
analyzed to identify if the founder is still a shareholder. Furthermore, any other 
shareholders who share the family name of the founder are examined to assess the 
family relationship to the founder. To include shareholdings by family members who do 
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not share the family name, all individuals listed in the top 20 shareholder section were 
examined to find potential family relationships to the founding family. Naturally, while 
these efforts attempt to identify all founding family shareholders, some of the 
individuals who did not share the founding family name may have been excluded when 
determining the percentage of founding family ownership. Next, the board of directors 
and management team were cross-referenced with the family shareholders to identify 
any family members that held positions as officers or directors. In addition to cross-
referencing the family shareholders, any officer or director who shared the founding 
family name was examined further to assess a potential relationship to the founding 
family. Throughout this process, the disclosure of related parties in the notes of the 
accounts assisted in identifying relationships between shareholders, directors and 
management. In total, 104 firms were identified as family-owned firms. They represent 
18.25% of the final sample. This number is comparable to the work of Mroczkowski 
and Tanewski (2007), Setia-Atmaja et al. (2011), and Yupitun (2008). The 
representation of family-owned firms is slightly higher in this study; this could 
potentially be explained by the fact that the data requirements were quite demanding, 
and thus stable, and large firms were more likely to be included in the sample as they 
tend to survive over the longer term (Francis et al., 2005).  
 
3.2.2 VALUE-RELEVANCE 
The concept of value-relevance is operationalized based on the valuation 
framework developed by Ohlson (1995). According to this framework, firm value is 
assumed to be a function of its earnings and book value. The basic value-relevance 
model can be stated as: 
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 𝑃𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 (6) 
Where P is the price per share for firm j at fiscal year-end t plus 3 months, EPS is 
earnings per share for firm j at year t, and BVPS is book value per share for firm j at 
year t. 
The value-relevance framework as stated in equation (6) is based on the premise 
that if earnings and book value are useful in determining the value of a firm, then the 
coefficients β1 and β2 will be positive and statistically significant. Additionally, 
researchers have also studied value-relevance of earnings and book value using the 
changes model, in which equation (6) is represented in a first difference state: 
 ∆𝑃𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2∆𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 (7) 
Where ΔP is the change in price per share for firm j at fiscal year-end t plus 3 
months as compared to the previous year, ΔEPS is the change in earnings per share for 
firm j at year t as compared to the previous year, and ΔBVPS is the change in book 
value per share for firm j at year t as compared to the previous year. 
It should be noted that the specification according to equation (7) is not 
appropriate for the purposes of this study. Previous research has established that while 
the changes model works well for assessing the value-relevance of earnings and flow 
measures, it is not appropriate when investigating the value-relevance book value and 
other stock measures (Barth et al., 1998b). Seeing that changes in book value tend to 
have a smaller impact on firm value than change in earnings, this thesis is unable to use 
this model for assessing the value-relevance of book value (Hung, 2000). As the notion 
of unidentifiable intangible assets and their impact upon the value-relevance of book 
value is an integral part of this study’s theoretical framework the levels model as 
specified in equation (6) is chosen for hypotheses testing. Exact specification of the 
model for the purposes of hypotheses testing will be discussed later in this chapter. 
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3.2.3 ACCOUNTING INFORMATION QUALITY 
This thesis uses accrual quality to operationalize the construct of accounting 
information quality. This area of research is well developed, however it is also 
controversial in the sense that multiple models for estimating accrual quality exist. 
Furthermore, researchers are not in agreement as to which model is the ‘best’ (Dechow 
et al., 2010). Historically, research has primarily employed the Jones model (1991) and 
various deviations of it, the most popular being the modified Jones model as modified 
by Dechow et al. (1995). However, recently, there has been an increased usage of the 
model developed by Dechow & Dichev (2002) and then modified by McNichols  
(2002). This model is considered to address some of the drawbacks of the Jones model. 
The main problem with the Jones model and its various deviations is that it uses an 
indirect method to measure accrual quality (Aboody et al., 2005). According to Francis 
et al. (2005) the Jones model considers a large portion of the accruals as abnormal as it 
only controls for a limited number of fundamental characteristics of the firm, thus 
making it a noisy measure. In contrast, the DD (2002) model is able to overcome this 
shortcoming as it provides a more direct measure of accounting information quality and 
is able to distinguish between accruals arising from fundamentals and accruals arising 
from earnings management (Schipper & Vincent, 2003). Additionally, recent research 
in the Australian context has also suggested that the DD (2002) model as modified by 
McNichols (2002) is the preferred model to estimate discretionary accruals (Aldamen & 
Duncan, 2011; Kent et al., 2010).  
As this thesis is primarily concerned with discretionary accruals and not the innate 
accruals of firms, the DD (2002) model as modified by McNichols (2002) will be used 
as the primary measure of accounting information quality5. In this model, the total 
                                                 
 
5 The modified Jones model  is used in the sensitivity testing stage. 
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accruals of the firm is regressed on past, present, and future operating cash flows; as 
well as the change in revenue and the level of PPE. 
 ∆𝑊𝐶𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑗,𝑡+1 + 𝛽4∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡   
  
(8) 
where, for firm j, ∆WCj,t is a comprehensive measure of change in working capital 
accruals, including change in accounts receivable, accounts payable, current inventory, 
current investments, current provisions and other current assets and liabilities in year t, 
CFOj,t is cash flow from operations in year t, ∆REVj,t is the change in operating revenue 
between year t-1 and year t, and PPEj,t is property plant and equipment in year t.  All 
variables in equation (8) are scaled by average total assets from year t-1 to t. For each 
year, equation (8) is estimated sector-by-sector. 
Accruals quality, AQ, is derived by taking the standard deviation of the firm-year 
specific residual (εj,t) from equation (1) for the years t-4 to t.  A high variation in the 
error term indicates that accruals map poorly into cash flows, revenues and PPE, which 
implies lower quality accruals. A low standard deviation, or AQ measure, signals high  
accruals quality. 
Furthermore, the accruals quality measure, AQ, is decomposed into innate and 
discretionary subcomponents in accordance with prior studies (Aldamen & Duncan, 
2011; Kent et al., 2010). AQ is regressed on five innate factors identified by DD (2002) 
and Francis et al. (2005), namely company size, standard deviation of cash flow from 
operations, standard deviation of sales revenue, length of operating cycle, and earnings 
losses as follows:  
 𝐴𝑄𝑗 = 𝜑0 + 𝜑1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑗 + 𝜑2𝜎(𝐶𝐹𝑂)𝑗 + 𝜑3𝜎(𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆)𝑗 + 𝜑4𝑂𝑝𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑗 + 𝜑5𝑁𝑒𝑔𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑗 +
𝜀𝑗  
(9) 
where for firm j, AQ is the accruals quality measure, SIZEj is the log of average 
total assets for 2002 to 2006, σ(CFO)j is the standard deviation of cash flow from 
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operation (scaled by average total assets) over the past five years, and σ(SALES)j is the 
standard deviation of sales (operating revenue, scaled by average total assets) over the 
past five years. OpCycle is the average age of inventory plus the average age of 
receivables (in days) between 2002 and 2006 (after winsorizing at 365 days), and 
NegEarnj is the number of years, out of the past five, where the reported income before 
extraordinary items is negative. The predicted values from equation (2) are the 
estimated innate components of the jth firm’s accruals quality, IAQ. The residual values 
from equation (2) are the estimated discretionary components of the jth firm’s accruals 
quality, DAQ. This measure, DAQ, is used as a proxy variable to operationalize 
accounting information quality.  
 
3.2.4 UNIDENTIFIABLE INTANGIBLE ASSETS 
This thesis uses an experimental variable to operationalize the level of 
unidentifiable intangible assets on a firm-by-firm basis. The variable is derived using 
factor analysis to form a one-factor solution based on three Tobin’s q measures, and 
represents the underlying unobserved unidentifiable intangible assets within each firm. 
This section discusses why Tobin’s q is an appropriate measure for unidentifiable 
intangible assets and reviews some of the prior research that has used it for this purpose. 
Due to accounting regulation, unidentifiable intangible assets are not reflected in a 
firm’s book value, and this makes it hard to quantify them for research purposes (Lev, 
2001). However as market values reflect not only the book value of a firm but also the 
value of the firm’s intangible assets, Tobin’s q has the ability to proxy for the level of a 
firm’s unidentifiable intangible assets. This has been stated by both accounting (Lev, 
2001) and management researchers (Teece & Pisano, 1994). Industries such as 
information technology, where unidentified intangible assets are common, have higher 
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Tobin’s q ratios in comparison to industries where book values reflect the true nature of 
the asset holdings (i.e. with more tangible asset bases) (Amir & Lev, 1996). The notion 
that Tobin’s q can proxy for intangible assets can be traced to the seminal work of 
Lindenberg and Ross (1981), who showed that industries that are R&D or advertising 
intensive are associated with abnormally high Tobin’s q ratios. 
While these studies are primarily based on observations of q, further research has 
actually employed Tobin’s q as a measure of unidentified intangible assets (Sanchez et 
al., 2000; Villalonga, 2004). Additionally, while studies have used q as a summative 
proxy for the level of intangible assets within firms (Villalonga, 2004), other studies 
have attempted to derive the value of specific intangible assets by regressing q on 
variables that indicate the level of the specific assets and using the predictive values as 
proxy measures of the specific assets (Hall, 1992, 1993; Hall et al., 2000; Ittner & 
Larcker, 1998; Megna & Klock, 1993; Simon & Sullivan, 1993). These studies attempt 
to isolate individual assets from q and often use survey instruments to attain information 
that may indicate the existence of these assets. However, such an approach is not 
possible for a large sample and consequently this thesis uses Tobin’s q as a summative 
measure for unidentifiable intangible assets. Consequently, the approach is similar to 
the method employed by Villalonga (2004). 
For the purpose of this thesis, three measures of q are estimated; Tobin’s q, 
Industry-adjusted q and Hedonic q. These three measures are widely employed in 
research and attempt to capture the same underlying phenomena (Anderson & Reeb, 
2003; Villalonga, 2004; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Tobin’s q is the original measure 
that was developed by James Tobin (Tobin, 1969) and is the sum of the market value of 
a firm's equity and the book value of total liabilities divided by total assets, and is 
estimated by the following equation: 
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 ln(𝑄)𝑗,𝑡 = (𝑀𝑉𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑇𝐿𝑗𝑡)/ 𝑇𝐴𝑗𝑡   
  
(10) 
where MV is the market value of equity for firm j in time t, TL is the book value 
of debt for firm j in time t, and TA is the total assets for firm j in time t. However, it is 
not possible to compare the q value of firms in different industries as there is an industry 
effect on q. Researchers have used an industry-adjusted q to address this drawback and 
control for the industry effect of q (Villalonga, 2004; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). 
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s q is estimated as a firm’s q minus the median q in the firm’s 
sector in the observation year.  
Furthermore, while researchers have been in agreement that Tobin’s q is able to 
capture the unidentifiable intangible assets of a firm to an extent, the measure in itself 
may be noisy as market speculation introduces volatility to the measure that is not based 
on the change in unidentifiable intangible assets of a firm. This issue was addressed by 
Villalonga (2004) who used a hedonic regression to isolate the variation in Tobin’s q to 
the underlying identified intangible assets within each firm. Using this method, a 
Hedonic q is estimated by using the predictive value Tobin’s q from a regression on 
intangible asset measurements that are recognized in the financial statements. The 
hedonic q is estimated as follows: 
 ln(𝑄)𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑂𝑂𝐷𝑊𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡  
  
(11) 
where q is Tobin’s q, GOODWILL is goodwill stock divided by assets and 
OTHERINTANG is other intangible stock divided by assets. This model is estimated on 
a year-by-year and sector-by-sector basis for all sectors in the sample, as indicated by 
subscript j. The sector-specific estimation allows the importance of the two variables to 
vary across industries. The predictive values of q antilog are then used as the value for 
Hedonic q. 
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However, while all of these measures (Tobin’s q, Industry- adjusted q and 
Hedonic q) have been employed in previous research as proxies for unidentifiable 
intangible assets (Hasso & Duncan, 2012), the existence of three highly correlated 
variables allows for the use of factor analysis to reduce these three measures into one 
summative measure that captures the underlying phenomena. Using a one factor 
solution, the variation in Tobin’s q, Industry- adjusted q and Hedonic q is captured and 
thus forms the variable Factored q, which is used as the primary measure of 
unidentifiable intangible assets in this thesis. 
 
3.3 OPERATIONALIZATION OF PROPOSITIONS 
This section provides the operationalization of the propositions that were 
developed in Chapter 2. In total, 8 hypotheses are presented and these are based on the 8 
propositions that were developed in Chapter 2. However, the order of these hypotheses 
has changed to enable easier analysis and interpretation of results. An overview of the 
hypotheses and the propositions that they are based on is presented in Table 3-2. 
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Table 3-2 Propositions to hypotheses 
# Proposition # Hypothesis 
P8 There is a relationship between family ownership and 
unidentifiable intangible assets. 
H1 There is a relationship between family ownership and unidentifiable 
intangible assets. 
P7 There is a relationship between family ownership and 
accounting information quality. 
H2 There is a relationship between family ownership and accounting 
information quality. 
P1 There is a positive relationship between earnings and firm 
value. 
H3 There is a positive relationship between earnings and firm value. 
P2 There is a positive relationship between book value and 
firm value. 
H4 There is a positive relationship between book value and firm value. 
P3 The relationship between earnings and firm value is 
positively moderated by accounting information quality. 
H5 The relationship between earnings and firm value is positively 
moderated by accounting information quality. 
P4 The relationship between book value and firm value is 
moderated by accounting information quality. 
H6 The relationship between book value and firm value is moderated by 
accounting information quality. 
P6 The relationship between earnings and firm value is 
moderated by the level of unidentifiable intangible assets. 
H7 The relationship between earnings and firm value is moderated by the 
level of unidentifiable intangible assets. 
P5 The relationship between book value and firm value is 
moderated by the level of unidentifiable intangible assets. 
H8 The relationship between book value and firm value is moderated by the 
level of unidentifiable intangible assets. 
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3.3.1 HYPOTHESIS 1: FAMILY OWNERSHIP AND ACCOUNTING INFORMATION 
QUALITY 
To test hypothesis 1, the relationship between family ownership and accounting 
information quality is estimated through an OLS regression. As prior research has 
established specific governance mechanisms that are associated with discretionary 
accruals in Australia, the analysis starts by testing these associations and thus 
comparing the results to validate this thesis’ sample. Kent et al. (2010) found that, in 
Australia, discretionary accruals are associated with audit quality characteristics. 
Specifically, the number of individuals on the audit committee and the usage of a Big 4 
firm for the firm audit. Thus, following Kent et al. (2010), the following equation is 
estimated as a control model: 
 𝐷𝐴𝑄𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐶𝑂𝑀 + 𝛽2𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗   (12) 
where, for firm j, DAQ is the discretionary accruals quality measure derived from 
the residuals in equation 2, AUDCOM is the number of directors on the audit committee 
in 2006 and BIG4 is a dummy variable coded as 1 if the firm use a Big 4 firm for their 
audit in 2006. As DAQ is an inverse measure of discretionary accruals quality, both 
𝛽1and 𝛽2 are expected to be negative. This equation is extended by introducing the 
FAMILY variable to test for hypothesis 1, which states that there is a relationship 
between family ownership and discretionary accruals quality. Additionally, to control 
for non-family block holders, the variable BLOCK is added to this equation as well: 
 𝐷𝐴𝑄𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐶𝑂𝑀 + 𝛽2𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑗 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐴𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑌𝑗 + 𝛽4𝐵𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗   (13) 
where, for firm j, DAQ is the discretionary accruals quality measure derived from 
the residuals in equation 2, AUDCOM is the number of directors on the audit committee 
in 2006 and BIG4 is a dummy variable coded 1 if the firm use a Big 4 firm for their firm 
audit in 2006, FAMILY is a continuous variable that accounts for the percentage of 
family ownership of the firm’s shares. BLOCK is a continuous variable that accounts 
 60 
Chapter 3: Research Design 60 
for the percentage of the firm’s shares held by block holders (excluding family 
ownership). Block holders are considered to be any non-family shareholders that own at 
least 5 % of the firm’s shares. As hypothesis 1 is non-directional, the sign of 𝛽3 is not 
predicted.  
 
3.3.2 HYPOTHESIS 2: FAMILY OWNERSHIP AND UNIDENTIFIABLE INTANGIBLE 
ASSETS 
To test hypothesis 2, the relationship between family ownership and 
unidentifiable intangible assets is examined using an OLS regression. Similar to the 
process for testing hypothesis 1, this process starts by establishing a control model by 
drawing on the work of Villalonga (2004) and Villalonga and Amit (2006). This prior 
research highlighted that a firm’s Tobin’s q is partially explained by factors such as firm 
size, age, the growth of the firm, beta, and leverage. Additionally, industry and time are 
also considered as hypothesis 2 uses a pooled cross-sectional sample. The control model 
is represented in the following equation: 
 𝐹𝑄𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛾𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 (14) 
where FQ is the Factored q for firm j at year t, FIRMCONTROLS is a vector of 
firm control variables for firm j at year t, INDUSTRY is a vector of industry control 
variables for firm j at year t, YEAR is a vector of year control variables for firm j at year 
t. 
FIRMCONTROLS is a vector of firm control variables where SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of the average total assets for the year; AGE is the natural logarithm of the 
number of years since incorporation; GROWTH is the sales growth in the past year; 
BETA is a proxy for market risk and is based on weekly share prices; LEVERAGE is 
total debt divided by the market value of equity at the end of the financial year. 
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INDUSTRY is a vector of industry control variables where CONDISC is a 
dummy variable that is coded 1 for firms in the Consumer Discretionary sector and 0 
otherwise. CONSTAPLES is a dummy variable that is coded 1 for firms in the 
Consumer Staples sector and 0 otherwise. ENERGY is a dummy variable that is coded 
1 for firms in the Energy sector and 0 otherwise. HEALTHCARE is a dummy variable 
that is coded 1 for firms in the Health Care sector and 0 otherwise. INDUSTRIAL is a 
dummy variable that is coded 1 for firms in the Industrials sector and 0 otherwise. IT is 
a dummy variable that is coded 1 for firms in the Information Technology sector and 0 
otherwise. MATERIALS is a dummy variable that is coded 1 for firms in the Materials 
sector and 0 otherwise. TELECOM is a dummy variable that is coded 1 for firms in the 
Telecommunication Services sector and 0 otherwise. 
YEAR is a vector of year control variables where 2003 is a dummy variable that is 
coded 1 if the firm data is from the 2003 financial year. 2004 is a dummy variable that 
is coded 1 if the firm data is from the 2004 financial year. 2005 is a dummy variable 
that is coded 1 if the firm data is from the 2005 financial year. 2006 is a dummy 
variable that is coded 1 if the firm data is from the 2006 financial year. 
Extending upon the control model, hypothesis two is tested by introducing the 
variable FAMILY and the additional control-variable BLOCK: 
 
𝐹𝑄𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛾𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐴𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑌𝑗,𝑡 +
𝛽2𝐵𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡  (15) 
where FQ is the Factored q for firm j at year t, FIRMCONTROLS is a vector of 
firm control variables for firm j at year t, INDUSTRY is a vector of industry control 
variables for firm j at year t, YEAR is a vector of year control variables for firm j at year 
t, FAMILY is a continuous variable that accounts for the percentage of family 
ownership of the firm’s shares. BLOCK is a continuous variable that accounts for the 
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percentage of the firm’s shares that is held by block holders (excluding family 
ownership). As hypothesis 2 is non-directional, the sign of 𝛽1 is not predicted.  
 
3.3.3 HYPOTHESES 3-8: THE MODERATING ROLES OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION 
QUALITY AND UNIDENTIFIABLE INTANGIBLE ASSETS 
Hypotheses 3 to 8 relate to accounting information quality and unidentifiable 
intangible assets, and their moderating impact upon the value-relevance of earnings and 
book value. These are tested using a value-relevance methodology. As discussed earlier 
in this chapter, as stock measures such as book value and unidentifiable intangible 
assets are central to this thesis, the levels model is used as it is better suited when 
investigating the value-relevance of book value (Barth et al., 1998b). 
While the original value-relevance framework specifies that firm value is a 
function of its earnings and book value, a number of studies have examined additional 
important firm-specific factors that also explain the variance in value. Collins et al. 
(1997) provide an overview of the research and identify firm-specific factors that should 
be controlled for in value-relevance studies, these are: (1) negative earnings; (2) size; 
(3) growth opportunities; and (4) leverage. 
 Negative earnings is an important control as the traditional value-relevance model 
does not consider the fact that even a firm with negative earnings will be of some value 
and most likely investors will place more weight upon these firms’ book value (Collins 
et al., 1999).  Additionally, firm size is of importance, as the traditional value-relevance 
model does not consider that smaller firms are often unprofitable and thus are valued 
upon their growth potential; in such cases the weight upon the earnings in the valuation 
may decrease. Consequently, firms’ growth opportunities will impact the value-
relevance of earnings and book value as these firms will tend to be valued at higher 
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earnings and book value multiples as compared to firms that are in the mature phase of 
their life cycle. Finally, leverage is important to consider as it proxies for the financial 
health of firms. Barth et al. (1998) showed that firms that are considered financially 
healthy are priced at higher multiples of their earnings and book value. 
In addition to the discussed firm-specific control factors, this thesis also considers 
the impact of industry as it has been shown that value-relevance varies across industries 
(Lev, 2001). Finally. controls for time are introduced as the sample is a pooled sample 
that spans the years 2002 to 2006. The full control model used for testing the value-
relevance hypotheses is specified as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑗,𝑡 +
𝜃𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡  (16) 
where P is the price per share for firm j at fiscal year-end t plus 3 months, EPS is 
earnings per share for firm j at year t, and BVPS is book value per share for firm j at 
year t, FIRMCONTROLS is a vector of firm control variables for firm j at time t, 
INDUSTRY is a vector of industry control variables for firm j at year t, YEAR is a 
vector of year control variables for firm j at year t. 
FIRMCONTROLS is a vector of firm control variables where LOSS is a dummy 
variable that is coded as 0 if the EPS is a negative number, SMALL is a dummy 
variable that is coded as 0 for firms whose total assets are below the sample median in 
year t, GROWTH is the sales growth between year t-1 and year t, LEVERAGE is total 
liabilities to total assets ratio in year t. The vector also includes interaction effects 
between each firm control variable and the variables EPS and BVPS. 
INDUSTRY is a vector of industry control variables where CONDISC is a 
dummy variable that is coded 1 for firms in the Consumer Discretionary sector and 0 
otherwise. CONSTAPLES is a dummy variable that is coded 1 for firms in the 
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Consumer Staples sector and 0 otherwise. ENERGY is a dummy variable that is coded 
1 for firms in the Energy sector and 0 otherwise. HEALTHCARE is a dummy variable 
that is coded 1 for firms in the Health Care sector and 0 otherwise. INDUSTRIAL is a 
dummy variable that is coded 1 for firms in the Industrials sector and 0 otherwise. IT is 
a dummy variable that is coded 1 for firms in the Information Technology sector and 0 
otherwise. MATERIALS is a dummy variable that is coded 1 for firms in the Materials 
sector and 0 otherwise. TELECOM is a dummy variable that is coded 1 for firms in the 
Telecommunication Services sector and 0 otherwise. The vector also includes 
interaction effects between each industry control variable and the variables EPS and 
BVPS. 
YEAR is a vector of year control variables where 2003 is a dummy variable that is 
coded 1 if the firm data is from the 2003 financial year. 2004 is a dummy variable that 
is coded 1 if the firm data is from the 2004 financial year. 2005 is a dummy variable 
that is coded 1 if the firm data is from the 2005 financial year. 2006 is a dummy 
variable that is coded 1 if the firm data is from the 2006 financial year. The vector also 
includes interaction effects between each year control variable and the variables EPS 
and BVPS. 
Having established the control model, this thesis proceeds to specify the models 
used to test each value-relevance hypothesis. Hypotheses 5 and 6 relate to the 
moderating effect of accounting information quality on the value-relevance of earnings 
and book value. Model 17 introduces the proxy variable for accounting information 
quality, DAQ, and the interaction effects between DAQ and EPS, and DAQ and BVPS. 
The equation is as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝐴𝑄𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑄𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 ∗
𝐷𝐴𝑄𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡  (17) 
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 Hypotheses 7 and 8 relate to the moderating effect of unidentifiable intangible 
assets on the value-relevance of earnings and book value. As previously discussed in 
this chapter, unidentifiable intangible assets are operationalized by using the variable 
FQ, Factored q. However, as both FQ and the dependent variable in value-relevance 
models, price, are derivatives of market value this introduces simultaneous equation 
bias. 
Consequently, this thesis proceeds to remove the effect of simultaneous equation 
bias by using a 2-stage least squares method as used by Barth et al. (1998). In the first 
stage, FQ is regressed on all the control variables in equations (14) and (16). The 
predicted value of FQ from this regression is used as the new proxy for unidentifiable 
intangible assets. In the second stage, the value-relevance of unidentifiable intangible 
assets is tested by introducing the predicted value of FQ to model 16. By construction, 
the predicted value does not reflect the association between the estimation error in FQ 
and price per share. The equation to test hypotheses 7 and 8 is as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑄𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑄𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑄𝑗,𝑡 +
𝛾𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡  (18) 
 where FQ is the level of unidentifiable intangible assets for firm j at time t and is 
the predictive value of FQ derived from a regression of FQ on all the control variables 
in equations (14) and (16).  
Finally, this thesis finishes the testing of hypotheses 3 to 8 by introducing a full 
model that tests these hypotheses jointly.  
 
𝑃𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝐴𝑄𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑄𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 ∗
𝐷𝐴𝑄𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑄𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑄𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑄𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑗,𝑡 +
𝛿𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡  
(19) 
While the full model is theoretically convincing as it captures all the proposed 
relationships, it comes at the expense of simplicity as the full model includes a number 
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of two-way interactions that are difficult to interpret from a reader’s perspective. The 
table below presents a detailed explanation of the purpose of each coefficient in model 
19 and relates it to the hypothesis that each coefficient tests. 
Table 3-3 Purpose of each coefficient in model 19 
Coefficient Purpose 
𝛽0 No hypothesis, β0 is the constant in the model. 
𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 Tests H3, that there is a positive relationship between 
earnings and firm value. If β1 is significant and positive 
then H3 is supported. 
𝛽2𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 Tests H4, that there is a positive relationship between 
book value and firm value. If β2 is significant and 
positive then H4 is supported. 
𝛽3𝐷𝐴𝑄𝑗,𝑡 Does not test any hypothesis however is required for 
statistical validity in order to test H5 and H6. This 
coefficient estimates the main effect of accounting 
information quality. 
𝛽4𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑄𝑗,𝑡 Tests H5, that the relationship between earnings and 
firm value is positively moderated by accounting 
information quality. If β4 is significant and negative 
(DAQ is an inverse measure) then H5 is supported.  
𝛽5𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑄𝑗,𝑡 Tests H6, that the relationship between book value and 
firm value is moderated by accounting information 
quality. If β5 is significant then H6 is supported 
𝛽6𝐹𝑄𝑗,𝑡 Does not test any hypothesis however is required for 
statistical validity in order to test H7 and H8. This 
coefficient estimates the main effect of unidentifiable 
intangible assets. 
𝛽7𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑄𝑗,𝑡 Tests H7, that the relationship between earnings and 
firm value is moderated by the level of unidentifiable 
intangible assets. If β7 is significant and then H7 is 
supported. 
𝛽8𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑄𝑗,𝑡 Tests H8, that the relationship between earnings and 
firm value is moderated by the level of unidentifiable 
intangible assets. If β8 is significant and then H8 is 
supported. 
𝛾𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑗,𝑡 No hypothesis, 𝛾 is a vector of firm control variables for 
firm j at time t 
𝛿𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑗,𝑡 No hypothesis, 𝛿 is a vector of industry control variables 
for firm j at year t 
𝜃𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡 No hypothesis, 𝜃 is a vector of year control variables for 
firm j at year t 
 67 
Chapter 3: Research Design 67 
In addition to model 19, two additional models are estimated to investigate the 
family effect in further detail. First, a model is estimated that is consistent with prior 
research that explores the relationship between ownership and value-relevance of 
accounting information (Bae & Jeong, 2007; Cascino et al., 2010). This model ignores 
the concepts of accounting information quality and unidentifiable intangible assets and 
instead assumes that any ownership effect would have a direct effect on the value-
relevance of earnings and book value. This model is specified as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐴𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑌𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝐴𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑌𝑗,𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝐴𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑌𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡 +
𝜁𝐵𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡  
(20) 
Furthermore, an additional model is estimated that combines models 19 and 20, 
and thus explores if there is a residual family effect. This model incorporates the 
moderating effects of accounting information quality and unidentifiable intangible 
assets. Family ownership is also included to estimate any residual effects that it may 
have in excess of any effect that is captured through accounting information quality and 
unidentifiable intangible assets.  
 
𝑃𝑗,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝐴𝑄𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐴𝑄𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 ∗
𝐷𝐴𝑄𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑄𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑄𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑄𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐹𝐴𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑌𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 ∗
𝐹𝐴𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑌𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐵𝑉𝑃𝑆𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝐴𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑌𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑗,𝑡 +
𝜃𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜁𝐵𝐿𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡  
(21) 
 If β10 is significant then family-ownership itself moderates the value-relevance 
of earnings, in excess of the family effect through the pathways of accounting 
information quality and unidentifiable intangible assets. Furthermore, if β11 is 
significant then family-ownership itself moderates the value-relevance of book value in 
excess of the family effect through the pathways of accounting information quality and 
unidentifiable intangible assets. This model is important in finding any unexplained 
effects and may provide avenues for future research. 
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3.4 SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES 
In total, 8 hypotheses have been presented in this chapter. Additionally, the 
models used to test each hypothesis have been introduced. The table below summarises 
the hypotheses and the decision rules that will be used in the hypotheses testing. 
Table 3-4 Summary of hypotheses 
# Hypothesis Decision rule 
H1 There is a relationship between family ownership and 
accounting information quality. 
𝛽3 ≠ 0 (Model 13) 
H2 There is a relationship between family ownership and 
unidentifiable intangible assets. 
𝛽1≠ 0 (Model 15) 
H3 There is a positive relationship between earnings and 
firm value. 
𝛽1 > 0 (Model 19) 
H4 There is a positive relationship between book value 
and firm value. 
𝛽2 > 0 (Model 19) 
H5 The relationship between earnings and firm value is 
positively moderated by accounting information 
quality. 
𝛽4 < 0 (Model 19) 
H6 The relationship between book value and firm value 
is moderated by accounting information quality. 
𝛽5 ≠ 0 (Model 19) 
H7 The relationship between earnings and firm value is 
moderated by the level of unidentifiable intangible 
assets. 
𝛽7 ≠ 0 (Model 19) 
H8 The relationship between book value and firm value 
is moderated by the level of unidentifiable intangible 
assets. 
𝛽8 ≠ 0 (Model 19) 
 
3.5 SUMMARY OF VARIABLES 
This thesis uses a large number of variables. To improve understandability, all 
variables across the models are summarised in the table below with a description of 
each variable. 
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Table 3-5 Summary of variables 
Group Variable Description 
Family 
Definition 
FAMILY (primary 
definition) 
A firm is said to be a family-owned firm when one or more family members are shareholders, and one or 
more family members are officers or directors (continuous variable) 
 FAMILY (alt. 1) A firm is said to be a family-owned firm when one or more family members are shareholders, and one or 
more family members are officers or directors (dummy variable) 
 FAMILY (alt. 2) A firm is said to be a family-owned firm when one or more family members are shareholders and the 
chief executive officer or chief financial officer is a family member (continuous variable) 
 FAMILY (alt. 3) A firm is said to be a family-owned firm when the family has at least 20% of the votes, and the chief 
executive officer or chief financial officer is a family member (continuous variable) 
   
Accounting 
Information 
Quality 
Accruals quality 
(AQ) 
 
The DD (2002) model as modified by McNichols (2002) is used to measure accruals quality. In this 
model, the total accruals of the firm is regressed on past, present, and future operating cash flows; as well 
as on the change in revenue and the level of PPE. Accruals quality, AQ, is derived by taking the standard 
deviation of the firm-year specific residual (𝜀𝑗,𝑡) from equitation (1) for the years t-4 to t. 
 Discretionary 
accruals quality 
(DAQ) 
 
AQ is regressed on five innate factors identified by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Francis et al. (2005), 
namely company size, standard deviation of cash flow from operations, standard deviation of sales 
revenue, length of operating cycle, and earnings losses. The residual values from the regression are the 
estimated discretionary components of the jth firm’s accruals quality. 
 AUDCOM AUDCOM is the number of directors on the audit committee in 2006 
 BIG4 BIG4 is a dummy variable coded as 1 if the firm uses a Big 4 firm for their firm audit in 2006 
 SIZE (Model 13) Size is the natural log of average total assets between 2002 and 2006 
 (CFO) (CFO) is standard deviation of CFO scaled by total assets over the past five years 
 (Sales) (Sales) is the standard deviation of sales scaled by total assets between 2002 and 2006 
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Group Variable Description 
 OpCycle OpCycle is the average age of inventory plus the average age of receivables (in days) between 2002 and 
2006 
 NegEarn NegEarn is the of number of years in which a loss was reported for between 2002 and 2006. 
 CFO CFO is the cash ﬂow from operations. 
 WC WC is a comprehensive measure of working capital accruals, including change in accounts receivable, 
accounts payable, current inventory, current investments, current provisions and other current assets and 
liabilities 
 PPE PPE is the property plant and equipment 
Unidentifiable 
Intangible 
Assets 
Tobin’s q (TQ) 
 
Tobin’s q is the ratio between the firm’s market value to the replacement cost of its physical assets. It is 
approximated by dividing the sum of the market value of equity and total liabilities by total assets. 
 Industry- adjusted 
q (IQ) 
Difference between the firm’s Tobin’s q and the asset-weighted average of the imputed q’s of its sector, 
where a sector’s imputed q is the sector 
average q. 
 Hedonic q (HQ) 
 
This measure of resource intangibility is the predicted value obtained from the regression of Tobin’s q on 
two accounting measures of intangible assets: goodwill and intangibles excluding goodwill. 
 Factored q (FQ) This experimental variable is a one factor solution of Tobin’s q, Industry- adjusted q and Hedonic q.  
 GOODWILL Goodwill stock divided by assets. 
 OTHERINTANG Other intangible stock divided by asset. 
 SIZE (Model 15) Natural logarithm of the average total assets for the year 
 AGE Natural logarithm of the number of years since incorporation 
 GROWTH Sales growth in the past year 
 BETA Proxy for market risk and is based on weekly share prices 
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Group Variable Description 
 LEVERAGE Total debt divided by the market value of equity at the end of the financial year. 
Value-
Relevance 
P Price per share for firm j at fiscal year-end t plus 3 months 
 EPS Earnings per share for firm j at year t 
 BVPS Book value per share for firm j at year t 
 LOSS  Dummy variable that is coded as 0 if the EPS is a negative number, 
 SMALL Dummy variable that is coded as 0 for firms whose total assets are below the sample median in year t 
 GROWTH (Model 
19) 
Sales growth between year t-1 and year t, 
 LEVERAGE 
(Model 19) 
Total liabilities to total assets ratio in year t. 
 EBIT EBIT is earnings before interest and tax  
 MV MV is market value 
 AGE Age is the number of years since incorporation 
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3.6 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH DESIGN 
This chapter presented the research design for this thesis. The sample for the 
hypotheses testing is comprised of 570 public firms that were listed on the ASX 
between 2002 and 2006. The low sample size is driven by the data requirements for 
hypotheses testing, as eight years of continuous data is necessary. Of these firms, 104 
were identified as family-owned firms using the family-owned firm definition 
developed by Villalonga and Amit (2006). Alternative family-owned firm definitions 
were identified from prior literature and will be used in sensitivity testing. 
The construct of accounting information quality was operationalized using an 
accrual quality model. The review of existing literature identified the Dechow and 
Dichev  (2002) model as modified by McNichols (2002) to be the most appropriate in 
estimating discretionary accruals and will be used as the primary measure for 
accounting information quality. The modified Jones model will also be used in 
sensitivity testing.  
The construct of unidentifiable intangible assets was operationalized by 
developing a factored experimental variable, Factored q. Prior literature identified 
Tobin’s q to be an appropriate proxy for intangible assets that are not recognized in the 
book value of a firm. The literature also used several different estimates of q, including 
the original Tobin’s q, industry-adjusted q, and hedonic q. As these estimates attempt to 
measure the same underlying phenomena, a one-factor solution was formed to capture 
the variation among these three estimations. 
Using these operationalizations, the propositions developed in Chapter 2 were 
transformed to hypotheses, and OLS regression models were specified in accordance 
with the prior literature to enable testing of the hypotheses. These hypotheses will now 
be formally tested in Chapter 4. 
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This chapter presents the empirical tests of the hypotheses developed in this thesis. The 
empirical tests presented derive from the research design discussed in chapter 3. First, 
the descriptive statistics for this sample are presented, together with separate descriptive 
statistics for each model that is used for hypotheses testing. Following, the models used 
in hypotheses testing are estimated and their results reported. The initial findings are 
presented and are then subjected to robustness testing, investigating the statistical 
robustness of the results as well as the robustness of the construct operationalization. 
The final section summarizes the findings of the results. 
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4.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 4-1 shows the sector-by-sector representation in the sample. The table also 
contains information about the presence of family-owned firms in each sector. The 
largest sector in the sample is the Materials sector (24.7%), followed by Industrials 
(18.6%) and Consumer Discretionary (17.5%). However, while the Consumer 
Discretionary sector is only the third largest sector in the sample, 35% of the firms in 
this sector are classified as family-owned firms. In comparison, family-owned firms 
represent 16.32% of the firms in the sample as a whole. In addition to the Consumer 
Discretionary sector, family-owned firms are also heavily represented in the 
Telecommunication Services sector, where they comprise 21.43% of firms. The 
disproportionate representation of family-owned firms in certain sectors indicates a need 
to control for sector in hypotheses testing. 
Table 4-1 Sector representation 
GICS Sector 
Number 
of firms 
Percent of 
sample 
Family-
owned 
firms 
Non-Family-
owned firms 
Percent 
family-owned 
firms 
Consumer Discretionary 100 17.5 35 65 35.00% 
Consumer Staples 30 5.3 3 27 10.00% 
Energy 47 8.2 3 44 6.38% 
Health Care 57 10.0 10 47 17.54% 
Industrials 106 18.6 16 90 15.09% 
Information Technology 69 12.1 13 56 18.84% 
Materials 141 24.7 10 131 7.09% 
Telecommunication Services 14 2.5 3 11 21.43% 
Utilities 6 1.1 0 6 0.00% 
Total 570 100.0 93 477 16.32% 
 
Table 4-2 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the hypotheses testing 
later in this chapter. These are grouped according to the hypotheses they test. 
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 The variable used to measure accounting information quality, DAQ, has a range 
between -0.374 and 0.462. This variable is an inverse measure, meaning that high 
values in DAQ are unfavourable and imply poor accounting information quality. The 
number of members on the audit committee, AUDCOM, ranges from 0 to 7, with 50% 
of the firms having between 2 and 3 audit committee members. Non-family block 
holders are very prevalent in the sample, on average they represent 35.7% of 
shareholders in firms, and in extreme cases up to 88% of a firm’s shareholders are block 
holders. Similarly, while family ownership averages 6% for the whole sample, the 
family on average holds 32.8% of the outstanding shares in firms that are classified as 
family-owned firms. Other notable insights from the descriptive statistics include the 
fact the average beta for the firms in the sample is 0.82, meaning that the firms in the 
sample are on average less risky than the market. This is expected, as the measurement 
of certain variables required several years of detailed financial data, biasing the sample 
towards larger and more stable firms. 
Table 4-2 Descriptive statistics for continuous variables 
Variable N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Percentiles 
Min 25th Median 75th Max 
H1 – Accounting Information Quality 
DAQ 570 -0.002 0.114 -0.374 -0.067 -0.017 0.041 0.462 
AUDCOM 570 2.439 1.505 0.000 2.000 3.000 3.000 7.000 
BLOCK 570 0.357 0.195 0.000 0.200 0.370 0.500 0.880 
FAMILY 570 0.060 0.152 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.860 
H2 – Unidentifiable Intangible Assets 
FQ 2850 0.013 0.621 -0.684 -0.264 -0.098 0.030 3.816 
FAMILY 2850 0.060 0.152 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.860 
GROWTH 2850 0.987 4.343 -0.970 -0.100 0.090 0.400 33.265 
AGE (log of Age) 2850 2.544 0.640 1.390 1.950 2.560 3.000 4.010 
LEVERAGE 2850 0.811 1.251 0.000 0.130 0.390 0.880 7.690 
BLOCK 2850 0.357 0.195 0.000 0.200 0.370 0.500 0.880 
BETA 2850 0.820 0.366 -0.090 0.590 0.800 1.010 2.130 
SIZE (log of TA) 2850 17.812 2.239 13.525 16.190 17.450 19.213 23.486 
H3-H8 – Value-Relevance 
PRICE 2850 2.187 4.394 0.010 0.100 0.440 2.390 29.204 
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Variable N Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Percentiles 
Min 25th Median 75th Max 
EPS 2850 8.890 26.266 -56.753 -1.900 0.600 13.800 134.867 
BVPS 2850 1.014 1.749 0.000 0.050 0.240 1.150 9.646 
DAQ 2850 -0.002 0.112 -0.270 -0.067 -0.017 0.040 0.384 
FQ (Predicted) 2850 0.013 0.369 -1.006 -0.233 -0.023 0.210 2.005 
FAMILY 2850 0.060 0.152 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.860 
BLOCK 2850 0.357 0.195 0.000 0.200 0.370 0.500 0.880 
GROWTH 2850 0.987 4.343 -0.970 -0.100 0.090 0.400 33.265 
LEVERAGE 2850 0.440 0.315 0.017 0.222 0.425 0.586 2.029 
 
This thesis reports a descriptive overview of the dummy variables used in the 
hypotheses testing. The frequencies for these variables are presented in Table 4-3. We 
can observe that the majority of the firms (62.5%) use a Big 4 auditor. Additionally, in 
44.9% of cases, the dummy variable Loss has a value of 1, meaning that these firms 
have negative earnings per share for that year. This pattern highlights the necessity to 
include this variable in the testing of hypotheses 3 to 8, as a large number of these firms 
must be valued based on their book value and cannot be valued based on earnings.  
Table 4-3 Descriptive statistics for dummy variables 
Variable Value Frequency Percent 
BIG4    
 0 214 37.5 
 1 356 62.5 
 Total 570 100.0 
SMALL    
 0 1425 50.0 
 1 1425 50.0 
 Total 2850 100.0 
LOSS    
 0 1569 55.1 
 1 1281 44.9 
  Total 2850 100.0 
 
Next, the correlation matrix for the variables in hypothesis 1 is explored (see 
Table 4-4). The dependent variable DAQ is significantly and negatively correlated with 
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the number of members on the audit committee (AC), the usage of a Big 4 auditor 
(BIG4), and family ownership (Family). These correlations indicate that these variables 
will be relevant in testing hypothesis 1. Additionally, there is a significant and positive 
correlation between the number of members on the audit committee (AUDCOM) and 
the usage of a Big 4 auditor as well as a significant and positive correlation between the 
AUDCOM variable and non-family block holders. Finally, there is also a significant and 
negative correlation between family ownership and non-family block holders. These 
significant correlations between the independent variables suggest that there may be 
concerns with multicollinearity, which is addressed in the robustness testing later in the 
chapter. 
Table 4-4 Correlation matrix for variables in Hypothesis 1 
 DAQ AUDCOM BIG4 FAMILY BLOCK 
DAQ 1     
ADUCOM -.142** 1    
BIG4 -.174** .176** 1   
FAMILY -.120** .003 .000 1  
BLOCK .013 .094* .029 -.270** 1 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels6 
The table contains pairwise correlations based on 570 observations. 
 
Table 4-5 presents the correlation matrix for the variables used in testing 
hypothesis 2. The dependent variable, FQ, is significantly and negatively correlated to 
the age of the firm, its size (log of total assets) and leverage (Debt/MV). A significant 
and positive correlation exists between the dependent variable and family ownership, 
providing initial support for hypothesis 2. However, there are also numerous significant 
correlations between the independent variables. Growth is significantly and negatively 
                                                 
 
6 This thesis denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels using symbols. However, it should be 
noted that some academic journals prefer not to denote results that are significant at the 10% level. As 
there is no consensus with respect to this issue, this thesis denotes results that are significant at the 10% 
level using the * symbol, and leaves it to the reader to decide if these results are “significant” or not. 
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correlated to size and leverage.  Larger firms tend to grow at lower rates, and high-
growing firms rely more heavily on equity funding. Interestingly, the age of the firm has 
a significant positive correlation to the risk of the firm, as measured by the beta, and has 
a significant negative correlation to family ownership. This data appears surprising 
because older firms are often stereotyped as less risky and family-owned firms are often 
suggested to be older. These correlations could be an attribute of the sample 
composition and its bias towards larger and more stable firms, and these relationships 
may be true for these firms in particular. Additionally, family ownership is significantly 
and positively correlated to leverage while negatively correlated with risk. In contrast, 
non-family block holder ownership is significantly and positively correlated to leverage, 
risk, and size. The numerous significant correlations between independent variables 
once again suggest potential problems of multicollinearity in the testing phase. 
Table 4-5 Correlation matrix for variables in Hypothesis 2 
  FQ GROWTH AGE SIZE LEVERAGE BETA FAMILY BLOCK 
FQ 1        
GROWTH .026 1       
AGE -.144** -.026 1      
SIZE -.220** -.100** .171** 1     
LEVERAGE -.187** -.060** .034 .105** 1    
RISK .007 -.008 .060** .014 .069** 1   
FAMILY .106** -.036 -.077** .003 .066** -.071** 1  
BLOCK -.008 .008 -.024 .109** .108** .102** -.270** 1 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels  
The table contains pairwise correlations based on 2850 observations. 
The correlation matrix for the variables used to test hypotheses 3 to 8 is depicted 
in Table 4-6. As expected, the dependent variable, PRICE, is significantly and highly 
positively correlated to both EPS and BVPS. Additionally, PRICE is also significantly 
and negatively correlated to the dummy variables LOSS and SMALL. While price was 
not found to be significantly correlated to family ownership, DAQ and LOSS had 
significant and negative correlations to family ownership while FQ is significantly and 
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positively correlated to family ownership. FQ is also significantly and negatively 
correlated to BVPS, indicating that high intangibility and book value per share are 
related. There are also significant correlations between all control variables and EPS as 
well as between these variables and BVPS. 
Table 4-6 Correlation matrix for variables in Hypothesis 3-8 
  Price EPS BVPS DAQ FQ Family Block Growth Leverage Loss Small 
Price 1           
EPS .765** 1          
BVPS .819** .695** 1         
DAQ -.011 -.009 -.063** 1        
FQ (Predicted) .070** -.029 -.192** .198** 1       
FAMILY -.017 -.005 .023 -.123** .178** 1      
BLOCK .009 -.006 -.019 .016 -.013 -.270** 1     
Growth -.071** -.064** -.087** .075** .044* -.036 .008 1    
Leverage .080** .038* .062** .069** .212** .014 .090** -.099** 1   
Loss -.342** -.537** -.374** .001 .184** -.091** -.021 .093** -.076** 1  
Small -.438** -.400** -.442** -.058** -.138** .025 -.061** .049** -.014 .455** 1 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels  
The table contains pairwise correlations based on 570 observations. 
4.2 H1: FAMILY OWNERSHIP AND ACCOUNTING INFORMATION 
QUALITY 
A relationship (non-directional) was hypothesized between family ownership and 
discretionary accruals quality (hypothesis 1). Before testing this hypothesis, this thesis 
considers the impact of the audit committee size and the usage of a Big 4 auditor, as 
these two variables were shown to be the two significant drivers of discretionary 
accruals in Australia by Kent et al. (2010). Table 4-7 shows the results for the 
regression using only these control variables; they confirm the previous results of Kent 
et al. (2010), as both AUDCOM (β =-.009, p<.01) and BIG4 (β =-.036, p<.01) are 
shown to be significant and negative. This means that a positive relationship (DAQ is an 
inverse measure) exists between audit committee size and discretionary accruals quality. 
There is also a positive relationship between use of a Big 4 auditor and discretionary 
accruals quality. It should be noted that Kent et al. (2010) estimated the discretionary 
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accruals (DAQ) using a pooled model, while these results are based on discretionary 
accruals estimations derived from sector by sector estimations. Consequently, these 
results provide incremental knowledge to the study of Kent et al. (2010). 
Next, the family ownership variable is introduced to test hypothesis 1: that there 
is a relationship between family ownership and discretionary accruals quality. Table 4-7 
shows the results after including the FAMILY variable. The variable FAMILY (β =-
.091, p<.01) is shown to be significant and has a negative coefficient. In other words, as 
the DAQ measure is inverse, family ownership has a positive association with 
discretionary accruals quality. Notably, there is no significant relationship between non-
family block holders and discretionary accruals quality. Furthermore, there is a 
significant change in the R square (∆=0.014, p<.05) in comparison to the control model. 
In conclusion, the results indicate that family ownership is positively associated with 
accounting information quality. 
 
Table 4-7 Family ownership and accounting information quality 
Variable beta (t-stat) beta (t-stat) 
(Constant) 0.042*** 
(4.098) 
0.048*** 
(3.57) 
AUDCOM -0.009*** 
(-2.757) 
-0.009*** 
(-2.743) 
BIG4 -0.036*** 
(-3.693) 
-0.036*** 
(-3.716) 
BLOCK  -0.003 
(-0.102) 
FAMILY  -0.091*** 
(-2.856) 
   
Adjusted R Square 0.040 0.051 
Std. Error of the Est. 0.112 0.111 
F 12.805 8.638 
Sig. 0.000 0.000 
n 570 570 
   
R Square Change  0.014 
Sig.  0.014 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels  
 
 81 
Chapter 4: Results 81 
AUDCOM  is the number of directors on the audit committee in 2006 and BIG4 is a dummy variable 
coded as 1 if the firm uses a Big 4 firm for their firm audit in 2006. FAMILY is a continuous variable that 
accounts for the percentage of family ownership of the firm’s shares. BLOCK is a continuous variable 
that accounts for the percentage of the firm’s shares that is held by block holders (excluding family 
ownership). 
 
4.3 H2: FAMILY OWNERSHIP AND UNIDENTIFIABLE INTANGIBLE 
ASSETS 
In H2, a relationship between unidentifiable intangible assets and family ownership is 
hypothesized. The results of the empirical test of H2 are reported in Table 4-8, and 
show that the predictors of the model explained 14.3% of the variance (Adj. R2=.143, 
F(2,55)= 26.062, p<.01). It was found that the variable of interest, FAMILY, 
significantly predicted unidentifiable intangible assets (β = .479, p<.01). Additionally, 
non-family block holders were also found to have a positive and significant association 
with resource intangibility (β = .228, p<.01). Furthermore, SIZE (β =-.048, p<.01), Age 
(β =-.062, p<.01), and BETA (β =-.079, p<.01) had significant and negative associations 
with unidentifiable intangible assets. While none of the yearly dummies had any 
significant associations, industry dummies for consumer discretionary (β = .178, p<.1), 
health care (β = .548, p<.01) and information technology (β = .195, p<.1) all had 
significant and positive associations with resource intangibility. The results also indicate 
that there is a stronger relationship for FAMILY (β = .479, p<.01) compared to BLOCK 
(β = .228, p<.01). It could be suggested that for each additional percentage of 
ownership, family ownership has twice the impact upon unidentifiable intangible assets 
in comparison to non-family block holder ownership. Furthermore, there is a significant 
change in the R square (∆=0.013, p<.01) in comparison to the control model. These 
results suggest that hypothesis 2 should not be rejected at this point. 
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Table 4-8 Family ownership and unidentifiable intangible assets 
Variable beta (t-stat) beta (t-stat) 
(Constant) 0.903*** 
(6.349) 
0.803*** 
(5.631) 
FAMILY 0.479*** 
(6.245) 
BLOCK 0.228*** 
(3.853) 
SIZE -0.046*** 
(-8.906) 
-0.048*** 
(-9.25) 
AGE -0.072*** 
(-4.066) 
-0.062*** 
(-3.517) 
GROWTH 0.000 
(-0.009) 
0.000 
(-0.007) 
BETA -0.073*** 
(-8.033) 
-0.079*** 
(-8.682) 
LEVERAGE 0.032 
(1.062) 
0.036 
(1.203) 
Controls - GICS Sector YES YES 
Controls – Year YES YES 
   
Adjusted R Square 0.131 0.143 
Std. Error of the Estimate 0.579 0.575 
F 26.180 26.062 
Sig. 0.000 0.000 
n 2850 2850 
   
R Square Change  0.013 
Sig.  0.000 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels  
 
FAMILY is a continuous variable that accounts for the percentage of family ownership of the firm’s 
shares. BLOCK is a continuous variable that accounts for the percentage of the firm’s shares that is held 
by block holders (excluding family ownership). SIZE is the natural logarithm of the average total assets 
for the year. AGE is the natural logarithm of the number of years since incorporation. GROWTH is the 
sales growth in the past year. BETA is a proxy for market risk and is based on weekly share prices. 
LEVERAGE is total debt divided by the market value of equity at the end of the financial year. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
 
 
4.4 H3-H8: ACCOUNTING INFORMATION QUALITY, UNIDENTIFIABLE 
INTANGIBLE ASSETS, FAMILY OWNERSHIP AND VALUE-
RELEVANCE OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION 
Hypotheses 3 to 8 relate to the value-relevance of accounting information and the 
moderating effects of accounting information quality and unidentifiable intangible 
assets. Table 4-9 reports the results from the primary test for hypotheses 3 to 8. First, a 
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control model is estimated to examine the extent to which the variance in price can be 
explained by the controls (model 16). The results indicate that the controls explained 
82.5% of the variance (Adj. R2=.825, F(2,55) 269.129, p<.01) in price. It should be 
noted that this control model considers EPS and BVPS and controls for firm 
characteristics, GICS sector, and time effects. While EPS (β =.079, p<.01) was found to 
have a significant and positive association with price, BVPS did not contribute to 
explaining the variance in price. The non-significance of BVPS is most likely due to the 
inclusion of extensive controls. 
 Next, models 17 and 18 are estimated to examine the effects of accounting 
information quality and unidentifiable intangible assets separately and to be able to 
examine the incremental explanatory power of each construct. However, these are not 
used in the hypotheses testing as they do not capture the full conceptual model of this 
thesis. Instead, this thesis focuses on model 19, which includes the variables of interest 
for hypotheses 5 to 8, namely; DAQ, FQ, and various interaction effects. The variables 
in the full model explained 90.9% of the variance (Adj. R2=.909, F(2,55)=507.699, 
p<.01) in price and the findings are reported in Table 4-9. Notably, there is a significant 
change in the R square (∆=0.083, p<.01) in comparison to the control model. 
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Table 4-9 Regression results for H3-H8 
Variable Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 
Fundamentals 
      (Constant) 
0.019 
(0.045) 
0.062 
(0.149) 
0.283 
(0.924) 
0.18 
(0.595) 
0.005 
(0.012) 
0.314 
(1.038) 
EPS (H3) 
0.069*** 
(4.781) 
0.066*** 
(4.632) 
0.032*** 
(3.033) 
0.024** 
(2.306) 
0.077*** 
(4.986) 
0.043*** 
(3.862) 
BVPS (H4) 
-0.036 
(-0.107) 
0.185 
(0.545) 
0.388 
(1.551) 
0.814*** 
(3.285) 
-0.212 
(-0.6) 
0.513** 
(2.008) 
H5-H6 - Accounting Information Quality 
     
DAQ 
 
0.185 
(0.528) 
-0.427* 
(-1.65) 
-0.495* 
(-1.925) 
EPS * DAQ (H5) 
 
0.015 
(0.497) 
-0.085*** 
(-3.717) 
-0.1*** 
(-4.37) 
BVPS * DAQ (H6) 
 
1.994*** 
(3.557) 
4.209*** 
(10.288) 
3.702*** 
(9.13) 
H7-H8 – Unidentifiable Intangible Assets 
     
FQ 
  
0.653*** 
(5.673) 
0.619*** 
(5.38) 
0.821*** 
(6.924) 
EPS * FQ (H7) 
  
0.074*** 
(19.398) 
0.073*** 
(19.369) 
0.074*** 
(19.759) 
BVPS * FQ (H8) 
  
1.006*** 
(15.911) 
1.074*** 
(17.247) 
1.143*** 
(18.477) 
Family Ownership 
      
FAMILY 
    
0.065 
(0.226) 
-0.645*** 
(-3.009) 
EPS * FAMILY 
    
0.005 
(0.311) 
-0.031*** 
(-2.623) 
BVPS * FAMILY 
    
-0.11 
(-0.509) 
-0.509*** 
(-3.291) 
       Controls –Block holders NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Controls - Firm Characteristics YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls - GICS Sector YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls – Year YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       Adjusted R Square 0.825 0.827 0.905 0.909 0.825 0.913 
Std. Error of the Est. 1.840 1.830 1.357 1.327 1.839 1.297 
F 269.129 257.231 511.023 507.699 240.494 482.710 
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
n 2850 2850 2850 2850 2850 2850 
       
R Square Change  0.002 0.079 0.083 0.000 0.087 
Sig.  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.331 0.000 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels  
P is share price three months after a firm’s fiscal year end. BVPS is book value of equity per share. EPS is 
net income per share. DAQ is the discretionary accruals quality measure as estimated using the DD 
(2002) model as modified by McNichols (2002). FQ is the predicted factored q score. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. FAMILY is a continuous variable that accounts for the 
percentage of family ownership of the firm’s shares. R Square Change and its significance is calculated in 
relation to the control model (model 16). 
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EPS (β =.024, p<.05) was found to have a significant and positive association 
with price; consequently, hypothesis 3 is not rejected. However, in contrast to the 
control model (16), the full model (19) shows that BVPS (β =.814, p<.01) is also 
significant in explaining price. As a result, hypothesis 4 is not rejected. 
 Next, this thesis focuses on hypothesis 5, that the relationship between earnings 
and firm value is positively moderated by accounting information quality. The 
interaction effect EPS * DAQ (β =-.085, p<.01) was found to have a significant and 
negative association with price. As DAQ is an inverse measure of accounting 
information quality, the results support the hypothesis. Hypothesis 5 cannot be rejected 
at this point. Furthermore, the interaction effect BVPS * DAQ (β =4209, p<.01) was 
found to have a significant and positive association with price. This provides support for 
hypothesis 6, that the relationship between book value and firm value is moderated by 
accounting information quality. Again, as DAQ is an inverse measure, the directionality 
for this relationship is negative.  
 This thesis proceeds to hypothesis 7, that the relationship between earnings and 
firm value is moderated by the level of unidentifiable intangible assets. The interaction 
effect EPS * FQ (β =.0619, p<.01) was found to have a significant and positive 
association with price. This provides support for hypothesis 7 and the directionality is 
positive. The interaction effect BVPS * FQ (β =1.074, p<.01) was also found to have a 
significant and positive association with price. This supports hypothesis 8, that the 
relationship between book value and firm value is moderated by the level of 
unidentifiable intangible assets. Furthermore, the results indicate that the directionality 
is positive for this relationship. In summary, the tests for hypothesis 7 and 8 indicate 
unidentifiable intangible assets do indeed moderate the value-relevance of both earnings 
and book value. The positive directionality indicates that the market perceives the 
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earnings and book value measures to be understated and compensates using a higher 
multiple in valuation. 
 To extend the hypotheses testing and analysis, this thesis finally considers if 
family ownership in itself may be value-relevant, and if it has a moderating effect on the 
value-relevance of earnings and book value. While this moderating effect is not 
supported by the conceptual model of this thesis, prior research that has investigated the 
value-relevance of ownership has assumed this form of relationship. Model 20 
introduces the family ownership variable, FAMILY, as well as its interactions between 
earnings and book value to the control model (Model 16). None of the variables related 
to family ownership are shown to be significant. Thus, it is apparent that it is important 
to consider the actual pathways (accounting information quality and unidentifiable 
intangible assets) in which family ownership may be value-relevant. Model 21 
introduces the family ownership variable, FAMILY, and its interactions between 
earnings and book value to the full model (Model 19). In effect, this model tests any 
residual effect that family ownership may have in excess of the effect through 
accounting information quality and unidentifiable intangible assets. Interestingly, the 
fixed effect of FAMILY is found to be significant and negative (β =-0.645, p<.01). 
Similarly, the interaction effects of FAMILY * EPS (β =-0.031, p<.01) and FAMILY * 
BVPS (β =-0.509, p<.01) are found to be significant and negative. These relationships 
imply that there is a residual negative effect of family ownership that is not captured 
through the pathways of accounting information quality and unidentifiable intangible 
assets. This residual effect is difficult to explain at this point in time, but its existence 
provides researchers with future potential research avenues, which will be discussed 
later in this thesis. 
 
 87 
Chapter 4: Results 87 
4.5 INITIAL FINDINGS 
The findings thus far for hypotheses 1 to 8 are summarized in the table below. 
For each hypothesis, the “reject” or “do not reject” is indicated, as well as the 
directionality of the finding. However, these initial findings are not definitive, as they 
have not been subject to statistical robustness testing or testing for the sensitivity of the 
findings to the construct operationalization choices. 
Table 4-10 Summary of initial findings 
# Hypothesis Decision  Direction 
H1 There is a relationship between family ownership 
and accounting information quality. 
Do not reject Positive 
H2 There is a relationship between family ownership 
and unidentifiable intangible assets. 
Do not reject Positive 
H3 There is a positive relationship between earnings 
and firm value. 
Do not reject Positive 
H4 There is a positive relationship between book 
value and firm value. 
Do not reject Positive 
H5 The relationship between earnings and firm value 
is positively moderated by accounting 
information quality. 
Do not reject Positive 
H6 The relationship between book value and firm 
value is moderated by accounting information 
quality. 
Do not reject Negative 
H7 The relationship between earnings and firm value 
is moderated by the level of unidentifiable 
intangible assets. 
Do not reject Positive 
H8 The relationship between book value and firm 
value is moderated by the level of unidentifiable 
intangible assets. 
Do not reject Positive 
 
4.6 STATISTICAL ROBUSTNESS  
This section tests if the models used to test hypotheses 1 to 8 violate any of the 
statistical assumptions of ordinary least squares regressions. The following four 
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assumptions are tested: (1) autocorrelation; (2) heteroscedasticity; (3) normality; (4) 
multicollinearity. 
 
4.6.1 AUTOCORRELATION  
Ordinary least squares regressions assume that the random errors are independent 
from each other. However, as this sample uses five years of data for testing of 
Hypothesis 2 to 8, the error terms from these regressions are expected to be correlated 
over time. Consequently, the autocorrelation assumption may be violated. The Durbin-
Watson test is estimated to formally detect any autocorrelation issues in the residuals. 
The Durbin-Watson statistics for the models that test the hypotheses in this chapter are 
reported in Table 4-11. 
Table 4-11 Durbin-Watson statistic 
Hypothesis Concept Durbin-Watson 
Hypothesis 1 Accounting Information Quality 1.948 
Hypothesis 2 Unidentified Intangible Assets .975 
Hypotheses 3-8 Value-Relevance 1.335 
 
 The results in the table above confirm the expectations. While the model used to 
test hypothesis 1 does not suffer from autocorrelation issues, the models used to test 
hypothesis 2 and hypotheses 3-8 both suffer from positive autocorrelation, as the 
Durbin-Watson statistic for these is significantly lower than the midpoint of 2 
(Chatterjee & Hadi, 2006). 
 To remedy the violation of the autocorrelation assumption, this thesis uses the 
Cochrane-Orcutt procedure as described in Neter et al. (1996). In summary, this 
iterative procedure estimates an autoregressive model by modifying the usual multiple 
regression model: 
Yt  = β 0 + β 1 X 1t + β 2 X 2t  +L+ β p X pt + ε t 
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by adding the equation  
ε t  = ρε t −1 + ut 
where  
|ρ| < 1 is the serial correlation 
u  ~ N (0, σ 2 ) 
 Using the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure, the model to test hypothesis 2 is re-
estimated to correct for autocorrelation issues in the model. Table 4-12 reports the re-
estimated model results corrected for autocorrelation and provides the uncorrected 
model for comparison. While there are minor changes to significance levels and 
coefficient magnitude, the variable of interest, FAMILY, is still significant at 1% and 
experiences a slight increase in coefficient magnitude. Consequently, the finding for 
hypothesis 2 is robust after correcting for autocorrelation. 
Table 4-12 Cochrane-Orcutt correction for autocorrelation in H2 
Variable Uncorrected Corrected 
(Constant) 0.803*** 
(5.63) 
0.914*** 
(4.95) 
FAMILY 0.479*** 
(6.25) 
0.493*** 
(4.932) 
BLOCK 0.228*** 
(3.85) 
0.2*** 
(2.628) 
SIZE -0.048*** 
(-9.25) 
-0.066*** 
(-10.144) 
AGE -0.062*** 
(-3.52) 
-0.038* 
(-1.689) 
GROWTH 0.000 
(-0.01) 
-0.001 
(-0.332) 
BETA 0.036 
(1.2) 
0.072* 
(1.883) 
LEVERAGE -0.079*** 
(-8.68) 
-0.059*** 
(-6.358) 
Controls - GICS Sector YES YES 
Controls – Year YES YES 
   
Adjusted R Square 0.143 0.097 
Std. Error of the Est. 0.575 0.243 
F 26.062 17.071 
Sig. 0.000 0.000 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels  
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Similarly, the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure is used to re-estimate the model testing 
hypotheses 3. The results are reported in .  
Table 4-13, and both the uncorrected and corrected models are reported for comparison. 
While there are slight changes in the magnitudes of the coefficients, and some changes 
to significance levels, the conclusions from the initial findings still hold even when 
correcting for autocorrelation.  
Table 4-13 Cochrane-Orcutt correction for autocorrelation in H3-H8 
Variable Uncorrected  Corrected 
Fundamentals 
 
 
 (Constant) 
0.18 
(0.595)  
0.14 
(1.038) 
EPS (H3) 
0.024** 
(2.306)  
0.033*** 
(4.862) 
BVPS (H4) 
0.814*** 
(3.285)  
0.423** 
(2.1) 
H5-H6 - Accounting Information Quality 
  
DAQ 
-0.427* 
(-1.65) 
-0.415* 
(-1.925) 
EPS * DAQ (H5) 
-0.085*** 
(-3.717) 
-0.09*** 
(-5.31) 
BVPS * DAQ (H6) 
4.209*** 
(10.288) 
3.312*** 
(6.12) 
H7-H8 – Unidentifiable Intangible Assets 
  
FQ 
0.619*** 
(5.38) 
0.712*** 
(5.924) 
EPS * FQ (H7) 
0.073*** 
(19.369) 
0.069*** 
(16.759) 
BVPS * FQ (H8) 
1.074*** 
(17.247) 
1.213*** 
(14.477) 
    Controls –Block holders NO NO 
Controls - Firm Characteristics YES  YES 
Controls - GICS Sector YES  YES 
Controls – Year YES  YES 
  
 
 Adjusted R Square 0.909  0.887 
Std. Error of the Est. 1.327  1.102 
F 507.699  315.043 
Sig. 0.000  0.000 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels  
P is share price three months after a firm’s fiscal year end. BVPS is book value of equity per share. EPS is 
net income per share. DAQ is the discretionary accruals quality measure as estimated using the DD 
(2002) model as modified by McNichols (2002). FQ is the predicted factored q score. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. FAMILY is a continuous variable that accounts for the 
percentage of family ownership of the firm’s shares.  
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4.6.2 HETEROSCEDASTICITY 
This thesis proceeds to test for heteroscedasticity in the ordinary least squares 
models that were used to test the hypotheses. Using the Breusch-Pagan (1979) 
procedure for each regression, this thesis tests whether the estimated variances of the 
residuals depend upon the independent variables. The results are reported in Table 4-14. 
Table 4-14 Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity 
Hypothesis Concept Chi 2 
Hypothesis 1 Accounting Information Quality 42.57*** 
Hypothesis 2 Unidentified Intangible Assets 1326.27*** 
Hypotheses 3-8 Value-Relevance 3521.76*** 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels  
 
 The results indicate that all three models suffer from heteroscedasticity. To 
remedy this issue, this thesis follows White’s (1980) correction for heteroscedasticity by 
estimating the robust standard errors for the coefficients in each regression. The 
significance levels from the robust standard error do not change for the variables in the 
models used to test Hypothesis 1 and 2. The model used to test hypotheses 3-8 has 
minor changes in significance levels; these are reported in Table 4-15. As shown, all 
previously significant variables remain significant with the exception of EPS. Thus after 
estimating the robust standard errors for the EPS coefficient there is now evidence to 
suggest that hypothesis 3 should be rejected. Naturally, due to the various interaction 
effects in the full model between EPS and other control variables (firm characteristics, 
industry, and year) the actual significance of EPS may be reduced as its importance may 
be better captured through its various interaction effects. The other notable change in 
significance relates to hypothesis 5, the interaction effect of EPS * DAQ is now 
significant at 10 % (exact significance level calculated at 5.8 %). 
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Table 4-15 White’s correction in H3-H8 
Variable 
Original 
SE Sig. 
Robust SE 
Sig. Change 
Fundamentals 
  (Constant) 
   EPS (H3) ** 
 
YES 
BVPS (H4) *** ** YES 
H5-H6 - Accounting Information Quality 
DAQ * ** YES 
EPS * DAQ (H5) *** * YES 
BVPS * DAQ (H6) *** *** 
 H7-H8 – Unidentifiable Intangible Assets 
FQ *** *** 
 EPS * FQ (H7) *** *** 
 BVPS * FQ (H8) *** ***   
 Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels  
 
 
4.6.3 NORMALITY 
The ordinary least squared technique assumes that the residuals of a regression are 
normally distributed. To test for this assumption, this thesis uses the Shapiro-Wilk W 
test for normality. The results are reported in the table below. 
Table 4-16 Shapiro-Wilk W test for normality of residuals 
Hypothesis Concept Obs W V z Prob>z 
Hypothesis 1 Accounting Information Quality 570 0.96054 14.941 6.538 0.000 
Hypothesis 2 Unidentified Intangible Assets 2850 0.6895 507.806 16.049 0.000 
Hypotheses 3-15 Value-Relevance 2850 0.79499 335.273 14.979 0.000 
 
 As the test assumes normality, the results indicate that the normality assumption 
is violated for the OLS regressions used for hypotheses testing. While the robust 
standard errors estimated in the previous section are also robust to normality violation, 
this thesis proceeds to estimate bootstrapped standard errors to provide further evidence 
that the violation of normality does not drive the results. The bootstrap procedure 
follows the method of Neter et al. (1996) and uses 1,000 replications. Similarly to the 
results in the previous section, the significance levels for the variables in the regressions 
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used to test Hypothesis 1 and 2 are unchanged when using bootstrapped standard errors. 
In the model used to test hypotheses 3-8, there are minor changes in significance levels; 
these resemble the changes from the robust standard error comparison in the previous 
section. EPS is not found to be significant when using bootstrapped standard errors and 
further supports the rejection of H3.  
Table 4-17 H3-H8 significance levels after bootstrapping 
Variable 
Original 
SE Sig. 
Bootstrapped 
SE Sig. Change 
Fundamentals 
  (Constant) 
   EPS (H3) ** 
 
YES 
BVPS (H4) *** * YES 
H5-H6 - Accounting Information Quality 
DAQ * ** YES 
EPS * DAQ 
(H5) *** ** YES 
BVPS * DAQ 
(H6) *** *** 
 H7-H8 – Unidentifiable Intangible Assets 
FQ *** *** 
 EPS * FQ (H7) *** *** 
 BVPS * FQ 
(H8) *** ***   
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels  
 
 
4.6.4 MULTICOLLINEARITY  
The final diagnostic for this thesis is the test for multicollinearity. It refers to the 
possibility of near-linear relationships within the independent variables. In the presence 
of multicollinearity, the coefficients may be unstable and the standard errors inflated, 
meaning that possible significant results are observed to be non-significant. This thesis 
uses variance inflation factors (VIF) to test for the presence of multicollinearity in the 
main models used. As a general rule, VIF values above 5 indicate the presence of 
multicollinearity, but other authors use a more lenient rule of 10 (O’brien, 2007). First, 
the VIFs are estimated for the model that tests the relationship between family 
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ownership and accounting information. The results are presented in the table below and 
indicate that this model is not influenced by the presence of multicollinearity. 
Table 4-18 Family ownership and accounting information quality - VIF diagnostics 
Variable VIF 
AUDITCOM 1.04 
BIG4 1.03 
FAMILY 1.09 
BLOCK 1.08 
 
Next, the VIFs are estimated for the model that tests the relationship between 
family ownership and unidentifiable intangible assets. The results are presented in the 
table below. Once again, no evidence of multicollinearity amongst the independent 
variables is found. 
Table 4-19 Family ownership and unidentifiable intangible assets - VIF diagnostics 
Variable VIF 
FAMILY 1.17 
BLOCK 1.15 
SIZE 1.15 
AGE 1.11 
GROWTH 1.03 
BETA 1.03 
LEVERAGE 1.1 
Controls - GICS Sector YES 
Controls – Year YES 
 
 Finally, the VIFs are estimated for the main model of this thesis that tests H3-
H8. The table below indicates that there is an issue with multicollinearity, as several 
independent variables have VIFs of above 10, the most notable ones being EPS 
(405.493) and BVPS (136.16). It should be noted, however, that multicollinearity 
causes unstable coefficients and the lack of significant relationships. Any significant 
relationships that are found are not driven by the presence of multicollinearity. Instead, 
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multicollinearity may have caused some variables to show up as insignificant when in 
fact they are able to explain the variation in price. The fact that EPS and BVPS both 
have high VIF values is not surprising, as there are many interaction variables between 
these variables and the control variables.  
Table 4-20 Family ownership and value-relevance of accounting information - VIF 
diagnostics 
Variable VIF 
Fundamentals 
(Constant) 147.74 
EPS (H3) 405.93 
BVPS (H4) 136.16 
H5-H6 - Accounting Information 
Quality 
DAQ 1.37 
EPS * DAQ (H5) 2.88 
BVPS * DAQ (H6) 3.12 
H7-H8 – Unidentifiable Intangible 
Assets 
FQ 2.92 
EPS * FQ (H7) 3.53 
BVPS * FQ (H8) 3.66 
 
To address the issue of multicollinearity, there are several options. First, the 
correlated independent variables can be factored and thus form new variables. However, 
this method is not appropriate in this case. While the overall explanatory power of the 
model may increase, it would also become impossible to observe which of these 
factored independent variables are significant in explaining the dependent variable. 
Furthermore, multicollinearity causes a lack of significant relationships; in other words, 
significant relationships found in the model are in fact significant. The main issue is that 
their coefficients may be unstable and there may be independent variables that appeared 
non-significant but are in fact significant in explaining the variability in the price. This 
thesis chooses to be conservative in regards to the significance levels and accepts the 
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fact that EPS does not show up as significant in explaining price, as this variable in 
itself is not the focus of this thesis. 
 
4.6.5 CHANGES OF FINDINGS DUE TO ROBUSTNESS TESTING 
This section examined if the models used to test the hypotheses violated any of 
the statistical assumptions of ordinary least squares regressions. It was found that all 
four assumptions were violated. However, the conclusions drawn previously were still 
mostly robust to these violations based on additional testing. Nonetheless, after 
addressing for heteroscedasticity and normality issues in model 20, the conclusions 
regarding hypothesis 3 have changed as EPS was not shown to be significant when 
using robust and bootstrapped standard errors. However, the testing for multicollinearity 
indicated that the lack of significance could be related to the presence of 
multicollinearity. 
 
4.7 ROBUSTNESS OF CONSTRUCT OPERATIONALIZATION 
This section performs further robustness tests by using alternative 
operationalizations of the important constructs in this thesis and observing whether the 
results are sensitive to the choice of proxy. The constructs subjected to sensitivity 
testing are: (1) the family-owned firm definition; (2) the measure of accounting 
information quality; (3) and the measure for unidentifiable intangible assets.  
 
4.7.1 FAMILY-OWNED FIRM DEFINITION 
As mentioned in Chapter 2 and 3, the definition of family-owned firm is highly 
contested, as there is no accepted standard definition. This thesis used seminal prior 
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literature to define what constitutes a family-owned firm. In the table below, three 
alternative definitions (definitions 2 to 4) are provided in addition to the primary one 
(definition 1). 
Table 4-21 Alternative definitions of family-owned firm 
Definition Number of 
family-
owned firms 
Percent of 
sample 
1. One or more family members are shareholders, 
and one or more family members are officers or 
directors 
 
104 18.25% 
2. One or more family members are shareholders, 
and one or more family members are officers or 
directors (dummy variable) 
 
104 18.25% 
3. One or more family members are shareholders 
and the chief executive officer or chief financial 
officer is a family member 
 
75 13.16% 
4. The family has at least 20% of the votes, and the 
chief executive officer or chief financial officer is a 
family member 
51 8.95% 
 
 Using these alternative definitions, this thesis now re-estimates the relevant 
models. First, this thesis explores the relationship between family ownership and 
accounting information quality (H1). The results are presented below. They indicate that 
the relationship between family ownership and accounting information quality is not 
sensitive to the family-owned firm definition. The alternative definitions (2-4) are all 
shown to be significant and negative, which is in line with the main findings. It should 
be noted that definition number 2 is a dummy variable; thus, the FAMILY coefficient 
magnitude is not comparable to the other definitions. 
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Table 4-22 Family ownership and accounting information quality – family-owned firm 
definition sensitivity 
 
Family-owned firm Definition 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
(Constant) 0.048*** 
(3.57) 
0.046*** 
(3.437) 
0.048*** 
(3.571) 
0.047*** 
(3.526) 
AUDITCOM -0.009*** 
(-2.743) 
-0.008*** 
(-2.653) 
-0.009*** 
(-2.915) 
-0.009*** 
(-2.932) 
BIG4 -0.036*** 
(-3.716) 
-0.038*** 
(-3.826) 
-0.037*** 
(-3.761) 
-0.036*** 
(-3.712) 
FAMILY -0.091*** 
(-2.856) 
-0.032** 
(-2.582) 
-0.105*** 
(-2.911) 
-0.105*** 
(-2.886) 
BLOCK -0.003 
(-0.102) 
0.005 
(0.188) 
0 
(-0.019) 
0 
(0.009) 
 
    Adjusted R Sq. 0.051 0.048 0.051 0.051 
Std. Error of the Est. 0.111 0.112 0.111 0.111 
F 8.638 8.249 8.721 8.683 
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
This thesis proceeds to examine the relationship between family ownership and 
the level of unidentifiable intangible assets in the firm (H2). The results are presented 
below. They show that the relationship is not sensitive to the family-owned firm 
definition. Across all four definitions, there exists a significant and positive relationship 
between family ownership and the level of unidentifiable intangible assets. While the 
magnitude of the FAMILY coefficient varies, the direction and significance is the same 
across all definitions. 
Table 4-23 Family ownership and unidentifiable intangible assets – family-owned firm 
definition sensitivity 
  Family-owned firm Definition 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
(Constant) 0.803*** 
(5.631) 
0.775*** 
(5.464) 
0.824*** 
(5.765) 
0.846*** 
(5.92) 
FAMILY 0.479*** 
(6.245) 
0.242*** 
(8.182) 
0.409*** 
(4.776) 
0.294*** 
(3.404) 
BLOCK 0.228*** 
(3.853) 
0.212*** 
(3.689) 
0.196*** 
(3.32) 
0.173*** 
(2.938) 
SIZE -0.048*** 
(-9.25) 
-0.048*** 
(-9.322) 
-0.048*** 
(-9.203) 
-0.048*** 
(-9.177) 
AGE -0.062*** 
(-3.517) 
-0.06*** 
(-3.374) 
-0.064*** 
(-3.579) 
-0.066*** 
(-3.683) 
GROWTH 0 
(-0.007) 
0 
(-0.162) 
0 
(0.019) 
0 
(0.002) 
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  Family-owned firm Definition 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
BETA 0.036 
(1.203) 
0.039 
(1.31) 
0.028 
(0.952) 
0.028 
(0.947) 
LEVERAGE -0.079*** 
(-8.682) 
-0.076*** 
(-8.475) 
-0.077*** 
(-8.497) 
-0.076*** 
(-8.411) 
Controls – GICS Sector YES YES YES YES 
Controls – Year YES YES YES YES 
     
Adjusted R Square 0.143 0.151 0.138 0.135 
Std. Error of the Est. 0.575 0.572 0.577 0.578 
F 26.062 27.767 25.075 24.390 
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Based on these results this thesis can conclude that the relationship between 
family ownership and accounting information quality is not sensitive to the family-
owned firm definition choice (H1). Neither is the relationship between family 
ownership and unidentifiable intangible assets (H2).  
 
4.7.2 ACCOUNTING INFORMATION QUALITY MEASURE 
This thesis uses the DD (2002) model as modified by McNichols (2002) to 
estimate discretionary accruals quality and operationalize the construct of accounting 
information quality. This section re-estimates the models in this thesis using an 
alternative discretionary accruals model: the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 
1995). Using all the firms in the sample, a cross-sectional regression is estimated for 
each year and each GICS sector as follows: 
ti
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     (22) 
where the subscript i indicates firm i, ΔSales is the change in sales, PPE is net 
property, plant and equipment, and ΔAR is the change in accounts receivable. The 
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residual in equation (21) is the discretionary accruals, estimated from the modified 
Jones model and alternatively measures accounting information quality. 
Using this measure, this thesis re-examines the relationship between family 
ownership and accounting information quality. The findings in the table below show 
that the results are sensitive to the choice of discretionary accruals quality model. When 
using the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995) no relationship between family 
ownership and accounting information quality is observed. However, the findings also 
show that the control variables of AUDITCOM and BIG4 are also insignificant. 
Intuitively, these two control variables should influence accounting information quality, 
and, as they are not significant, it could be suggested that the modified Jones model is 
too noisy. Francis et al. (2005) considers the modified Jones model to be a noisy 
measure because it considers a large portion of the accruals as abnormal and only 
controls for a limited number of fundamental characteristics of the firm. 
Table 4-24 Family ownership and accounting information quality – accounting 
information quality measure sensitivity 
Variable DD Model Modified 
Jones Model 
(Constant) 0.048*** 
(3.57) 
0.037 
(1.178) 
AUDITCOM -0.009*** 
(-2.743) 
-0.005 
(-0.661) 
BIG4 -0.036*** 
(-3.716) 
-0.01 
(-0.426) 
BLOCK -0.003 
(-0.102) 
-0.004 
(-0.048) 
FAMILY -0.091*** 
(-2.856) 
-0.053 
(-0.895) 
   
Adjusted R Square 0.051 -0.004 
Std. Error of the Est. 0.111 0.263 
F 8.638 0.434 
Sig. 0.000 0.784 
  
Next, this thesis investigates the sensitivity of the moderating effect of 
accounting information quality on the value-relevance of both earnings and book value. 
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The main results are re-estimated and presented below. The main findings appear to be 
the same; the two-way interactions of EPS * DAQ (H5) and BVPS * DAQ (H6) 
maintain both their significance and directionality. Consequently, this result is not 
sensitive to the choice of accounting information quality model. The only noticeable 
change in the results is that book value is no longer shown to be value-relevant as a 
main effect (H4). However, the book value effect is captured through the multiple 
interactions in the model between BVPS and other variables. 
Table 4-25 Value-relevance of accounting information – accounting information quality 
measure sensitivity 
Variable DD 2002 Modified Jones 
Fundamentals 
 (Constant) 
0.18 
(0.595) 
0.27 
(0.884) 
EPS (H3) 
0.024** 
(2.306) 
0.033*** 
(3.134) 
BVPS (H4) 
0.814*** 
(3.285) 
0.391 
(1.569) 
H5-H6 - Accounting Information Quality 
DAQ 
-0.427* 
(-1.65) 
-0.077 
(-0.723) 
EPS * DAQ (H5) 
-0.085*** 
(-3.717) 
-0.028*** 
(-4.223) 
BVPS * DAQ (H6) 
4.209*** 
(10.288) 
0.492*** 
(4.688) 
H7-H8 – Unidentifiable Intangible Assets 
FQ 
0.619*** 
(5.38) 
0.645*** 
(5.628) 
EPS * FQ (H7) 
0.073*** 
(19.369) 
0.075*** 
(19.722) 
BVPS * FQ (H8) 
1.074*** 
(17.247) 
0.984*** 
(15.583) 
   Controls - Firm 
Characteristics 
YES YES 
Controls - GICS Sector YES YES 
Controls – Year YES YES 
   Adjusted R Square 0.909 0.905 
Std. Error of the Est. 1.327 1.352 
F 507.699 487.592 
Sig. 0.000 0.000 
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4.7.3 UNIDENTIFIABLE INTANGIBLE ASSETS MEASURE 
In this thesis, a new experimental variable was developed to operationalize the 
construct of unidentifiable intangible assets. This variable was Factored q, FQ, and was 
a one-factor solution of the variables Tobin’s q, industry-adjusted Tobin’s q, and 
hedonic q. An alternative way to measure unidentifiable intangible assets that may be 
easier to understand would be to group the sample firms into two groups: those with low 
levels of unidentifiable intangible assets and those with high levels of unidentifiable 
intangible assets. Using this method, firms with above median Tobin’s q were coded as 
1 for the alternative FQ measure and firms below median Tobin’s q were coded as 0 for 
FQ. This coding effectively created a high intangibility dummy. 
 This thesis then proceeds to re-examine the relationship between family 
ownership and unidentifiable intangible assets using this new measure. However, as this 
measure is categorical and not continuous, a logit regression was employed using the 
independent variables to predict their statistical significance in explaining membership 
in group 1 (high intangibility). The results are shown below. They indicate that the 
results of this relationship are indeed sensitive to the measure used to operationalize 
unidentifiable intangible assets. FAMILY is not found to be significant in predicting 
group membership in the high intangibility group. Interestingly, BLOCK is still shown 
to be significant using this alternative operationalization. Furthermore, additional 
sensitivity testing is performed by re-estimating the original model (OLS) using the 
original components of the FQ measure, namely the three variations of Tobin’s q, as the 
dependent variable. These results are reported in Appendix D, and show that each of the 
three variations produces qualitatively similar results as the factored FQ measure. 
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Table 4-26 Family ownership and unidentifiable intangible assets – unidentifiable 
intangible assets measure sensitivity 
Variable beta (z-test) 
(Constant) -0.19*** 
(0.759) 
FAMILY 28.861 
(0) 
BLOCK 0.141*** 
(0.577) 
SIZE -0.047*** 
(0.031) 
AGE -0.136*** 
(0.072) 
GROWTH 0.003*** 
(0.792) 
BETA 0.228*** 
(0.077) 
LEVERAGE -0.782*** 
(0) 
Controls - GICS Sector YES 
Controls – Year YES 
  
chi2(19) 1228.97 
chi2 0 
Log likelihood -1360.9826 
Pseudo r2 0.3111 
 
Next, the moderating role of unidentifiable intangible assets in the value-
relevance of earnings and book value is subjected to sensitivity testing. The results are 
presented below. The findings show that the moderating role of unidentifiable intangible 
assets is not sensitive to the measure utilized, as the significance and directionality is 
maintained when using the alternative dummy variable for FQ. Several other 
hypotheses, EPS (H3), BVPS (H4), and EPS * DAQ (H5), are no longer significant in 
explaining the variation in price. Thus, these relationships are sensitive to the 
operationalization of unidentifiable intangible assets. 
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Table 4-27 Value-relevance of accounting information – unidentifiable intangible assets 
measure sensitivity 
Variable Original FQ Dummy FQ 
Fundamentals 
 
(Constant) 
0.18 
(0.595) 
0.05 
(0.136) 
EPS (H3) 
0.024** 
(2.306) 
0.009 
(0.708) 
BVPS (H4) 
0.814*** 
(3.285) 
0.099 
(0.331) 
H5-H6 - Accounting Information Quality 
DAQ 
-0.427* 
(-1.65) 
0.041 
(0.134) 
EPS * DAQ (H5) 
-0.085*** 
(-3.717) 
-0.024 
(-0.869) 
BVPS * DAQ (H6) 
4.209*** 
(10.288) 
2.973*** 
(6.017) 
H7-H8 – Unidentifiable Intangible Assets 
FQ 
0.619*** 
(5.38) 
0.343*** 
(4.488) 
EPS * FQ (H7) 
0.073*** 
(19.369) 
0.046*** 
(11.947) 
BVPS * FQ (H8) 
1.074*** 
(17.247) 
0.299*** 
(5.384) 
   Controls - Firm Characteristics YES YES 
Controls - GICS Sector YES YES 
Controls – Year YES YES 
   Adjusted R Square 0.909 0.866 
Std. Error of the Est. 1.327 1.608 
F 507.699 329.975 
Sig. 0.000 0.000 
 
 
4.8 SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
This chapter provided empirical tests of the hypotheses presented in this thesis. 
The results showed that family ownership is positively related to accounting 
information quality (H1) and the level of unidentifiable intangible assets in the firm 
(H2). This relationship implies that family-owned firms report higher-quality 
accounting information and more faithfully represent the underlying economic nature of 
their firms. They also appear to have a higher level of unidentifiable intangible assets. 
The sensitivity analysis also confirmed that the findings for these two hypotheses is not 
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sensitive to the family-owned firm definition, but is sensitive to the choice of measure 
for  accounting information quality and unidentifiable intangible assets respectively. 
When using the alternative measure for accounting information quality, no significant 
relationships between family ownership and accounting information quality are found 
(H1). Furthermore, when using the alternative measure for unidentifiable intangible 
assets, the relationship between family ownership and unidentifiable intangible assets is 
not shown to be significant (H2). 
The results also indicate that there are positive relationships between earnings and 
firm value (H3) as well as book value and firm value (H4). However, the significance 
levels for the relationships were sensitive to model specification and statistical 
robustness.  
Accounting information quality was found to positively moderate the relationship 
between earnings and firm value (H5), while negatively moderating the relationship 
between book value and firm value (H6). This trend implies that when firms report 
high-quality accounting information, the market increases the weight on their earnings 
and decreases the weight on their book value. However, the negative moderating effect 
for book value does not imply that reporting high-quality information is undesirable, as 
the results merely show that there appears to be a trade-off between the weighting on 
earnings and book value, not the firm value itself. These results are not sensitive to 
either the choice of family-owned firm definition or the choice of accounting 
information quality measure. 
Furthermore, it was found that the relationship between earnings and firm value 
is positively moderated by the level of unidentifiable intangible assets (H7), and the 
relationship between book value and firm value is also positively moderated by 
unidentifiable intangible assets (H8). These relationships imply that when firms have 
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an increase in unidentifiable intangible assets, the market increases the multiple it pays 
for their earnings and book value. As such, the market realises that both the earnings 
and book values of these firms are understated. These results are not sensitive to either 
the choice of family-owned firm definition or the choice of unidentifiable intangible 
assets measure. 
 
Chapter 4: Results 107 
Table 4-28 Summary of results 
   
 Sensitivity 
 Hypothesis 
Expected 
direction 
Observed 
direction 
Robust 
direction 
Family-
owned firm 
definition 
Accounting information 
quality measure 
Unidentifiable 
intangible assets 
measure 
H1: There is a relationship between family ownership and 
accounting information quality. 
? + + + N.S. + 
H2: There is a relationship between family ownership and 
unidentifiable intangible assets. 
? + + + + N.S. 
H3: There is a positive relationship between earnings and firm 
value. 
+ + N.S. + + N.S. 
H4: There is a positive relationship between book value and firm 
value. 
+ + + N/A N.S. N.S. 
H5: The relationship between earnings and firm value is 
positively moderated by accounting information quality. 
+ + + N/A + N.S. 
H6: The relationship between book value and firm value is 
moderated by accounting information quality. 
? - - N/A - - 
H7: The relationship between earnings and firm value is 
moderated by the level of unidentifiable intangible assets. 
? + + N/A + + 
H8: The relationship between book value and firm value is 
moderated by the level of unidentifiable intangible assets. 
? + + N/A + + 
N.S. stands for not significant. 
N/A stands for not applicable.
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This thesis investigated the relationship between family ownership and the value-
relevance of accounting information. The theoretical development in Chapter 2 
proposed that the value-relevance of accounting information is moderated by its 
qualitative characteristics, specifically by its faithful representation and relevance. 
These moderators were established through normative theory derived from accounting 
standards and from positive theories developed through research. This thesis posited 
that family ownership is indirectly related to the value-relevance of accounting 
information, through its relationships to the two moderators faithful representation and 
relevance, which were operationalized as accounting information quality and 
unidentifiable intangible assets. This chapter contains the discussion and conclusions 
that can be drawn from the results that were presented in Chapter 4. The hypotheses are 
first discussed separately; afterwards, the results and conclusions from all hypotheses 
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are merged to unravel a higher order understanding of the contribution made in this 
thesis. Finally, the limitations and future research opportunities are discussed. 
 
5.1 H1: FAMILY OWNERSHIP AND ACCOUNTING INFORMATION 
QUALITY 
This thesis investigated the association between family ownership and accounting 
information quality (faithful representation) as proxied by discretionary accruals 
quality. It has been suggested that the traditional owner-manager agency conflict, Type I 
agency problem, is mitigated in publically listed family-owned firms (Anderson et al., 
2003; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Nevertheless, the 
concentration of ownership and management in these firms leads to Type II agency 
problems, as the family may act opportunistically and expropriate wealth from the firm 
at the expense of minority shareholders.  
Figure 5-1 Family ownership and accounting information quality 
Family 
Ownership
Accounting 
Information Quality
H1
 
Given this interesting agency context, considerable research has been conducted 
in this area. Prior studies have found conflicting evidence regarding this relationship. 
Studies from the US show a positive relationship between family ownership and 
accruals quality (Ali et al., 2007; Wang, 2006), while some non-US studies show a 
negative relationship (Kim & Yi, 2006; Prencipe et al., 2008; Yang, 2010). However, 
this prior work shares a common theme: it uses accruals quality measures that do not 
discriminate between accruals arising from the economic fundamentals of the firm and 
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accruals arising from earnings management. These economic fundamentals have been 
found to drive accruals in prior research, both in a US setting (Dechow & Dichev, 2002; 
Francis et al., 2005), and, more recently, within the Australian setting (Aldamen & 
Duncan, 2011; Kent et al., 2010). These studies have found that, when considering 
economic fundamentals of the firm, the conclusions regarding what drives accruals 
quality may change (Francis et al., 2005). Consequently, the existing evidence regarding 
the association between family ownership and accruals quality is not convincing. 
This thesis thus extended the research in this area by decomposing the accruals 
quality measure into innate and discretionary accruals and focusing on the relationship 
between family ownership and discretionary accruals specifically. It was found that 
family ownership is positively associated with accounting information quality. The 
evidence, which includes controls for governance, is consistent with Wang’s (2006) US 
evidence, indicating that family ownership has a positive relationship with accounting 
information quality. However, the findings of this thesis provide evidence that this 
effect is specific to discretionary accruals. The results imply that family ownership 
should be considered to be a sound governance mechanism, specifically in Australia, 
where high investor protection can mitigate the Type II agency problems that have been 
found to be present in other countries (La Porta et al., 1999). 
Furthermore, the results are not sensitive to the definition of family-owned firm. 
Three alternative family-owned firm definitions were used in the sensitivity analysis, 
and the results are consistent across all alternative definitions, showing that family 
ownership is positively related to accounting information quality. 
However, the results are sensitive to the operationalization of accounting 
information quality. No relationship between family ownership and accounting 
information quality was found when using the modified Jones model to estimate the 
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discretionary component of accrual. The alternative proxy was also not related to either 
the use of Big 4 auditors, number of members on the audit committee, or the level of 
block-holding within the firm. Consequently, it could be suggested that the alternative 
proxy may not be a suitable measure for accounting information quality as it was not 
related to either of the control variables and could instead represent white noise. This 
may also explain why recent research in the Australian setting has been using the DD 
(2002) model as modified by McNichols (2002) (Aldamen & Duncan, 2011; Kent et al., 
2010). 
Considering the results in conjunction with the findings from the sensitivity 
testing, this thesis provides evidence of a positive relationship between family 
ownership and accounting information quality. Furthermore, the results are robust to 
alternative family-owned firm definitions but are sensitive to the choice of proxy for 
accounting information quality. 
 
5.2 H2: FAMILY OWNERSHIP AND UNIDENTIFIABLE INTANGIBLE 
ASSETS 
This thesis also investigated the relationship between family ownership and the 
level of intangible assets within the firm. Prior research indicates that the nature of 
family-owned firms leads to an accumulation of unidentifiable intangible assets (Hasso 
& Duncan, 2012; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). 
Figure 5-2 Family ownership and unidentifiable intangible assets 
Family 
Ownership
Unidentifiable 
Intangible Assets
H2
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The long-term orientation of the family alters the managerial practices within the 
firm. First, the family name is often intertwined with the firm. The family has an 
incentive to build the firm’s brand by building strong relationships with customers and 
suppliers. Second, family-owned firms also tend to focus more heavily on human 
capital-developing activities. Due to their emotional connections to their firms, families 
usually provide workplaces not exclusively driven by the profit motive. This thesis 
operationalized the construct of unidentifiable intangible assets by using Tobin’s q. 
While accounting research and family-owned firm research has primarily used Tobin’s 
q as a measure of firm value, there exists a body of research that uses it as a measure of 
the intangible assets within a firm (Lev, 2001; Villalonga, 2004). The findings of prior 
family-owned firm research were used to support the developed hypotheses, as these 
studies often found a positive relationship between family ownership and Tobin’s q 
(Hasso & Duncan, 2012). This thesis posited that Tobin’s q was actually a proxy for 
unidentifiable intangible assets. Furthermore, to improve the research design, this thesis 
considered the following alternative Tobin’s q measures: an industry-adjusted measure, 
and a hedonic q measure developed by Villalonga (2004). These three q measures were 
factored into one variable that was used as a proxy for the level of unidentifiable assets 
within each firm. The choice to use a one-factor solution was driven by the desire to 
summarize the variation in the three different, yet related, estimations of q. 
This thesis found that family ownership is positively related to the level of 
unidentifiable intangible assets in the firm. We can, therefore, conclude that family-
owned firms tend to hold more unidentifiable intangible assets than non-family-owned 
firms. Although the family may negatively affect social capital through family feuds 
and human capital through nepotism, the results indicate that the positive impact of the 
family outweighs any negative impact.  
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Furthermore, the result was subjected to sensitivity testing. It was found that the 
result was not driven by the choice of family-owned firm definition as it was found that 
all three alternative definitions of family-owned firm also showed a positive relationship 
with unidentifiable intangible assets. This thesis also provides an alternative way of 
operationalizing the unidentifiable intangible assets within the firm in the sensitivity 
tests. A dummy variable was created, and firms that had above-median levels of Tobin’s 
q were considered to be highly intangible while firms that had below median values for 
Tobin’s q were considered to be of low intangibility. Using this alternative definition, a 
logit regression was used to predict group membership. This sensitivity test did not find 
any relationship between family ownership and unidentifiable intangible assets. 
Consequently, the finding for this hypothesis is sensitive to the unidentifiable intangible 
assets definition and operationalization. 
In summary, this thesis found a positive relationship between family ownership 
and unidentifiable intangible assets. The results were robust to alternative definitions of 
what constitutes a family-owned firm, but were sensitive to the operationalization of 
unidentifiable intangible assets. 
 
5.3 H3 AND H4: THE VALUE-RELEVANCE OF EARNINGS AND BOOK 
VALUE 
The tests of the two first hypotheses found evidence of a relationship between 
family ownership and accounting information quality as well as unidentifiable 
intangible assets. Having established these relationships, this thesis proceeded to 
examine the value-relevance of accounting information. 
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Prior literature has established that firm value can largely be explained by 
earnings and book value. While other relevant factors may impact value, these two 
accounts measures are commonly accepted as crucial for valuation (Collins et al., 1997). 
Figure 5-3 The relationship between earnings and book value and firm value 
Earnings
Firm Value
H3
Book Value H4
 
This thesis examined the value-relevance of earnings and book value through a 
traditional value-relevance methodology using the levels approach. Alternatively, it 
could have considered the changes in each of these accounting items; however, research 
has found that the changes approach is not suitable when the study has a focus on the 
book value of the firm (Barth et al., 1998a; Kothari & Zimmerman, 1995). As a result, 
this thesis used a levels approach. It was found that both earnings and book values were 
indeed value-relevant, as there was a significant and positive association between 
earnings and firm value as well as between book value and firm value. However, their 
value-relevance was sensitive to testing for statistical and construct operationalization 
robustness. This is most likely attributed to the fact that this thesis considered several 
control variables such as size, growth, leverage, negative earnings, year, and industry. In 
addition to using these control variables as fixed effects, each control variable was 
interacted with earnings and book value. As such, while earnings or book value may not 
appear as significant, as several of the control interactions with earnings and book value 
were still significant, their value-relevance was captured through these indirect 
relationships. Nonetheless, the value-relevance of earnings and book value was not at 
the core of this thesis and its contribution; rather, this thesis discussed how their value-
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relevance is moderated by accounting information quality and unidentifiable intangible 
assets. 
 
5.4 H5 AND H6: THE MODERATING ROLE OF ACCOUNTING 
INFORMATION QUALITY 
While value-relevance researchers appear to agree that not all information is 
equal, surprisingly little research has investigated the moderating impact of accounting 
information quality or earnings management upon the value-relevance of earnings and 
book value. 
The limited evidence available suggests that accounting information quality is 
value-relevant and that when the quality is high then the value-relevance of earnings 
increases. Christensen et al. (1999) found a negative relationship between the incentives 
for earnings management and the information content of earnings. Similarly, Marquardt 
and Wiedman (2004) found that the value-relevance of earnings decreases for firms 
where there is ex-post evidence of earnings management. Whelan and McNamara 
(2004) provided additional insights by differentiating between not only discretionary 
and non-discretionary accruals, but also by decomposing discretionary accruals into two 
components: short-term discretionary accruals and long-term discretionary accruals. In 
accordance to the authors’ expectations, they found that earnings management via long-
term discretionary accruals has a greater impact upon the value-relevance of earnings 
and book value as compared to via short-term discretionary accruals. 
Furthermore, the IFRS conceptual framework stresses that faithful representation 
is a primary characteristic of decision-useful information. In conjunction with the 
established evidence, this criterion necessitated this thesis to consider the role of 
accounting information quality in the conceptual model. As such, the moderating role of 
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accounting information quality on the value-relevance of earnings and book value was 
investigated. 
Figure 5-4 The moderating role of accounting information quality 
Accounting 
Information Quality
Earnings
Firm Value
Book Value
H6
H5
 
This thesis used the DD (2002) model as modified by McNichols (2002) to 
estimate discretionary accruals quality and thus empirically operationalize accounting 
information quality at the firm level. The results showed that accounting information 
quality is indeed value-relevant. It was found that firms that supplied accounting 
information of high quality had a higher weight (coefficient magnitude) upon their 
earnings; as such, accounting information quality positively moderated the relationship 
between earnings and firm value. Conversely, the weighting placed upon book value is 
decreased for these firms as the valuation shifts to a more earnings-based valuation. 
Thus, accounting information quality negatively moderates the relationship between 
book value and firm value. These results were then subjected to sensitivity testing using 
the modified Jones model to estimate the discretionary accruals quality on a firm level. 
The sensitivity test showed that the results were not sensitive to the choice of 
discretionary accruals model. 
In summary, this thesis provided further evidence of the importance of accounting 
information quality for value-relevance research. The results show that accounting 
information quality positively (negatively) moderates the relationship between earnings 
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(book value) and firm value. These results are robust to the use of an alternative proxy 
in the estimation of accounting information quality.  
 
5.5 H7 AND H8: THE MODERATING ROLE OF UNIDENTIFIABLE 
INTANGIBLE ASSETS 
In addition to investigating the moderating role of accounting information quality, 
this thesis also investigated the moderating role of unidentifiable intangible assets. In 
this respect, this thesis provided the first empirical test of its kind. Previous research has 
primarily noted that the accounting standards were deficient in recognizing intangible 
assets of firms, and specifically the unidentifiable intangible assets components of social 
capital (brand value) and human capital. For example, Barth et al. (1998) found that 
brand value estimates are value-relevant and provide incremental information content 
beyond earnings and book value when explaining the variation in firm value. However, 
as the brand is only one part of the unidentifiable intangible assets held by firms, the 
existing evidence may not have recognized the entire problem. This is also supported by 
Amir and Lev (1996), who found that the value-relevance of accounting information is 
lower in industries that tend to have higher levels of unidentifiable intangible assets. 
This thesis borrowed from the management literature and used Tobin’s q to 
estimate the unidentifiable intangible assets within each firm. However, given that 
Tobin’s q is inherently related to firm value, the measure in itself is not appropriate to 
use in value-relevance models, as it would introduce simultaneous equation bias. This 
could perhaps explain why it has not been used for this purpose in the past. To address 
this issue, this thesis used a two-stage least squares technique to regress each firm’s 
unidentifiable intangible asset measure upon variables that could explain the variation 
and used the predictive value of this regression for the final measure for unidentifiable 
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intangible assets. This remedied simultaneous equation bias and ensured that the 
variable still accounted for part of the variation in unidentifiable intangible assets 
holdings on a firm level. Using this measure, it was found that unidentifiable intangible 
assets moderate the value-relevance of earnings and book value. 
Figure 5-5 The moderating role of unidentifiable intangible assets 
Unidentifiable 
Intangible Assets
Earnings
Firm Value
Book Value
H8
H7
 
It was found that unidentifiable intangible assets positively moderated the 
relationships between both earnings/firm value and book value/firm value. In other 
words, firms that hold a high level of unidentifiable intangible assets are observed to be 
valued at a higher earnings and book value multiple. This confirmed much of the prior 
literature, which had noted that Tobin’s q is not an overall firm value measure but rather 
an outcome of understated book values stemming from unidentifiable intangible assets 
(Hasso & Duncan, 2012; Villalonga, 2004). 
These results were subject to sensitivity testing using a simple grouping of firms 
into low and high intangibility categories based on their Tobin’s q in relation to the 
median. The sensitivity testing showed that the results were not sensitive to the measure 
used in the primary analysis. 
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5.6 THE COMPLETE PICTURE 
This thesis examined the relationship between family ownership and the value-
relevance of accounting information. Prior research in this area was sparse and limited. 
This thesis addressed this gap by providing a deeper understanding of the issue in 
Chapter 2, by considering the exact pathways of how family ownership could affect the 
value-relevance of accounting information. Based on the review of both value-relevance 
and family-owned firm research, it was found that family ownership can potentially 
impact the value-relevance of accounting information through its relationships to the 
qualitative characteristics of accounting information, as operationalized by accounting 
information quality and unidentifiable intangible assets. The notion that the value-
relevance of accounting information would be impacted by these two constructs is 
supported by prior research and by the IFRS conceptual framework. Thus, this thesis 
used both a normative and a positive lens in constructing a conceptual model. 
The results showed positive relationships between family ownership and 
accounting information quality and between family ownership and unidentifiable 
intangible assets. These results suggest that family-owned firms supply accounting 
information of higher quality, as they have lower discretionary accruals, and this 
behavior implies that the reduction in Type I agency conflicts outweigh the potential 
increased Type II agency conflicts. Additionally, the results also support the notion that 
family ownership is positively related to the level of unidentifiable intangible assets 
within the firm. This result, the family effect on the increase in unidentifiable intangible 
assets, outweighs any potential detrimental effects due to nepotism or family feuds.  
Furthermore, accounting information quality and unidentifiable intangible assets 
were found to have an impact on the value-relevance of accounting information. 
Accounting information quality, operationalized as discretionary accrual quality, was 
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found to have a positive relationship with the value-relevance of earnings, while it had a 
negative relationship with the value-relevance of book value. These relationships 
suggest that firms that report information of poor quality are valued more based on their 
book value rather than on their earnings. It was also found that unidentifiable intangible 
assets had a positive relationship with the value-relevance of earnings and book value. 
This suggests that the market recognizes that both the earnings and book values of firms 
are understated relative to their holdings of unidentifiable intangible assets; therefore, it 
uses a higher multiple for earnings and book value in the valuation process.  
The results in Chapter 4 also considered the simple model of a direct family effect 
upon the value-relevance of earnings and book value as suggested by Cascino et al. 
(2010); however, no significant relationships were found. This result supported the 
conceptual model that had no direct link between family ownership and the value-
relevance of earnings and book value. However, when controlling for both accounting 
information quality and unidentifiable intangible assets, it was found that there was an 
unexplained negative family effect on both the value-relevance of earnings and book 
value. There was also a negative fixed effect based on the level of family ownership. In 
large, these unexplained effects suggest that there is still variation in price that cannot 
be explained by accounting information quality and unidentifiable intangible assets. It is 
also noteworthy that this residual family effect is negative on the whole. 
The unexplained family effect could be partially driven by the choice of proxies in 
the operationalization of constructs such as accounting information quality and 
unidentifiable intangible assets. If the proxies are not able to capture the underlying 
construct to the full extent, and if there is a systematic ownership bias in their 
deficiency, then there would be an unexplained family effect. However, it could also 
potentially be attributed to the notion that investors do not value accounting information 
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quality in the same way for both family and non-family-owned firms. Thus, if investors 
demand higher accounting information quality from family-owned firms in order to be 
assured that no Type II issues exist; then perhaps family-owned firms are penalized 
more heavily for reporting poor-quality accounting information than non-family-owned 
firms are.  
In summary, this thesis provides evidence that the conceptual model presented in 
Chapter 2 does in fact hold true, and documents a more refined pathway for the 
relationship between family ownership and the value-relevance of accounting 
information. However, the results also suggest that there are still unexplained family 
effects, and provide avenues of future research in this area. 
 
5.7 IMPLICATIONS OF THIS THESIS 
This section discusses the implications of this thesis. Specifically, it describes the 
implications for research, policy makers, and users of financial information. 
 
5.7.1 IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH 
This thesis has provided a number of important findings with implications for 
theory. Prior research suggested that accounting information quality moderates the 
value-relevance of accounting information. This thesis has confirmed this proposition 
and introduced the importance of unidentifiable intangible assets and how this concept 
can be controlled for in value-relevance studies. Based on the explanatory power of the 
models in this thesis, it is also shown that unidentifiable intangible assets provide 
significant additional explanatory power for firm value above and beyond that of 
accounting information quality. 
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This thesis has also shown that family ownership is associated with higher levels 
of unidentifiable intangible assets. This discovery has implications for any research that 
utilizes accounting information in its models. For example, prior research has utilized 
Tobin’s q as measure for firm value and often found that family-owned firms are valued 
higher by the market. However, this thesis proposed and found evidence suggesting that 
the higher Tobin’s q values are not an outcome of higher firm values but rather a greater 
understatement of the true assets of family-owned firms, and the market’s recognition of 
this deficiency has led to inflated Tobin’s q values. Any performance studies that use 
accounting-based performance ratios should limit their conclusions to accounting 
performance rather than true performance. 
 
5.7.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY MAKERS 
The implications for policy makers primarily stems from the evidence this thesis 
has provided regarding the value-relevance of unidentifiable intangible assets. The 
accounting standards have long been considered deficient when accounting for 
intangible assets (Cañibano et al., 2000). This thesis provides further evidence of this 
concern by showing that the market considers these unidentifiable intangible assets, and 
that they are represented in the market values of firms. While policy makers and 
standard setters may perceive this to be sufficient in the sense that the market adjusts for 
these unidentifiable intangible assets, the market’s adjustment is most likely crude and, 
as such, markets may not be operating at optimal efficiency. Additionally, through 
ignoring these unidentifiable intangible assets and not regulating their relevant 
information, users may sometimes be misled. Barth et al. (1998) showed that brand 
value estimates by the Financial Times are value-relevant. This introduces an interesting 
issue: while the estimates provided by the Financial Times and other providers may be 
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used for valuation purposes by investors, this information is not audited and there is 
little investor protection when it comes to the reliability of this information. Thus, the 
current conservative policy of not recognizing all intangible assets may in fact be 
introducing greater uncertainty and risk in the market. 
 
5.7.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR USERS OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
This thesis has shown that family ownership is associated with higher-quality 
accounting information and a higher level of unidentifiable intangible assets in firms. 
These two concepts are important for users of financial statements, as these statements 
merely present the amounts that are recognized according to the accounting standards. 
These accounting standards do not consider the quality of the amount recognized and 
the unrecognized intangible assets that do not qualify for recognition on financial 
statements. The quality of the accounting information assures the investors that they 
may rely on the information supplied, and the book value of firms provides investors 
with an understanding of the resources of the firm. However, as these two concepts are 
systematically different for family-owned firms, it becomes important for investors to 
delineate between family-owned firms and non-family-owned firms. 
 
5.8 LIMITATIONS OF THIS THESIS 
This section discusses the notable limitations of this thesis and considers how 
these limitations may have impacted the findings and, in turn, the conclusions made. 
This thesis used Australia as its study context. As such, the findings of this thesis may 
not be generalizable to other markets. Australia has a highly developed financial market 
with strong legal protection mechanisms (La Porta et al., 1999). This thesis found that 
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family ownership is associated with high accounting information quality. This could be 
partially explained by the legal system in Australia and its ability to protect minority 
shareholders from asset expropriation. In countries with weak minority shareholder 
protection laws, the observed relationship may not hold. However, this limitation should 
not be particularly significant to generalizations made about family-owned firms in 
other highly developed markets. Additionally, the Australian stock market is much 
smaller than, for example, the U.S. stock market; thus the findings may not be 
applicable to the largest of firms in these highly developed markets.  
This thesis also suffers from survival bias, as the accounting information quality 
measure used effectively required eight years of financial data to estimate. This biases 
the sample toward larger and more stable firms. As such, the results may not be 
generalizable to all firms, especially younger and smaller firms. However, the usage of 
these larger and more stable firms will most likely also decrease the variation in their 
accounting information quality measure; in turn, this would decrease the chance of 
finding significant relationships. Hence, any significant relationships found in this thesis 
are strong enough to withstand such effects.  Furthermore, the sample excluded firms in 
the financial services sector. While this presents a limitation to the generalizability of 
the findings to this particular sector, it is common practice in capital markets research to 
remove firms within this industry due to their distinctive regulatory situation. 
 Arguably, the primary limitation of this thesis stems from construct validity. 
This thesis and its theoretical development presented linkages between constructs, such 
as: family-owned firms, unidentifiable intangible assets, and accounting information 
quality. The methods used to operationalize them were grounded in prior literature to 
increase construct validity. However, as earnings management models are controversial 
and highly debated, the fact that they have been used in prior research may not in itself 
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guarantee construct validity. Similarly, there is no commonly accepted definition of 
what constitutes a family-owned firm, especially in the listed firm context. Furthermore, 
to operationalize unidentifiable intangible assets, this thesis used a new measure. While 
the measure was grounded in prior research, it had not been applied in a value-relevance 
context before. To address the issues relating to construct validity, this thesis used 
alternative operationalizations for all important constructs in the sensitivity analysis. 
This not only increases the construct validity of this thesis but also minimizes mono-
operational bias. 
 Furthermore, the family-owned firm definition employed in this thesis was 
restricted to firms that were founded by the family and not just firms where the family 
holds significant ownership. This choice was based on prior seminal work of Anderson 
and Reeb (2003) and Villalonga and Amit (2006). However, this means that any firm 
where there is a family who is a block-holder (but is not the founding family of the 
firm) is classified as a nonfamily firm. Additionally, as the alternative family-owned 
firm definitions used in the sensitivity testing were also restricted to founding family 
firms, the results of this thesis may not be generalizable to family-owned firms that 
were not founded by the family. 
 
5.9 FUTURE RESEARCH 
The theoretical model of this thesis and the findings provide numerous 
opportunities for future research. This section provides an overview of some of these 
potential opportunities. First, it would be extremely beneficial to test the theoretical 
development of this thesis in a different country setting. Such a test would also address 
a limitation of this thesis, namely that it is based in an Australian context. Future 
researchers would provide a great contribution by examining if the proposed 
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relationships hold in other countries. In particular, it would be interesting to investigate 
these issues in countries that don’t have highly developed markets and legal 
mechanisms. In these countries, the family may have a higher incentive to act 
opportunistically and expropriate wealth from minority shareholders. This thesis 
provided an empirical test of the accounting standards, operationalizing the construct of 
relevance by measuring the level of unidentifiable intangible assets within a firm. Prior 
research had only considered one part of the qualitative characteristics in value-
relevance studies, namely the construct of faithful representation that has often been 
operationalized by earnings management. As this thesis provided a way to 
operationalize both relevance and faithful representation, it would be fruitful to explore 
this relationship in more detail in other countries. 
Furthermore, this thesis used publically listed firms in its sample. As the majority 
of firms in the world are in fact private firms, it would be a great contribution to explore 
the theoretical model in a private firm setting. The relationships observed could 
potentially differ in a private firm setting, as there is lower transparency in these 
markets. However, future researchers should take care, as the dependent construct in 
this thesis is firm value. The lower efficiency in private markets could potentially be a 
major limitation for this type of future research. 
  
5.10 CONCLUSION 
In summary, this thesis investigated the value-relevance of family ownership. It 
was found that value-relevance of earnings and book value was moderated by 
accounting information quality and unidentifiable intangible assets. Family ownership 
was, in turn, found to be related to higher accounting information quality and a higher 
level of unidentifiable intangible assets. As such, family ownership may be considered 
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value-relevant through its effects on firms’ accounting information quality and 
unidentifiable intangible assets. Furthermore, an unexplained family effect was also 
found after controlling for the effect of accounting information quality and 
unidentifiable intangible assets. 
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APPENDIX A: FACTOR ANALYSIS  
 
Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean StDev n 
Tobin's q 2.338 9.495 2850 
Industry-adjusted q .000 9.367 2850 
Hedonic q .013 .266 2850 
 
Correlations 
  Tobin's q Industry-adjusted q Hedonic q 
Tobin's q 1.000 .987 .135 
Industry-adjusted q .987 1.000 .092 
Hedonic q .135 .092 1.000 
 
KMO and Bartlett’s Test 
Test Result 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .474 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 10543.301 
df 3 
Sig. 0.000 
  Total variance explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 2.012 67.066 67.066 2.012 67.066 67.066 
2 .975 32.516 99.582    
3 .013 .418 100.000    
 
Component matrix 
 
Component 
1 
Tobin's q .993 
Industry-adjusted q .988 
Hedonic q .222 
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APPENDIX B: HYPOTHESIS 2 COMPLETE RESULTS  
 
Full results for Hypothesis 2 
Variable beta (t-stat) beta (t-stat) 
(Constant) 0.903*** 
(6.349) 
0.803*** 
(5.631) 
FAMILY 0.479*** 
(6.245) 
BLOCK 0.228*** 
(3.853) 
SIZE -0.046*** 
(-8.906) 
-0.048*** 
(-9.25) 
AGE -0.072*** 
(-4.066) 
-0.062*** 
(-3.517) 
GROWTH 0.000 
(-0.009) 
0.000 
(-0.007) 
BETA -0.073*** 
(-8.033) 
-0.079*** 
(-8.682) 
LEVERAGE 0.032 
(1.062) 
0.036 
(1.203) 
Controls - GICS Sector   
CONSUMER DISCRETIONARY 0.216** 
(2.128) 
0.178* 
(1.764) 
CONSUMER STAPLES 0.105 
(0.958) 
0.108 
(0.997) 
ENERGY 0.042 
(0.401) 
0.062 
(0.59) 
HEALTH CARE 0.548*** 
(5.256) 
0.548*** 
(5.282) 
INDUSTRIALS 0.085 
(0.838) 
0.079 
(0.782) 
IT 0.193* 
(1.87) 
0.195* 
(1.892) 
MATERIALS 0.093 
(0.928) 
0.103 
(1.031) 
TELECOM 0.148 
(1.228) 
0.115 
(0.961) 
Controls - Year   
2003 -0.004 
(-0.114) 
-0.004 
(-0.127) 
2004 -0.027 
(-0.778) 
-0.028 
(-0.818) 
2005 -0.031 
(-0.907) 
-0.032 
(-0.932) 
2006 -0.029 
(-0.845) 
-0.03 
(-0.861) 
   
Adjusted R Square 0.131 0.143 
Std. Error of the Estimate 0.579 0.575 
F 26.180 26.062 
Sig. 0.000 0.000 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels  
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APPENDIX C: HYPOTHESES 3-8 COMPLETE RESULTS  
 
Full results for models 16 to 21 
Variable Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 
Fundamentals 
      
(Constant) 
0.019 
(0.045) 
0.062 
(0.149) 
0.283 
(0.924) 
0.18 
(0.595) 
0.005 
(0.012) 
0.314 
(1.038) 
EPS (H3) 
0.069*** 
(4.781) 
0.066*** 
(4.632) 
0.032*** 
(3.033) 
0.024** 
(2.306) 
0.077*** 
(4.986) 
0.043*** 
(3.862) 
BVPS (H4) 
-0.036 
(-0.107) 
0.185 
(0.545) 
0.388 
(1.551) 
0.814*** 
(3.285) 
-0.212 
(-0.6) 
0.513** 
(2.008) 
H5-H6 - Accounting Information Quality 
      
DAQ 
 
0.185 
(0.528) 
-0.427* 
(-1.65) 
-0.495* 
(-1.925) 
EPS * DAQ (H5) 
 
0.015 
(0.497) 
-0.085*** 
(-3.717) 
-0.1*** 
(-4.37) 
BVPS * DAQ (H6) 
 
1.994*** 
(3.557) 
4.209*** 
(10.288) 
3.702*** 
(9.13) 
H7-H8 – Unidentifiable Intangible Assets 
      
FQ 
  
0.653*** 
(5.673) 
0.619*** 
(5.38) 
0.821*** 
(6.924) 
EPS * FQ (H7) 
  
0.074*** 
(19.398) 
0.073*** 
(19.369) 
0.074*** 
(19.759) 
BVPS * FQ (H8) 
  
1.006*** 
(15.911) 
1.074*** 
(17.247) 
1.143*** 
(18.477) 
Family Ownership 
      
FAMILY 
    
0.065 
(0.226) 
-0.645*** 
(-3.009) 
EPS * FAMILY 
    
0.005 
(0.311) 
-0.031*** 
(-2.623) 
BVPS * FAMILY 
    
-0.11 
(-0.509) 
-0.509*** 
(-3.291) 
Controls - Block holders 
      
BLOCK 
    
0.075 
(0.354) 
-0.135 
(-0.898) 
EPS * BLOCK 
    
-0.023** 
(-2.091) 
-0.026*** 
(-3.16) 
BVPS* BLOCK 
    
0.192 
(1.129) 
0.407*** 
(3.344) 
Controls - Firm Characteristics 
      
GROWTH 
-0.083 
(-0.652) 
-0.058 
(-0.456) 
-0.026 
(-0.245) 
0.047 
(0.451) 
-0.082 
(-0.644) 
-0.047 
(-0.458) 
LEVERAGE 
0.334*** 
(3.299) 
0.343*** 
(3.401) 
0.158** 
(1.972) 
0.157** 
(2.005) 
0.334*** 
(3.287) 
0.064 
(0.822) 
LOSS 
0.017* 
(1.802) 
0.019** 
(1.967) 
0.001 
(0.172) 
0.005 
(0.663) 
0.017* 
(1.779) 
0.003 
(0.439) 
SMALL 
-0.187* 
(-1.956) 
-0.182* 
(-1.899) 
0.012 
(0.152) 
0.005 
(0.069) 
-0.188* 
(-1.952) 
0.068 
(0.91) 
EPS * GROWTH 
0.049*** 
(5.66) 
0.051*** 
(5.902) 
0.029*** 
(4.468) 
0.033*** 
(5.236) 
0.051*** 
(5.775) 
0.029*** 
(4.561) 
EPS * LEVERAGE 
-0.118*** 
(-15.606) 
-0.117*** 
(-14.241) 
-0.072*** 
(-12.424) 
-0.059*** 
(-9.446) 
-0.116*** 
(-15.309) 
-0.053*** 
(-8.668) 
EPS * LOSS 
-0.001 
(-1.387) 
-0.001 
(-1.386) 
-0.001* 
(-1.896) 
-0.001 
(-1.344) 
-0.001 
(-1.42) 
-0.001 
(-1.41) 
EPS * SMALL 
-0.001 
(-0.2) 
-0.003 
(-0.429) 
0.019*** 
(4.027) 
0.018*** 
(3.898) 
-0.002 
(-0.304) 
0.017*** 
(3.652) 
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BVPS * GROWTH 
0.8*** 
(4.134) 
0.74*** 
(3.829) 
0.555*** 
(3.813) 
0.404*** 
(2.821) 
0.815*** 
(4.173) 
0.503*** 
(3.568) 
BVPS * LEVERAGE 
0.306*** 
(3.694) 
0.358*** 
(4.15) 
0.012 
(0.192) 
0.158** 
(2.499) 
0.33*** 
(3.932) 
0.188*** 
(3.003) 
BVPS * LOSS 
-0.095*** 
(-3.674) 
-0.11*** 
(-4.237) 
-0.01 
(-0.529) 
-0.034* 
(-1.784) 
-0.094*** 
(-3.603) 
-0.027 
(-1.474) 
BVPS * SMALL 
-0.797*** 
(-7.656) 
-0.759*** 
(-7.309) 
-0.809*** 
(-10.544) 
-0.744*** 
(-9.881) 
-0.787*** 
(-7.509) 
-0.691*** 
(-9.31) 
Controls - GICS Sector 
      
CONSUMER DISCRETIONARY 
0.108 
(0.265) 
0.012 
(0.028) 
-0.308 
(-1.02) 
-0.289 
(-0.972) 
0.086 
(0.21) 
-0.299 
(-1.023) 
CONSUMER STAPLES 
-0.871* 
(-1.934) 
-0.885** 
(-1.968) 
-0.206 
(-0.619) 
-0.089 
(-0.271) 
-0.87* 
(-1.931) 
0.022 
(0.068) 
ENERGY 
-0.389 
(-0.931) 
-0.469 
(-1.115) 
-0.322 
(-1.043) 
-0.254 
(-0.832) 
-0.399 
(-0.953) 
-0.255 
(-0.855) 
HEALTH CARE 
0.377 
(0.908) 
0.344 
(0.826) 
-0.388 
(-1.227) 
-0.252 
(-0.809) 
0.355 
(0.855) 
-0.316 
(-1.04) 
INDUSTRIALS 
-0.051 
(-0.124) 
-0.099 
(-0.241) 
-0.372 
(-1.234) 
-0.311 
(-1.045) 
-0.076 
(-0.187) 
-0.319 
(-1.095) 
IT 
0.007 
(0.018) 
-0.069 
(-0.165) 
-0.397 
(-1.289) 
-0.314 
(-1.031) 
-0.004 
(-0.009) 
-0.341 
(-1.144) 
MATERIALS 
-0.35 
(-0.871) 
-0.437 
(-1.074) 
-0.512* 
(-1.721) 
-0.441 
(-1.493) 
-0.364 
(-0.904) 
-0.435 
(-1.509) 
TELECOM 
-0.03 
(-0.061) 
-0.093 
(-0.192) 
-0.363 
(-1.012) 
-0.329 
(-0.934) 
-0.06 
(-0.124) 
-0.333 
(-0.965) 
EPS * CONSUMER DISCRETIONARY 
0.022 
(1.616) 
0.022 
(1.609) 
0.024** 
(2.405) 
0.026*** 
(2.635) 
0.02 
(1.428) 
0.017* 
(1.729) 
EPS * CONSUMER STAPLES 
-0.013 
(-0.945) 
-0.013 
(-0.925) 
0.006 
(0.621) 
0.009 
(0.913) 
-0.013 
(-0.964) 
0.003 
(0.303) 
EPS * ENERGY 
-0.033** 
(-2.201) 
-0.03** 
(-2.007) 
0.005 
(0.415) 
0.017 
(1.512) 
-0.035** 
(-2.251) 
0.008 
(0.755) 
EPS * HEALTH CARE 
0.076*** 
(5.386) 
0.076*** 
(5.413) 
-0.01 
(-0.895) 
-0.003 
(-0.306) 
0.073*** 
(5.067) 
-0.015 
(-1.377) 
EPS * INDUSTRIALS 
-0.007 
(-0.538) 
-0.009 
(-0.65) 
0.008 
(0.841) 
0.011 
(1.094) 
-0.007 
(-0.542) 
0.005 
(0.504) 
EPS * IT 
0.023 
(1.442) 
0.022 
(1.357) 
0.014 
(1.221) 
0.019 
(1.637) 
0.021 
(1.328) 
0.01 
(0.831) 
EPS * MATERIALS 
-0.013 
(-0.966) 
-0.012 
(-0.875) 
0 
(0.03) 
0.009 
(0.866) 
-0.012 
(-0.909) 
0.002 
(0.217) 
EPS * TELECOM 
-0.001 
(-0.053) 
-0.001 
(-0.05) 
0.036*** 
(2.801) 
0.037*** 
(2.936) 
0.002 
(0.096) 
0.031** 
(2.534) 
BVPS * CONSUMER DISCRETIONARY 
0.372 
(1.153) 
0.275 
(0.857) 
0.61** 
(2.564) 
0.439* 
(1.881) 
0.494 
(1.51) 
0.707*** 
(3.047) 
BVPS * CONSUMER STAPLES 
1.176*** 
(3.617) 
1.051*** 
(3.241) 
0.991*** 
(4.129) 
0.77*** 
(3.264) 
1.262*** 
(3.836) 
0.808*** 
(3.459) 
BVPS * ENERGY 
1.522*** 
(4.47) 
1.319*** 
(3.851) 
1.231*** 
(4.879) 
0.809*** 
(3.237) 
1.624*** 
(4.678) 
0.929*** 
(3.725) 
BVPS * HEALTH CARE 
0.836** 
(2.533) 
0.585* 
(1.759) 
0.776*** 
(3.139) 
0.303 
(1.235) 
0.968*** 
(2.876) 
0.468* 
(1.908) 
BVPS * INDUSTRIALS 
0.584* 
(1.792) 
0.439 
(1.346) 
0.893*** 
(3.711) 
0.633*** 
(2.676) 
0.683** 
(2.072) 
0.808*** 
(3.451) 
BVPS * IT 
0.378 
(0.827) 
0.288 
(0.629) 
0.8** 
(2.354) 
0.537 
(1.606) 
0.49 
(1.067) 
0.709** 
(2.153) 
BVPS * MATERIALS 
1.043*** 
(3.21) 
0.868*** 
(2.658) 
1.282*** 
(5.348) 
0.929*** 
(3.919) 
1.121*** 
(3.417) 
1.036*** 
(4.426) 
BVPS * TELECOM 
0.853 
(1.454) 
0.725 
(1.24) 
1.424*** 
(3.282) 
1.213*** 
(2.854) 
0.979* 
(1.647) 
1.474*** 
(3.499) 
Controls - Year 
      
2003 
0.013 
(0.099) 
0.017 
(0.134) 
-0.074 
(-0.79) 
-0.066 
(-0.717) 
0.011 
(0.084) 
-0.075 
(-0.838) 
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2004 
0.016 
(0.125) 
0.01 
(0.082) 
0.017 
(0.185) 
0.004 
(0.042) 
0.016 
(0.122) 
0.001 
(0.016) 
2005 
0.104 
(0.808) 
0.092 
(0.72) 
0.118 
(1.24) 
0.086 
(0.927) 
0.105 
(0.818) 
0.089 
(0.974) 
2006 
0.319** 
(2.478) 
0.317** 
(2.472) 
0.243** 
(2.539) 
0.23** 
(2.461) 
0.323** 
(2.51) 
0.249*** 
(2.716) 
EPS * 2003 
-0.009 
(-1.522) 
-0.009 
(-1.56) 
0 
(0.015) 
-0.002 
(-0.423) 
-0.009 
(-1.483) 
-0.003 
(-0.605) 
EPS * 2004 
0 
(0.018) 
0 
(0.059) 
0.005 
(1.09) 
0.003 
(0.714) 
-0.001 
(-0.186) 
0.001 
(0.248) 
EPS * 2005 
0.007 
(1.167) 
0.006 
(0.998) 
0.011** 
(2.281) 
0.006 
(1.373) 
0.006 
(1.009) 
0.004 
(0.942) 
EPS * 2006 
0.013** 
(2.169) 
0.013** 
(2.024) 
0.009** 
(1.977) 
0.007* 
(1.659) 
0.013** 
(2.134) 
0.009** 
(1.992) 
BVPS * 2003 
-0.094 
(-1.091) 
-0.093 
(-1.082) 
-0.007 
(-0.107) 
0.005 
(0.078) 
-0.096 
(-1.114) 
0.025 
(0.416) 
BVPS * 2004 
-0.03 
(-0.346) 
-0.025 
(-0.29) 
0.045 
(0.705) 
0.069 
(1.1) 
-0.014 
(-0.162) 
0.11* 
(1.774) 
BVPS * 2005 
-0.029 
(-0.312) 
-0.005 
(-0.055) 
0.034 
(0.507) 
0.099 
(1.488) 
-0.018 
(-0.192) 
0.139** 
(2.117) 
BVPS * 2006 
-0.338*** 
(-3.657) 
-0.331*** 
(-3.601) 
0.007 
(0.104) 
0.019 
(0.279) 
-0.345*** 
(-3.73) 
0.009 
(0.132) 
       Adjusted R Square 0.825 0.827 0.905 0.909 0.825 0.913 
Std. Error of the Est. 1.840 1.830 1.357 1.327 1.839 1.297 
F 269.129 257.231 511.023 507.699 240.494 482.710 
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels  
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APPENDIX D: HYPOTHESIS 2 SENSITIVITY TESTING 
 
This appendix contains the results for hypothesis 2 using alternate definitions of 
unidentifiable intangible asset. As observed below, the FAMILY effect is stable and is 
not sensitive to the choice of proxy. 
Variable  FQ Tobin’s Q Industry-
adjusted Q 
Hedonic Q 
(Constant)  0.803*** 
(5.631) 
0.808*** 
(5.507) 
0.834*** 
(5.388) 
0.854*** 
(5.294) 
FAMILY 0.479*** 
(6.245) 
0.483*** 
(6.123) 
0.504*** 
(6.057) 
0.504*** 
(5.811) 
BLOCK 0.228*** 
(3.853) 
0.236*** 
(3.878) 
0.263*** 
(4.088) 
0.247*** 
(3.69) 
SIZE  -0.048*** 
(-9.25) 
-0.048*** 
(-8.995) 
-0.05*** 
(-8.834) 
-0.05*** 
(-8.574) 
AGE  -0.062*** 
(-3.517) 
-0.066*** 
(-3.622) 
-0.066*** 
(-3.427) 
-0.066*** 
(-3.288) 
GROWTH  0.000 
(-0.007) 
0.000 
(-0.091) 
0.000 
(-0.08) 
0.000 
(-0.039) 
BETA  -0.079*** 
(-8.682) 
0.022 
(0.714) 
0.019 
(0.597) 
0.023 
(0.684) 
LEVERAGE  0.036 
(1.203) 
-0.078*** 
(-8.349) 
-0.079*** 
(-8.07) 
-0.08*** 
(-7.86) 
Controls - GICS Sector  YES YES YES YES 
Controls – Year  YES YES YES YES 
      
Adjusted R Square  0.143 0.134 0.125 0.118 
Std. Error of the Estimate  0.575 0.592 0.625 0.651 
F  26.062 24.292 22.463 21.022 
Sig.  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
n  2850 2850 2850 2850 
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels  
 
FAMILY is a continuous variable that accounts for the percentage of family ownership of the firm’s 
shares. BLOCK is a continuous variable that accounts for the percentage of the firm’s shares that is held 
by block holders (excluding family ownership). SIZE is the natural logarithm of the average total assets 
for the year. AGE is the natural logarithm of the number of years since incorporation. GROWTH is the 
sales growth in the past year. BETA is a proxy for market risk and is based on weekly share prices. 
LEVERAGE is total debt divided by the market value of equity at the end of the financial year. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
 
